IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

[1]         On May 15, 2023, after a trial, Sable Raven Thom Jamerson was found guilty of sexual assault of the complainant R.H.B. [name redacted] in Vancouver, British Columbia, on or about July 17, 2019, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Ms. Jamerson is before the Court for sentencing. Sentencing has been delayed due to Ms. Jamerson’s change of counsel and further defence adjournments to secure medical information from Ms. Jamerson’s treating physicians.

[2]         The circumstances of the offence, more fully set out in R. v. Jamerson, 2023 BCPC 95, are summarized below.

[3]         In 2019, Ms. Jamerson and her common-law partner lived in a two-bedroom apartment in Vancouver. They agreed to host the complainant, who was her partner’s niece, for an overnight stay in their apartment. The teenage complainant had recently moved to Canada from overseas to attend university on Vancouver Island. She was visiting Vancouver to see a friend off at the airport. She arranged to see her uncle and Ms. Jamerson. The plan was to overnight with them before returning to Vancouver Island. Ms. Jamerson was in her early 40s and the complainant was 18 years of age.

[4]         Ms. Jamerson and the complainant socialized in the living room well past midnight. They sat on the sofa and conversed about personal matters. The complainant shared some highly personal and intimate information with Ms. Jamerson who does not dispute the general nature of their conversation.

[5]         On that evening, each consumed alcoholic drinks, including cider, wine, and whisky, and shared a small amount of marijuana.

[6]         At some point, the complainant drifted off to sleep on the sofa. She was awakened by a feeling of pain caused by Ms. Jamerson assaulting her sexually by digital penetration. The complainant described a sensation of acute pain. The complainant did not consent and could not have consented, as she had been asleep. She pretended to have just awakened, got up from the sofa, and quickly made her way to her bedroom, locking the door behind her.

[7]         The next morning, the complainant left the apartment without saying goodbye. On her return to Vancouver Island, she sought mental health care at a hospital.

[8]         At the sentencing hearing, the complainant provided a comprehensive Victim Impact Statement.

[9]         Ms. Jamerson was born in 1976 in Saskatchewan. She is now aged 47 years. She has both African and Indigenous ancestry. She is one of four children in a blended family. Her biological father abandoned the family when she was age 2 and she was raised in a household where her single mother struggled financially, often relying on social assistance.

[10]      Ms. Jamerson recalls she did not experience or see any abuse in her childhood home.

[11]      She graduated from high school in 1995 and moved to Vancouver at age 18. At age 27, she entered into a relationship with the complainant’s uncle, J.B. They separated for five years but reconciled, and have been life partners for 15 of the 20 years they have known each other.

[12]      Ms. Jamerson does not use illicit substances. She describes herself to be a moderate drinker and a regular user of marijuana.

[13]      Ms. Jamerson received a pastry chef certificate from Vancouver Community College in 2000. Until her recent health challenges she worked regularly at various hotels in Vancouver as a pastry chef. She is presently unemployed because of underlying Crohn’s disease, with attendant gastrointestinal (GI) health complications.

[14]      Subsequent to the criminal proceedings, Ms. Jamerson sought clinical counselling but did not reveal to her counsellor the circumstances surrounding her conviction.

[15]      The foregoing biographical information with respect to Ms. Jamerson was contained in the pre-sentence report prepared by Probation Officer Tod Taylor.

[16]      In the section titled “Attitude and Understanding Regarding the Offence”, the report notes that Ms. Jamerson denies the sexual assault, and appears to blame the victim. Ms. Jamerson said that she kissed the complainant after the complainant revealed to her that she found women attractive, and because she felt sorry for her in not having an outlet for sharing her sexuality. In a similar vein of victim blaming, the complainant’s uncle, J.B., blames the complainant for fabricating a lie about his partner, Ms. Jamerson.

[17]      The pre-sentence report concludes that there are limited supports and programming for female sexual offenders and, in the main, the programming is generalized counselling and support. However, as noted in the summary, victim blaming places additional challenges and barriers to rehabilitation. The report indicates that generally female sexual offenders are at a low risk to reoffend.

[18]      Ms. Jamerson has tendered evidence of her underlying health challenges in medical letters, which I have reviewed. Her gastroenterologist Dr. Salh indicates that Ms. Jamerson suffers from Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis, the progression of which in 2017 was life threatening and required a bowel resection and placement of a stoma. The stoma, an opening in the abdomen region, remains in place. She will require ongoing monitoring of her disease and if sufficiently stabilized she may be a candidate for further surgeries including the reversal of her stoma. In the opinion of Dr. Salh, the time frame for the surgeries is likely within one to two years.

[19]      Ms. Jamerson’s orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Lisa Howard confirms ongoing avascular necrosis caused by the adverse effects of her Crohn’s medications. The necrosis required Ms. Jamerson to undergo successful hip joint replacement surgery of both hips in 2022, and left knee surgery in December 2023. Her right knee is being monitored for degenerative deterioration but surgery is not imminent at this time. Ms. Jamerson will need to engage in physiotherapy and continue with steroid injections and a medication regimen of infusions to manage her Crohn’s disease.

[20]      As a result of this medical history, Ms. Jamerson was approved to receive disability benefits in May 2022.

[21]      Ms. Jamerson submits that she suffers ongoing, significant pain and has impaired functioning and limited mobility. She requires regular physiotherapy and the use of mobility aids. She has relied on her partner to support her post-surgically in functioning and treatment needs. Her partner has provided a letter to the Court to this effect.

[22]      The complainant R.H.B. provided a written Victim Impact Statement that she read out in court.

[23]      She describes the deep and lasting adverse impact the assault has had, and continues to have, on her emotional and economic well-being. She feels an overall lack of security and trust in her relationships, and has feelings of discomfort in intimacy. She suffers from ongoing anxiety, depression and insomnia. She has needed therapy to help her deal with betrayal from someone she considered a family member who caused her harm and pain. She suffered economic losses due to taking time off work to process the legal and emotional after-effects of the assault. She was forced to return to the workplace before she was ready because she could not afford to lose income needed to support herself.

[24]      R.H.B. spoke eloquently about how she has been hurt by someone who she saw as an aunt and a role model, someone she trusted enough to share personal dilemmas and confidences with. She worries that she will never fully heal from this trauma. I found R.H.B.’s statement to be insightful and compelling.

[25]      The Crown seeks a custodial sentence of 14 months, followed by two years of probation. It seeks a DNA order and a SOIRA order.

[26]      The defence proposes a conditional sentence order (CSO) of 18 months to be served in the community under supervision, followed by a probation order of up to two years.

[27]      Counsel have provided the court with the following cases in support of their submissions.

[28]      The Crown relies on R. v. Rosenthal, 2015 YKCA 1; R. v. Daychief, 2023 BCPC 62; R. v. Webber, 2021 BCSC 1194; R. v. M.R., 2018 ONSC 583; R. v. Delaney, 2018 ONCJ 984; and R. v. Lemmen, 2020 BCPC 67.

[29]      The defence relies on R. v. Adubofour-Poku, 2017 BCPC 192; R. v. Dhaliwal, 2020 BCPC 215; R. v. Zarpa, 2009 NLTD 178; R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2020 BCSC 308; R. v. Chen, 2019 BCSC 1290; R. v. Tuffs, 2011 SKQB 441; R. v. Hans, 2016 BCPC 222; R. v. Cadman, 2016 BCSC 474; R. v. Yusuf, 2011 BCSC 626; R. v. Browne, 2021 ONSC 6097; R. v. Ralph, 2014 BCSC 467, and R. v. T.H., 2024 BCCA 123.

[30]      The sentencing process is governed by the legislative framework outlined in s. 718 to s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

[31]      Section 718 of the Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect the public and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. To achieve this purpose, sentencing judges are required to undertake an individualized assessment of the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender in committing it, and to balance all relevant sentencing objectives and principles to arrive at a just sentence.

[32]      The objectives of sentencing include denunciation of the unlawful conduct, deterrence of the offender and others from committing similar offences, separation of the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation of the offender, reparation for harm done, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender, including an acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[33]      Section 718.1 of the Code requires the sentencing judge to take into account the gravity of the offence, assessed by the seriousness of the offending and the harm caused to the victim, as well as harm to society, by the breach of its values. Also relevant is the degree of responsibility of the offender in committing the offence, which focuses on the moral culpability or fault of the offender, having regard to their individual circumstances, maturity, level of functioning, motivation, and other factors.

[34]      A proportionate sentence which balances these two considerations is said to be the cornerstone principle of sentencing in determining a “fair, fit and principled sanction”: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at para. 10; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at para. 40; R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para. 37.

[35]      Section 718.2 of the Code sets out a number of secondary sentencing principles which must be considered in determining the sentence, including assessing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court must impose the least restrictive sanction that is reasonable and consistent with the harm done, after considering the sentencing factors including proportionality, parity and restraint.

[36]      In determining the gravity of the offence, I take into account the type and nature of the assault, the context in which the assault occurred, the extent of harm caused, and the degree of vulnerability of the complainant.

[37]      The offending in this case was a serious violation of the bodily integrity of the victim because of the invasive nature of the act of digital penetration. The degree of physical interference was significant because the penetrative acts were highly intrusive and harmful to R.H.B.’s sexual and bodily integrity.

[38]      The assault occurred while the complainant was asleep. She was in no position to anticipate or fend off the assault.

[39]      The assault was of a short duration, likely less than a few minutes, and no additional violence preceded, accompanied or followed the offending behaviour.

[40]      I accept that the impact of the assault on the complainant’s psychological and emotional health has been and remains profoundly traumatic.

[41]      The case authorities I have reviewed indicate that sexual assault by digital penetration is a serious offence. The Yukon Court of Appeal in Rosenthal observed that there is no logical basis on which to exclude sexual assault by digital penetration from the range applicable to cases involving sexual intercourse: at paras. 7-8.

[42]      In R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, the SCC noted that the harms caused by digital penetration and penile penetration are not dissimilar, speaking specifically in that case to sexual crimes perpetrated against children, but not restricting the analysis to child victims of crime. As noted succinctly in R. v. Daychief at para. 57:

[43]      In assessing the degree of responsibility of Ms. Jamerson in committing the offence, I note that the offending occurred in Ms. Jamerson’s home and the home of R.H.B.’s uncle. It was an environment in which R.H.B. had implicit trust that she would be secure and safe. The familial context is a relevant factor in the moral culpability of Ms. Jamerson because she was the mature adult and R.H.B. was age 18.

[44]      The offending took place at a time when R.H.B. was trying to navigate her own sexual identity. Ms. Jamerson knew R.H.B was in a place of vulnerability when she sought counsel and support from her. R.H.B. believed Ms. Jamerson was a trusted confidante. In that context, Ms. Jamerson’s motivations in violating R.H.B. were self-serving and morally indefensible. She has caused great harm to the complainant.

[45]      In assessing the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender’s responsibility, I conclude that Ms. Jamerson’s offending was serious, invasive, violative, and she bears a high degree of moral blameworthiness.

[46]      The primary sentencing objectives are:

[47]      Rehabilitation is a relevant sentencing objective. The path forward in rehabilitation often requires that an offender be willing to examine the factors that may have driven them to commit sexual assault and their own role in the offence. Rehabilitation is very closely linked to an acknowledgement of harm caused by the sexual assault, which is not present in this case.

[48]      If the offender is unable or unwilling to critically self-examine their own functioning or accept their role in the wrongdoing, as noted in the pre-sentence report, then it is difficult to place much weight on rehabilitation as an objective in determining sentence.

[49]      Aggravating factors on sentencing are as follows:

[50]      The relevant mitigating factors with respect to Ms. Jamerson are that she:

[51]      I will discuss Ms. Jamerson’s health as a consideration in sentencing later in these reasons.

[52]      Ms. Jamerson is of Indigenous and African ancestry. In the pre-sentence report, Ms. Jamerson did not outline the impact of this background on her upbringing or life opportunities. Due to her membership in two marginalized, minority communities, with the intersectionality between racism and colonialism, I accept that she likely experienced some degree of marginalization. She described being raised in a single parent limited-income household but had a good upbringing overall. Her ancestry is a relevant but not prominent factor in the overall assessment of her personal circumstances.

[53]      I turn now to the legal authorities on sentencing.

[54]      Previously decided case authorities provide guidance to a sentencing judge, in that sentences imposed on similarly situated offenders committing similar crimes in similar circumstances can give guidance in crafting a proportionate and individualized sentence. In R. v. Friesen, the SCC said:

[55]      I start first with the general observation by Justice Willock, as he then was, in R. v. Yamelst, 2013 BCSC 1689 at para. 26 that:

[56]      I have considered the case authorities submitted by counsel. Many of the cases are dated, but the most helpful cases in assessing parity and proportionality involve sexually penetrative acts on vulnerable, sleeping victims decided by jurists in this province.

[57]      Two of the more recent and relevant cases from British Columbia are R. v. Daychief and R. v. Webber.

[58]      In R. v. Daychief, a first time offender with strong community support was sentenced on conviction after trial to custody of 12 months followed by 18 months’ probation. The fact that the victim was sleeping when the assault occurred was an aggravating factor. A conditional sentence order was rejected as a fit sentence.

[59]      In R. v. Webber, the 17 year old complainant passed out or fell asleep and awoke to find that Mr. Webber had removed her pants and underwear and was digitally penetrating her while also attempting to remove her top. He was found to have reduced moral blameworthiness by reason of his developmental disability and lack of maturity. He had no criminal record and came from highly disadvantaged circumstances. The Court took into account relevant Gladue factors in mitigation of sentence, and imposed a 12-month jail sentence with two years’ probation for the sexual touching and digital penetration of a sleeping victim.

[60]      In R. v. Eustache, 2014 BCCA 337, the offender sexually assaulted an unconscious victim who had just turned 18 years old by removing her panties and rubbing his bare genitals against hers. The 12 month custodial sentence and two years’ probation was upheld on appeal, with the Court noting at para. 15 that the Crown and defence were in agreement that the upper range was three years.

[61]      In R. v. Rosenthal, the accused digitally penetrated the sleeping victim. She woke up and told him she was not interested in having sex and he removed his hand. The accused had no record. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown appeal against a two year suspended sentence and imposed a sentence of 14 months’ incarceration. Significantly, the Court acknowledged, at para. 8, that digital penetration is a serious and invasive form of sexual assault for which the range of sentence is 12-30 months’ custody.

[62]      The defence cases that approximate a similar factual underpinning as in this case include R. v. Tuffs, a 2011 Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench decision where the accused put his hands down the victim’s pants, and tried to kiss her. He received a suspended sentence, with 18 months’ probation because his family was dependent on him. The Court noted at para. 33 that such cases often result in a period of incarceration. The offending in Tuffs was of a lesser magnitude in terms of gravity than that by Ms. Jamerson.

[63]      In R. v. Hans, decided in 2016, the offender entered a guilty plea to sexually assaulting the victim as she slept. There was a strong expression of remorse and acceptance of responsibility. Objective evidence of rehabilitation of the Aboriginal offender was a major factor in the case. He received an 18 month CSO followed by a lengthy probation order. The mitigating factors in Hans, including a guilty plea and rehabilitation, are more prominent than in this case.

[64]      In R. v. Browne, the accused inserted a vibrator in the vagina or anus of the victim while she was asleep. On conviction after a trial he received a conditional sentence order of two years less a day. The offender had taken significant rehabilitative steps, as noted in para. 105, including participating in “numerous therapy sessions dealing with sexual boundaries, consent and understanding the victim’s perspective and the harm he caused.” Those strong rehabilitative steps in Browne are absent in this case.

[65]      R. v. Tayo Tompouba, the offender continued with sexual intercourse with the complainant after she fell asleep, without taking steps to confirm her consent. The Court noted that the offender was youthful, in his early 20s, and had a reduced level of moral blameworthiness because he mistakenly believed in ongoing consent. He faced a risk of deportation because of his immigration status, which was a significant collateral consequence leading to a 90-day sentence. 

[66]      In R. v. Ralph, the accused teacher pled guilty to a dated offence involving the touching of a young person for a sexual purpose. The offending fell short of intercourse. The Court took into account the guilty plea, the poor health of the offender, elderly parents reliant on her, and the impact of collateral consequences of job loss and adverse publicity. The Court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day. 

[67]      Based on the case law, I am satisfied that the appropriate range of sentence for sexual assaults of sleeping victims without gratuitous violence, including by digital penetration, is between 12-30 months custody. The Court of Appeal of Yukon in R. v. Rosenthal at para. 8 stated that:

[68]      In this case, the Crown has proceeded summarily. Therefore, the maximum available sentence for a sexual assault conviction under s. 271 of the Code is 18 months’ incarceration.

[69]      On the law, and giving weight to the principle of proportionality in sentencing, it is beyond dispute that a custodial sentence is generally warranted for an invasive sexual assault.

[70]      Where, within or outside the general range of sentence, a particular form or type of sentence is situated will depend on case‑specific considerations after a balancing of sentencing facts with the objectives and principles of sentencing.

[71]      The Crown seeks a sentence of 14 months imprisonment, which opens the gateway to determining whether the sentence can be served in the community. The defence seeks a conditional sentence order of 18 months to be served in the community under strict conditions, pursuant to s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code.

[72]      The principles which underlie conditional sentences are set out in ss. 742 - 742.7 of the Code. R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 (CanLII), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, describes the proper approach to the application of these principles (see paragraph 127).

[73]      A conditional sentence order is available for sexual offences if:

[74]      The first two elements for a CSO are established in this case. The third element is at issue, because the Crown contends that a non-jail sentence would be inconsistent with the need to impose a proportionate, deterrent and denunciatory sentence given the gravity of the offence.

[75]      The defence relies on the recent case of R. v. T.H., dated April 9, 2024, in which the B.C. Court of Appeal held that the effective five year period of punitive restrictions (being a CSO of two years less a day and probation of three years) along with a significant restitution order, met the objectives of sentencing.

[76]      Additionally, the defence states that Ms. Jamerson’s underlying health condition is a further personal circumstance that is significant and serious enough to justify a community-based sentence.

[77]      In assessing the relevance of the offender’s medical condition on sentence, the B.C. Court of Appeal in R. v. Salehi, 2022 BCCA 1, set out the test to be applied as follows:

[78]      The Court of Appeal in Salehi notes, at para. 65, that medical conditions that make imprisonment more onerous should be considered in sentencing, regardless of whether the issue is categorized as a personal circumstance or as a mitigating factor.

[79]      A similar test is set out in R. v. Lemmen, at para. 158, where Judge MacCarthy situates the impact of imprisonment in an institution on the health of the offender under the rubric of collateral consequences.

[80]      As said by the SCC in R. v. Pham, collateral consequences are different than aggravating and mitigating factors, because the latter sentencing factors are related to the gravity of the offence or the degree of responsibility of the offender. The relevance of collateral consequences flowing from the personal circumstances of the offender are linked to the application of the principles of individualization and parity to address situations where a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of his or her personal circumstances: R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 at para. 11.

[81]      The test for assessing the impact of the medical health of an offender on sentence, flowing from Lemmen at paras. 161-169, can be summarized as follows:

[82]      The defence medical evidence on sentencing is set out in the letters of Dr. Salh and Dr. Howard. The evidence of B.C. Corrections is set out in the email to counsel by Anne Timothy, Health Services Manager of Alouette Correctional Centre for Women (ACCW).

[83]      Dr. Salh, gastroenterologist, notes that Ms. Jamerson underwent bowel surgery in 2017 and has a post-surgical stoma in place that requires care and monitoring. Future GI surgery is contemplated but unlikely to be scheduled in the immediate or near future. He advises that in managing Ms. Jamerson Crohn’s disease:

[84]      Dr. Howard, an orthopaedic surgeon, indicates that Ms. Jamerson’s hip and left knee replacement have been completed and are considered successful outcomes. She may require a total right knee replacement in the next year, depending on the progression of the necrosis of the knee bone. If orthopaedic surgery is scheduled, she will have to manage the risk of infection while on Renflexis, which I infer is the biologic required to control the symptoms of Crohn’s disease, but which increases the risk of infection. The risk is greater in and around the time of surgery and in the postoperative period.

[85]      The information received from the health services manager at ACCW is that the institution can competently manage clients with underlying health challenges, including those suffering from Crohn’s disease or requiring stoma care and ostomy supplies. Trained clinical staff can give Ms. Jamerson her prescribed medication or can facilitate and arrange for her to attend for biologic medication infusions every four to eight weeks in a community clinic setting. ACCW has robust infection prevention and control policies and practices in place to mitigate against the risk of infection. ACCW is capable of dealing with health-compromised clients and any specific risk or infection concern can be minimized by access to nursing care or a physician for urgent care needs. 

[86]      Based on the medical reports, I am satisfied that although Ms. Jamerson’s current health condition requires careful management, it is not one that falls into the category of a significant, life threatening condition likely to cause undue hardship or serious risk of impairment to her health. Moreover, I am not persuaded that the high threshold for establishing the third element of the test, that the prison services are not able to provide adequate medical care, has been met by the defence in this case.

[87]      I return to the question of parity and proportionality in determining sentence. I note that in R. v. Webber, a developmentally disabled 21 year old with a highly disadvantaged background received a 12 month custodial sentence for assault by digital penetration. At para. 43, the Court noted that the defence submission of a 90 day jail sentence plus lengthy probation has “no denunciatory or deterrent effect” and was out of touch with development of sentencing law for sexual offences.

[88]      In R. v. Daychief, at paras. 73-76, a case of digital penetration of a sleeping victim, the sentencing judge noted that a CSO would not meet the purpose and principles of sentencing where the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are pressing, and where there is an absence of any recognition of harm caused to the victim.

[89]      The defence relies on the recent B.C. Court of Appeal case of R. v. T.H. where the offender received an effective five year period of punitive restrictions under a CSO and probation, and financial consequences. The BCCA in R. v. T.H. stated at para. 6 that the CSO sentence was a “borderline case”, and the sentencing judge’s decision required deference given the limited scope of appellate review.

[90]      The Court in R. v. T.H. referred to R. v. R.S., 2023 ONCA 608, which involved forced digital penetration accompanied by choking to overcome the victim’s resistance. The majority of the ONCA found a CSO of two years less a day followed by two years’ probation to be disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and unfit.

[91]      The B.C. Court of Appeal underscored this point again this week in R. v. Henry, 2024 BCCA 132, in which it upheld a sentence of custody of two years less a day for sexual assault by intercourse with a sleeping victim. The Court stated that granting a CSO would “run against recent trends in Canadian sentencing law” (para. 34) and specifically commented on R. v. T.H. as follows:

[92]      For the reasons I have articulated, including a review of recent appellate authorities, I find that the sexual assault by digital penetration of a sleeping victim is a serious offence causing significant harm to the victim’s bodily autonomy, sexual integrity and dignity. The aggravating factors of this case outweigh the mitigating factors to such a degree that a CSO, even under strict conditions, would fail to have the necessary denunciatory and deterrent effect. I conclude that a CSO would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing. I find that the appropriate sentence is incarceration for a period of twelve months. 

[93]      Ms. Jamerson is to serve a period of twelve months in custody.

[94]      Pursuant to section 743.21 of the Criminal Code, during the custodial period of the sentence Ms. Jamerson shall have no communication directly or indirectly with R.H.B.

[95]      The custodial sentence is to be followed by a period of probation of two (2) years, with the following conditions:

[96]      Sexual assault is a designated offence per section 490.011(1)(a)(xvi) of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (SOIRA). The Crown seeks a 10 year SOIRA order under s. 490.012 and s. 490.013(2)(a) unless the court is satisfied that such an order is not required.

[97]      The order is presumptive unless the offender satisfies the court that there is no connection between the making of the order and the investigation or prevention of sexual crimes, or alternatively, the impact on the order on their privacy would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society.

[98]      I have considered the nature and seriousness of the designated offence as described in these reasons. Ms. Jamerson is a first time offender and is at low risk to reoffend. She is under medical constraints. It is unlikely that requiring her to register and report will assist in the investigation and prevention of sexual crimes. I am satisfied that making the order would have a grossly disproportionate impact on her privacy or liberty when balanced against the public interest in protecting society from sexual crimes. I decline to order that Ms. Jamerson be placed under a SOIRA order.

[99]      I impose the following ancillary orders: