[1]         C.W. and P.C. are the biological parents of P., who turned four on [omitted for publication], 2021. Their intimate relationship of three years ended on January 7, 2018, when P. was eight-months-old. Since then, P. has resided primarily with C.W. Until recently, P.C. had little meaningful parenting time with P., much of which was supervised, and no overnight visits. P.C. seeks to move towards a parenting arrangement where he and C.W. share equal parenting time with P.  C.W. wants primary residence of and all the parental responsibilities for P. She is content with the status quo but is willing to tweak it to allow P.C. some minimal overnight parenting time.

[2]         The issues before me are:

[3]         That C.W. and P.C. are P.’s guardians is not disputed.

[4]         The documents and evidence I have on which to determine these issues are:

[5]         This matter came before me for a four-day trial commencing October 5, 2020. At the end of the fourth day of trial, October 8, 2020, it was clear the trial would not conclude. By that time I had heard the direct evidence and cross-examination of C.W. and four of her witnesses. On the fourth day, P.C. had not yet called any evidence in the trial.

[6]         Before adjourning the trial, I heard P.C.’s interim application for an order increasing his parenting time with P., which C.W. opposed. On October 23, 2020, I released and filed my Ruling and Reasons for Judgment on P.C.’s interim application for increased parenting time (the “October 23, 2020 Decision”). In the October 23, 2020 Decision, I set out the background and procedural history to this family matter, which I have incorporated by reference and append to these Reasons for Judgment.

[7]         On October 23, 2020, I found C.W. and P.C. were the parents and guardians of P., born [omitted for publication], 2017 (“P.”), and made the following interim order:

[8] The allocation of parenting time over the Christmas holidays is adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager to schedule a one hour hearing on or before December 11, 2020;

[9] The parties are at liberty to change the parenting time arrangements set out in this order, provided they do so in writing;

[10] This order is reviewable on application by either party after December 31, 2020;

[11] The parties may attend the review hearings of this application remotely;

[12] The Court has drafted this order and the signatures of counsel approving its form is dispensed with; and

[13] The Court Registry will distribute a filed copy of this Order and my October 23, 2020 Ruling on Application to counsel via email.

[14]      C.W. advised the court that she and P.C. first began following the parenting-time schedule set out in the October 23, 2020 Decision once P.C. had received a copy of it at the end of February 2021. Since then, P.C. has had parenting time with P.:

[15]      When P.C.’s shift work prevented him from exercising parenting time with P. on the weekends, P.C. extended his weekday visits with P. by one hour. This meant P.C. picked up P. from day care on his weekday visits at 2:00 p.m. rather than 3:00 p.m. At the time of trial, the parties had reverted to P.C. exercising the parenting arrangement set out in my October 23, 2020 Decision.

[16]      Ms. Hauser advised the court that P.C. was willing to consider C.W.’s adjournment request, provided the parties could agree on a new interim parenting-time schedule which would provide P.C. increased and overnight parenting time with P.  P.C. also wanted an interim order scheduling for Christmas as thus far, it was based on whatever C.W. would allow.

[17]      C.W. advised the court she was not prepared to agree to P.C. having any increased parenting time because of a pending investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) and Ministry of Child and Family Development (“MCFD”) into allegations P.C. had sexually abused P.  C.W. advised the court on October 2, 2021, she received a telephone call from an RCMP officer advising her that the RCMP and MCFD had received a complaint that P.C. had sexually abused P. and that she and P. were to attend at the RCMP detachment to provide a statement. They did this on October 4, 2021. C.W. says she was directed by the RCMP not to advise P.C. of the investigation, as they would do it directly.

[18]      P.C. was not aware of these allegations. Neither the RCMP nor MCFD had contacted him. P.C. was not surprised, however, as C.W.’s litigation strategy from the outset of these proceedings was to thwart his parenting time with P. through repeated complaints against him to MCFD. C.W. would make a complaint either directly, or indirectly through one of her supporters; MCFD opens a file and investigates P.C. and his home; within a matter of days, MCFD closes its file upon finding there were no protection concerns. P.C. says C.W. always finds one reason or another why she is entitled to refuse him parenting time, whether or not it is court ordered.

[19]      I adjourned the October 5, 2021 hearing of C.W.’s Adjournment Application. The matter was rescheduled for October 8, 2021, to afford Ms. Hauser and P.C. an opportunity to investigate C.W.’s recent allegations (CEIS Document 73).

[20]      On October 6, 2021, C.W. unilaterally terminated all of P.C.’s in-person parenting time with P.

[21]      On October 6, 2021, MCFD notified C.W. that neither MCFD nor the RCMP had concerns about P.C. exercising his parenting time with P.  C.W. responded it was her “right and duty to protect P.”. Until she knew more about what was going on, she was going to continue to withhold P. from P.C.

[22]      On October 8, 2021, C.W. filed an affidavit (CEIS Document 76) explaining that between October 2, 2021 and October 6, 2021, she had been in touch with the RCMP and MCFD with respect to a complaint made against P.C. that he had sexually abused P. Both C.W. and P. attended at the Quesnel RCMP detachment for an interview on October 2 and 3, 2021. At the end of the interview on October 3, 2021, the social worker present at the interview advised C.W. that MCFD did not have any immediate concerns and that P. could see her father on Monday (October 4, 2021). C.W. says the social worker told her that “she was going to pass it over to Joanne Bowden and they would be reaching out to more people for interview and statements” and they would advise. C.W. goes on to state that the RCMP told her “they had to do more investigating as well and would be in touch and that it would be an ongoing investigation”.

[23]      C.W. goes on to say that on October 6, 2021, she spoke with MCFD team lead social worker Joanne Bowden, who told her MCFD could not put a safety plan in place yet but one could come later on and she could not discuss anything further about the sexual interference complaint against P.C.

[24]      C.W. says that MCFD “has concerns” and they will be interviewing more people, but did not yet have sufficient evidence to put in place a safety plan. The social workers will update her if more evidence comes to light or if a safety plan needs to be implemented.

[25]      C.W. also confirmed that on October 6, 2021, she sent P.C. a text, cancelling his parenting time with P., until she could get more answers from anyone about what was going on.

[26]      In his affidavit of October 7, 2021 (CEIS Document 75), P.C. said that after the October 5, 2021 Family Management Conference (“FMC”), he telephoned the Quesnel RCMP for information about the allegations C.W. cited in the hearing. P.C. stated:

[27]      Although C.W. cancelled P.’s in-person parenting time with P.C., she does not oppose them having electronic communication.

[28]      On October 8, 2021, C.W.’s Adjournment Application (CEIS Document 71) came back before me for a continuation of the October 5, 2021 hearing. C.W. attended the hearing on her own behalf. P.C. appeared represented by Ms. C. Hauser. P.C. opposed C.W.’s application both on administrative and substantive grounds.

[29]      On October 8, 2021, I refused C.W.’s Adjournment Application for the reasons set out below.

[30]      In Navarro v. Doig River First Nation, 2015 BCSC 2173, Dillon J. considered an adjournment in the context of a civil proceeding. She comments at para. 18 (citations omitted):

[31]      In paras. 19, 20, and 21 of Navarro, Dillon J. identified the various factors the court will consider in an adjournment application: (a) the timeliness of the request; (b) the expeditious and speedy resolution of matters on the merits; (c) the reasonableness of the request; (d) the grounds or explanation for the adjournment; (e) the potential prejudice to each party; (f) the right to a fair trial; (g) the proper administration of justice; (h) the history of the matter including deliberate delay or misuse of the court process; and (i) the fact of a self-represented litigant. The BCSC has applied Navarro in a family law context in: Schuetze v Pyper, 2021 BCSC 2209 (CanLII); Atkinson v Atkinson, 2021 BCSC 2033 (CanLII); and Prasad v Prasad, 2019 BCSC 1248 (CanLII). I have conserved these same factors in the case before me.

[32]      Rule 62 governs case management orders which, among other things, permits a judge to adjourn a court appearance (62(f)).

[33]      Rule 114 of the Provincial Family Law Rules requires a party to apply to adjourn a trial under Rule 62, Case Management Order. Rule 114 states:

[34]      In this case, C.W. filed her Adjournment Application on September 20, 2021, which is only 28 days before the first day of trial.

[35]      C.W.’s application was based primarily on the fact that her previous counsel Mr. G. Petrisor removed himself as her solicitor of record on May 3, 2021, after a breakdown in their solicitor-client relationship. C.W. claims she had made a number of attempts, albeit unsuccessfully, to obtain new counsel. Many of the lawyers she contacted were unable or unwilling to accept her as a client; many were unaffordable. C.W. said she did have a likely prospect; however, he is not available for the continuation of the trial dates. She did not advise the court the name of the prospective counsel or when she spoke to him. She could not say when he would be available to continue the trial, only that he was a busy man.

[36]      C.W. said she delayed bringing her adjournment application for a week because she had to self-isolate due to a COVID-19 outbreak. I understand C.W. has a computer and this application could have been filed electronically. In any event, even if she had filed her application a week earlier, C.W. still would have been out of time under Rule 114.

[37]      I was not satisfied the special circumstances referenced in Rule 114(1)(c) applied, because C.W. had known for over five months that Mr. Petrisor would no longer be representing her in these proceedings.

[38]      C.W. commenced these proceedings on January 9, 2018. P. was born on [omitted for publication], 2017, and is now four and one-half years old. This means C.W. and P.C. have been litigating P.’s parenting arrangements for most of her young life.

[39]      P.C. says that his ability to have parenting time with his daughter has been frustrated by C.W.’s antagonistic litigation strategy, which included her: (a) unilaterally refusing him parenting time; (b) refusing to comply with his court-ordered parenting time; (c) levelling complaints against him to MCFD and the RCMP, either directly or indirectly through her support network; or (d) manufacturing one reason or another why she was entitled to withhold his parenting time with P.

[40]      This matter first came before the court for trial on March 2 to 5, 2020. The trial was adjourned on March 2, 2020, to facilitate P.C.’s application for disclosure from MCFD with respect to C.W.’s recent pre-trial complaints against him.

[41]      On April 12, 2020, the trial was rescheduled for October 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2020. The parties anticipated they would each have two days of trial to present their case. At a pre-trial conference held before Judge Galbraith on August 12, 2020, Mr. Petrisor advised he would have two or three witnesses. Judge Galbraith ordered the parties exchange witness statements and documents by September 4, 2020. At no time did Mr. Petrisor suggest that C.W. required more than two days of trial. Rather than two or three witnesses, C.W. called five witnesses. Rather than two days of allotted trial time, C.W. used all four days of trial to present her case, even though most of her witnesses had filed extensive affidavits (see CEIS Documents 2, 24, 25, 26, 28, 37, 40, 41, 42 and 48). This left time no time for P.C. to present his case.

[42]      At the conclusion of the fourth day of trial (October 8, 2020), I referred this matter to the Judicial Case Manager to schedule three more days of trial. For one reason or another, it took until April 12, 2021, to fix a date for the trial’s continuation.

[43]      When counsel attended before the Judicial Case Manager, P.C.’s counsel, Ms. C. Hauser, was available for trial in the last week of July 2020, but Mr. Petrisor was not. As a result, the continuation of this trial could not be scheduled before October 18, 20, and 21, 2021, when both counsel were available. This resulted in over a year delay in continuing with the trial.

[44]      On May 3, 2021, Mr. Petrisor removed himself as counsel of record. C.W. sought out but did not retain alternative counsel for a variety of reasons set out in her affidavit filed October 8, 2021, at paragraph 11.

[45]      The additional interim parenting time I granted P.C. in the October 23, 2020 Decision was not implemented until March 2021. Although C.W. and her counsel received a copy of my decision as of November 9, 2020, P.C. and his counsel were not even aware it had been filed.

[46]      In her October 8, 2021 affidavit (CEIS Document 76), C.W. declared she was unilaterally suspending P.C.’s parenting time because of a complaint by an unknown person to the MCFD and the RCMP alleging he was sexually abusing P. Although neither the police nor MCFD have suggested P.C. be prohibited from or restricted in exercising parenting time with P., C.W. believed she was entitled to do so. P.C. argued this was a typical scenario in this litigation: either immediately before or after a court appearance, C.W. either directly or indirectly manufactures a complaint against him to MCFD which spawns an investigation. Ultimately, MCFD determines the complaint to be unsubstantiated; however, in the interim, C.W. uses the fact of the investigation as justification for suspending or restricting his parenting time.

[47]      C.W. found it difficult to find affordable counsel to take on a trial already underway. In the circumstances, I did not find her application to adjourn the trial unreasonable.

[48]      The reason Mr. Petrisor removed himself as C.W.’s counsel of record was due to a breakdown in relationship. That happens from time to time and I drew no negative inferences from its occurrence. I accepted neither C.W. nor Mr. Petrisor anticipated he would be withdrawing as her legal counsel when he scheduled the trial continuation for October 18, 20 and 21, 2021.

[49]      I recognized that undoubtedly there would be some prejudice to C.W. having to proceed self-represented. Nevertheless, her case was more or less complete. As P.C. has experienced legal counsel, this would assist in the orderly presentation of his evidence. This benefit would accrue not only to P.C., but to C.W. and the Court as well.

[50]      As P.C. had not started his case, C.W. did not have to obtain transcripts of his evidence or that of his witnesses. Most of C.W.’s own witnesses filed affidavits, which she has possessed for at least a year. P.C. has also filed affidavits of his evidence and that of Corina Fransen (CEIS Documents 20, 22 and 75).

[51]      C.W.’s preference as to parenting arrangements was to maintain the status quo. The interim order I made on October 23, 2020, was a makeshift solution until a proper determination could be made after a trial on the merits. It was not to create a new status quo to decide what had not yet been decided at the time of the interim order.

[52]      Typically, delay prolongs the status quo and works in favour of the person who seeks it – in this case, C.W.  P.C.’s role in parenting P. has been marginalized since the onset of these proceedings. His efforts in obtaining meaningful parenting time with P. has been repeatedly frustrated by the lack of finality. For example, P.C. waited four months for hearing of his November 16, 2018 Notice of Motion (CEIS Document 18). On March 22, 2019, the hearing was converted to a Family Case Conference, which produced an interim without prejudice consent order. Two weeks later, on April 4, 2019, C.W. applied to set aside the March 22, 2019 Order on the basis that it was “without prejudice”. The interim order I granted on October 23, 2020, was also frustrated by the lack of timely disclosure and therefore not implemented until March 2021.

[53]      Even though the matter was before the court on October 5 and 8, 2021, C.W. took the position she was entitled to unilaterally terminate all of P.C.’s parenting time without seeking judicial permission. She took no steps to seek a variation to my October 23, 2020 Order pending the conclusion of an ongoing RCMP or MCFD investigation into the allegations of P.C. sexually abusing P.

[54]      Clearly, any delay in completing this trial was highly prejudicial to P.C.  P. was four and one-half years old years old and P.C. still had no overnight parenting time with her.

[55]      The parties are entitled to a fair trial. Some of the recognized hallmarks of a fair trial include:

[56]      In my view, a fair and balanced process militated towards proceeding with the trial. P.C. had not had an opportunity to answer C.W.’s case and to present his own. Since he separated from C.W., P.C. has had little say in the parenting arrangements for P.

[57]      The proper administration of justice in family law proceedings does not facilitate the ossification of a disputed parenting arrangement through trial delay. It goes without saying, delay favours the parent who seeks the existing parenting arrangement. If the court were to allow a party unlimited time to search for and retain a desirable and affordable legal counsel, the trial could be delayed indefinitely. Where the applicant seeks the status quo, their quest for legal representation may not be fuelled with the same zeal as one who seeks a variation.

[58]      There have been many delays, but I cannot say there has been a misuse of the court process. I say this notwithstanding C.W. applied to set aside an order to which she had consented to two weeks earlier. Having said that, I would be wary about granting another order in these proceedings on an “interim without prejudice basis”.

[59]      C.W.’s recent allegations that there have been reports of P.C. sexually abusing P. are deeply troubling. Child sexual abuse is a horrific crime. Using unsupported and unproven allegations of sexual abuse to undermine a parent’s ability to play a meaningful role in their child’s life is egregious conduct, deserving of strong judicial rebuke. In this case, there is simply a dearth of evidence upon which I can draw any reliable inferences as to the genesis of the allegations made against P.C., or whether there is an active and ongoing investigation. The fact that neither the RCMP nor MCFD have taken any steps to prevent or restrict P.C.’s access to P. are strong indicators they do not believe they have sufficient evidence to justify such measures.

[60]      Self-represented family law litigants routinely appear before this Court. Without stepping into the role of counsel, the trial judge has a duty to provide sufficient assistance to self-represented litigants to ensure trial fairness. The trial judge’s foremost duty is to preside with impartiality and neutrality between the parties and cannot become a participant in the litigation: McFarlane v. Safadi, 2004 CanLII 12644 (ONCA), at paras. 31 and 32.

[61]      It was apparent that if I refused her adjournment application, C.W. would most likely be a self-represented litigant. This is a factor I must consider, but it is not determinative. I was satisfied that C.W. was capable of dealing with this litigation, given her case had already been aptly presented by senior counsel. Moreover, throughout these proceedings, C.W. has demonstrated significant administrative, organizational and cognitive skills.

[62]      I was satisfied C.W.’s lack of legal representation would not impact her ability to have a fair trial on the merits. After a careful consideration of Navarro factors and balancing required, I declined C.W.’s application to adjourn the trial.

[63]      I have already thoroughly reviewed C.W. and P.C.’s background and procedural history in my October 23, 2020 Decision.

[64]      C.W. continues to live alone with P. at [omitted for publication] in Quesnel, BC. She no longer works for [omitted for publication]. She now works for [omitted for publication]; however, continues to work from 7:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.

[65]      P. continues to attend A.S.’s “[omitted for publication] Daycare” in Quesnel from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. She has made a number of friends in that day care. She now attends dance once per week and will start swimming lessons in January 2022. I gather P. will enter Kindergarten in September 2022.

[66]      The parties are following my October 23, 2020 Order for parenting time, with the exception they switched P.C.’s weekday parenting time with P. so that C.W. can take P. to dance class on Tuesday. Specifically, P.C. has parenting time:

[67]      Although C.W. believes that P.C.’s parenting time with P. has improved in the last year, she still opposes any significant increase in his parenting time. C.W. bases her rejection to a more equitable parenting-time arrangement to include:

[68]      P.C. continues to reside in his two-bedroom condominium at [omitted for publication] Drive, Quesnel, BC, [omitted for publication].

[69]      P.C. now has interim primary residence of his two sons with C.H.: E.H., born [omitted for publication], 2014, and L.H., born [omitted for publication], 2015. On September 22, 2021, P.C. and C.H. appeared before Judge Stanford. At that time, Judge Stanford found P.C. and C.H. were joint guardians of E.H. and L.H. under s.39(1) of the Family Law Act, and ordered, among other things:

[70]      P.C.’s parenting arrangements with E.H. and L.H. are relevant given the history of this litigation as described in my October 23, 2020 Decision.

[71]      P.C. still works for [omitted for publication], although he has been laid off intermittently over the past 18 months because of the COVID-19 pandemic. P.C. ordinarily works the graveyard shift, although sometimes works the “gold shift”. On the graveyard shift, P.C.’s first shift begins at midnight, to 8:00 a.m., followed by four more shifts from 1:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. (five nights in total). P.C. sometimes works the “gold shift”, which consists of three shifts in two days, followed by five days off. This means that P.C. works a total of 32 hours over the course of a weekend and gets paid for 40. His shift begins at 1:00 a.m. on Friday and concludes at 11:00 a.m. Saturday. His next shift begins at 6:30 p.m. on Saturday and ends at either 4:30 a.m. or 6:00 a.m. Sunday. On the gold shift, P.C. has only seven hours’ respite between shifts.

[72]      P.C. also works on his family’s cattle ranch, which is in the [omitted for publication] area on the [omitted for publication] Road. It is about a one hour and one and one-half hour drive, depending on the road and weather conditions. He generally has two or three of his own cows he raises and sells.

[73]      Post-separation, P.C. had an intimate relationship with M.R., who was a neighbour in his condominium complex. After a while, M.R. moved into his residence and cared for P.C.’s children if he had to work while they were in his care. P.C. and M.R.’s relationship ended in November 2020.

[74]      After he separated from M.R., P.C. purchased and installed bunkbeds, in a spare bedroom at his sister’s (K.O.) residence. K.O. is 43-years-old and lives alone with her two children: D.O. who is 20-years-old and R. who is 14. She is an educational assistant worker who works at the school weekdays between 8:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. When P.C. has to work his graveyard shift, the boys stay overnight at K.O.’s residence. Typically, P.C. and his children have dinner at K.O.’s residence. P. showers at K.O.’s home, then P.C. returns P. to her mother. P.C. returns to K.O.’s residence to tuck his boys in before going to work. K.O. feeds E.H. and L.H. breakfast and takes them to school. P.C. also has other caregivers who assist with child care from time to time when P.C. is at work.

[75]      P.C. wishes to move towards a shared parenting arrangement with P., in which he and C.W. would share equal parenting time and parenting responsibilities. He acknowledges a shared parenting regime would have to be a graduated process. C.W. opposes an equal parenting regime based on: (a) P.C.’s history of family violence; (b) what she considers to be P.C.’s deficient parenting skills; and (c) her desire to have the majority of parenting time with, and all parenting responsibilities for, P.

[76]      The paramount consideration in determining issues of guardianship, parenting responsibilities and parenting time is the best interests of the child. I have set out the legislative framework for parenting arrangements in the October 23, 2020 Decision, and I will not repeat them in these Reasons for Judgment.

[77]      Parenting time is the right of the child: J.B.D.K. v. T.A.B., 2017 BCSC 1186 (CanLII), aff’d in King v. Borserio, 2018 BCCA 308 (CanLII); Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC); Slawter v. Bellefontaine, 2012 NSCA 48; MacGyver v. Richards, 1995 CanLII 8886 (ON CA). The court must make parenting-time orders that are in the child’s best interests. Section 37 of the Family Law Act sets out an analytical framework for the court to determine what is in the child’s best interests. I have considered the s. 37 factors in the circumstances of this case as follows:

[78]      The evidence of both parties depicts P. as a healthy child who is developing and functioning appropriately for her age. K.O. describes P. as a happy-go-lucky, well-rounded, inquisitive little girl who is always on the go.

[79]      C.W. asserts P. has “potential allergies” for which she has sought medical attention, but has produced no medical evidence. C.W. is critical of P.C. because he uses a different non-prescription antihistamine for P.’s allergic outbreaks than what C.W. uses. Absent any evidence from a medical practitioner with respect to the issue, I do not consider the parents’ different preferences of any significance.

[80]      I am satisfied that both C.W. and P.C. can provide for P.’s health and emotional well-being. I am also satisfied that P.’s well-being will be best served by having a consistent relationship with both parents.

[81]      P. is only four-years-old and thus it would not be appropriate to consider her views on the matters before the court: F.K.L. v D.M.A.T, 2020 BCSC 1296 (CanLII), para. 72, citing K.W. v. L.H., 2018 BCCA 204, para. 113. Justice Gomery states in F.K.L.:

[82]      A child as young as P. rarely testifies in a family law proceeding. The Supreme Court of Canada recognizes that it might be traumatic for and harmful to a child to testify in court. For this reason, hearsay statements of their evidence is necessary. The necessity prerequisite is easily met in family law proceedings; however, the reliability requirement is not. In D.A.M. v. D.M.T., 2013 BCSC 359, Justice Fisher (as she then was) explained:

[83]      In P.V. v. D.B., 2007 BCSC 237, at paras. 18 and 19, Justice Russell cited the indicia of reliability of a child’s hearsay statements in a family law proceeding espoused in R.(S.F.) v. R.(E.C.), 1997 CanLII 741 (BC SC):

[84]      In this case, C.W. and her witnesses have adduced hearsay evidence to persuade the court that P. did not want to have a relationship with her father. I accept P. was effectively estranged from her father by the manner in which this litigation has been conducted. I gather P.’s anxiety over spending time with P.C. has abated over the past year. C.W. testified P. no longer “freaks out” when she has to spend time with P.C., but sometimes makes “interesting comments”, such as saying she “hates her dad because he teases her and is mean to her brothers”.

[85]      Conversely, P.C. and K.O. say that P. appears to enjoy her time with her father and her brothers and her extended paternal family. K.O. says that if P. is having fun, she more often than not wants to extend her visit.

[86]      Given C.W.’s animus against P.C. and her penchant for cultivating alliances against him, I am not persuaded that P.’s reticence to spend parenting time with her father is not the end product of coercion.

[87]      P. has no shortage of people who love her, from both her paternal and maternal extended family. This includes C.W. and her mother S.W. and other members of P.’s maternal extended family. At long last, P. has been afforded an opportunity to establish a relationship with not only her father P.C., but also her paternal extended family, including E.H., L.H., K.O., D.O., R.O. and “Poppa” (D.C.). For many years, these relationships were stifled as a result of P.C.’s lack of parenting time. I am confident that once P. can enjoy longer periods of parenting time with P.C., she will have an opportunity to bond with other members of her paternal family as well.

[88]      P.C. is close to his father, who lives on the family ranch at [omitted for publication]. His mother died when he was an adolescent; however, P.C.’s brother also lives on the ranch, albeit in a separate residence. P.C. often takes E.H. and L.H. for overnight visits at the ranch where there are plenty of exciting and interesting things for them to do. P.C. expects that with overnight parenting time, he will be able to take P. to his family ranch, which is too far away for the duration of parenting time previously allotted to him. P.C. is confident P., like E.H. and L.H., will enjoy the ranch.

[89]      P.C. is very close to his sister K.O. who often cares for his children in her home when he is working nightshift. I am satisfied K.O. is a loving and competent caregiver to P.C.’s children. P. has not yet spent the night at K.O.’s residence but she is welcome to do so in the event P.C. has to work the graveyard shift while P. is in his care.

[90]      Whereas P.’s relationship with her father and paternal relatives is flourishing, her relationship with her mother and maternal relatives is firmly entrenched.

[91]      For the first eight months of her life, P. was in the care of both her parents. Since C.W. and P.C. have separated, P. has been primarily in the care of her mother who has seized all of the decision-making responsibilities for the child. P.C. has had very little meaningful parenting time with P. The reason for this disparity is largely attributable to C.W.’s resistance to P.C. having parenting time except on her terms. Unfortunately, C.W.’s terms were forged on the premise that she is the sole arbiter of P.’s best interest.

[92]      In my view, C.W. interfered with P.C.’s parenting time with P. to an unacceptable degree. Hence, P.C. has had only such parenting time with P. as the court will allow. Even then, C.W. seems to regard P.C.’s court-ordered parenting time as more of a suggestion than a judicial pronouncement. C.W. justifies her intrusiveness on what she views as P.C.’s demonstrably deficient parenting skills.

[93]      I realize that P.C. first became a father when he was19-years-old. His partner, C.H., had a three-year-old child from a previous relationship. As a result, P.C. was thrust into the role of parent and step-parent shortly after graduating from high school. By the time P. was born on [omitted for publication], 2017, P.C. was the father of three children and the step-parent to one. He was just 23-years-old and C.H. was 21. C.W. was 34-years-old. Although P. was her first and only child, C.W. brought a mature and informed perspective to her parenting responsibilities.

[94]      When he testified at trial, P.C. was 28-years-old. He says he has matured and is a much better parent today then he was in his early 20s. In the beginning, he parented his children more-or-less how he himself was parented. As a result of MCFD involvement in 2018, P.C. participated in parenting programs and anger-management counselling. He has also had the benefit of K.O.’s support and sagacity. I acknowledge that despite his youth, P.C. always worked hard to support his children and family. At trial, he demonstrated insight into his strengths and weaknesses. I am satisfied P.C. has matured into a caring, loving and competent parent. It is time for the court to resolve this conflict so P.’s parenting time with her father has some predictability and stability.

[95]      Children as young as P. have a heightened need for stability. Fortunately, both her parents and extended family reside in the Quesnel area. Both parents have relatively stable employment, residential accommodation and lifestyles.

[96]      The greatest instability in P.’s life is her inconsistent parenting time with her father. Any parenting arrangements will have to assure P. has continuity with both her guardians. Specifically, P.’s parenting time with her father should not be arbitrary and subject to what C.W. deems is in P.’s best interests at any particular time. P.’s need for stability means that there has to be special and persuasive circumstances to justify either guardian withholding parenting time from the other.

[97]      Although there has been some suggestion of historical mental-health and substance-misuse issues, the preponderance of the evidence indicates C.W. and P.C. are both capable of exercising their parenting responsibilities. I accept that at times P.C. bristled when confronted with the antipathy of C.W.’s hand-picked supervisors. I am not going to conduct a microscopic analysis of every single grievance C.W. levied against P.C. during his supervised parenting time. Whatever his shortcomings may have been, they did not warrant the degree to which they were scrutinized, dissected and embellished. Whatever deficits P.C. may have exhibited early on in parenthood, he appears to have matured into a loving, caring, responsible and competent parent.

[98]      C.W. works from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. five days per week. This necessitates P. attending day care from 6:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., unless P.C. picks her up earlier. P.C. also works fulltime, albeit shift work. Additionally, he has full-time responsibility for E.H. and L.H. and occasional duties on his family’s ranch.

[99]      C.W. submits that P.C. is already struggling to manage all of his commitments at present. Sometimes he refuses extra parenting time C.W. offers. There has been the odd occasion when P.C. had cancelled parenting time because of road conditions or because his vehicle would not start. C.W. put into evidence photographs (Exhibit 9) of Highway 97 to show the roads were passable when P.C. said they were not. P.C. maintains the photographs do not depict the road conditions where he was when he cancelled the parenting time. As this was one incident, I do not consider it relevant to whether P.C. ought to have increased parenting time.

[100]   P.C.’s changes in shifts at work makes arranging child care difficult. His standard shift is the graveyard shift. The first day of his graveyard shift is from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., with the following days from 1:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. I recognize that given his shift work at [omitted for publication], his duties on the family ranch, his full-time care obligations for E.H. and L.H., and his part-time parenting time with P., P.C. has a challenging and complex schedule. He is fortunate to have K.O. to help him with child care while he is working. C.W. also works fulltime; however, her shift is always during the day when P. is in day care. C.W. has no partner and no other children in her care. She also has her mother to assist her with P.’s care from time to time.

[101]   C.W. is concerned that P.C. resides in a two-bedroom condominium which does not accommodate him and three children. P.C. says if his parenting time with P. increases, he will convert the dining room into an extra bedroom, which he will use as his bedroom and give P. his present bedroom. P.C.’s long term goal is to move out to the family ranch in [omitted for publication]. The children would be able to commute to and from school via school bus.

[102]   The Family Law Act expects parents to support their children. Most do so through employment income. Millions of children are raised by parents who work outside the home and their children are not worse for wear. Working parents provide a positive role model for children, who one day will have to support themselves. In my view, the fact a parent has to work is not reason enough to limit their parenting time.

[103]   In this case, both parents work outside the home and both require child care while at work. C.W. would like P. to attend day care fulltime, whether she is in her care or P.C.’s care. If I made such an order, it may result in P. being in the care of third parties for the majority of the time she is in P.C.’s care. I am not convinced this is in P.’s best interest. I acknowledge the parties may still have to pay for P. to attend day care full time, but that does not mean she has to attend on all or even part of those days when she is in P.C.’s care and he is available to care for her. Next September, P. will be attending school fulltime, so her current day-care arrangements will likely change in any event.

[104]   In N.J. v. S.J., 2018 BCSC 2352, Justice Brundrett (at para. 257) held that family violence under the Family Law Act is an overarching consideration in imposing parenting arrangements.

[105]   Family violence under the Family Law Act is defined and broadly interpreted: S.M.S. v. S.M.U, 2021 BCSC 933 (CanLII), citing R.W. v. P.C., 2017 BCSC 998, at paras.36-41. In Morgadinho v. Morgadinho, 2014 BCSC 192 (CanLII), Justice Schultes states at para. 59:

[106]   P.C. acknowledges that he and C.W. had a turbulent relationship, marred by family violence. They fought between themselves and with C.H. who was pregnant with L.H. when P.C. and C.W. moved in together. The police and MCFD became involved in domestic disputes between: (a) P.C. and C.H.; (b) P.C. and C.W.; and (c) C.W. and C.H. (see CEIS Document 25, Exhibit A).

[107]   C.W. blames P.C. for any and all violence which occurred in their relationship. She blames P.C. for family violence she says occurred in his previous relationship with C.H., although she was not present to witness its occurrence. P.C. accepts some but not all responsibility for the domestic turmoil in his relationships. He says his physical altercations with C.W. were minor and mutual. He acknowledges their relationship became “pretty toxic” when they argued.

[108]   P.C. agrees that when C.W. was eight-months’ pregnant, they became embroiled in a verbal and physical altercation. He says they began arguing; he tried to walk away. C.W. grabbed him and he pushed her. He became angry, punched a hole in the wall and kicked a dresser (see Exhibit 8). Although C.W. was not injured, P.C. admits the incident should not have happened.

[109]   In her application for a protection order filed January 8, 2018 (CEIS Document 2, 3, 4), C.W. described a violent incident precipitating her separation from P.C. on January 7, 2018. This was the date she presented P.C. with a separation agreement to sign (CEIS Document 1). She says P.C. pushed and shoved her around while she was holding P., who was eight-months-old at the time. At trial, C.W. provided a medical record and photographs (Exhibit 8) depicting minor injuries she says she sustained in the physical altercation. She also tendered a copy of the GR Baker Memorial Hospital Emergency Room Record from July 8, 2018 (Exhibit 7), which record her as claiming she sustained injuries when “her husband pushed her over a barrel”.

[110]   On the basis of her allegations, C.W. sought and obtained a Protection Order, ex parte, prohibiting P.C. from having any contact with her, directly or indirectly, except on certain conditions. The Protection Order was only granted for two weeks (CEIS Document 47).

[111]   Not unexpectedly, P.C.’s version of the January 7, 2018 altercation is very different from C.W.’s. P.C. says that while she was holding P., C.W. got a bat and used it to hit him on the arm. When doing so, she almost dropped P. He sustained a lump on his arm as a result of this assault upon him. It was P.C. who called the police and reported the incident, who asked him to leave the residence to prevent any further escalation. P.C. complied. The police investigated the incident and did not lay charges against either parent. P.C. never sought medical treatment for his injuries.

[112]   Although P.C. and C.H. came to MCFD’s attention in 2014, it was the January 7, 2018 incident which precipitated MCFD’s intervention. As a result of this incident, C.W. made allegations of family violence against P.C. and persuaded C.H. to do the same.

[113]   The January 7, 2018 incident occurred over four years ago. P. was not injured and C.W. and P.C. each sustained a minor injury. The police did not lay any charges as a result of this incident. Despite C.W.’s insistence she was the victim in this, I suspect that both parties contributed to the fracas. C.W.’s January 8, 2018 statement to the medical staff is a prior consistent statement. It is presumptively inadmissible on the basis it is hearsay, self-serving and lacks probative value. Such statements can be admitted if they are necessary for the trial judge to understand: a) the chronology of events; b) how the matter came to the knowledge of police; or c) the conduct of the complainant. See: R. v. C.M.M., 2020 BCCA 56, paras. 144 to 147.

[114]   As a result of the congeries of complaints C.W. and C.H. made to MCFD, the Director of MCFD sought and obtained a protective intervention order pursuant to s. 28 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act on May 1, 2018, in CFCSA File 17584. On May 23, 2018, the Director withdrew its application for thus concluding that proceeding.

[115]   P.C. admitted that he spanked E.H. and L.H. in the past. After MCFD intervened and imposed a safety plan, P.C. completed a number of parenting courses which he found very helpful. He says he tries to be calmer and less intimidating. P.C. now has court-ordered primary parenting time with E.H. and L.H. and there is no suggestion this is not in their best interests.

[116]   I understand from social worker Corina Fransen’s March 15, 2019 affidavit, and her evidence in court on October 20, 2021, that MCFD has had no further child-protection concerns vis-à-vis P.C. and his children after October 2018. Still, C.W. continued to make complaints against P.C. to MCFD. MCFD investigated each of these complaints and found them unsubstantiated.

[117]   C.W. again withheld parenting time in early October 2021, shortly before the continuation of this trial. She asserted the RCMP and MCFD received allegations that P.C. had sexually abused P. Neither of these child protection agencies implemented any safety measures against P.C.  C.W. has taken steps to have P. tested in the Suspected Child Abuse & Neglect Clinic (“SCAN”) in Prince George in December 2021.

[118]   Corina Fransen advised the court that if MCFD is provided with new information concerning the safety of a child, the social workers will put in place a safety plan until they have had an opportunity to investigate and assess the allegations. This safety plan may be verbal or in writing. In this case, MCFD has not instituted any safety plan, which indicates to the court the recent allegations against P.C. are unsubstantiated.

[119]   P.C. believes C.W. orchestrated this most recent complaint because her complaints of physical violence have fallen fallow, particularly since he now has primary parenting time with E.H. and L.H. He believes C.W. has “upped the ante” with allegations of sexual abuse in an effort to thwart his parenting time with P.

[120]   I have no evidence of P.C. acting violently against any of his children since MCFD withdrew its April 20, 2018 protective intervention application on May 23, 2018. There is no evidence P.C. has ever been violent towards P. or that P. has suffered any physical or emotional harm as a result of family violence.

[121]   Although there had been some family violence between P.C. and C.W. while they were together, they have been separated now for over four years. Since then there has been no evidence of any family violence between P.C. and C.W. There is no evidence of any family violence whatsoever against P.  C.W. has attempted to enmesh C.H., E.H. and L.H. in these proceedings, to bolster her allegations of ongoing family violence in P.C.’s household. The evidence does not support such a finding; in fact, its shows the opposite. I am satisfied that neither P.C. nor C.W. is impaired in their ability to care for P. and meet her needs.

[122]   Given both C.W. and P.C. work fulltime outside the home, any parenting arrangement will necessitate some degree of cooperation. Obviously, it would be best if P. could spend parenting time with each parent when that parent is present and available to care for her. Given the parents live and work in the same community, I see no logistical reason why they cannot share parenting responsibilities for P.

[123]   P.C.’s ability to work cooperatively with C.W. has been impeded by her campaign to gather evidence to use against him in these proceedings. I assume that once this trial has concluded, she will cease this activity. Nevertheless, P.C. worries that if the court makes an order increasing his parenting time with P. beyond that which C.W. will tolerate, she will escalate her efforts to undermine his relationship with P.

[124]   I am not aware of any criminal or civil proceeding relevant to P.’s safety, security, or well-being. C.W.’s suggestion that there is some secret inchoate investigation into allegations that P.C. has sexually abused P. is not a proceeding. In my view, a “civil or criminal proceeding” means an action, suit, cause, matter, or an appeal in court.

[125]   At the conclusion of the trial on October 21, 2021, I made an interim order pending delivering these Reasons for Judgment and my final order. I ordered on an interim basis:

[126]   In my view, it is in P.’s best interest to continue having primary residence with her mother. P. should also have increased overnight parenting time with her father during the week and extended overnight parenting time on holidays. I also believe C.W. and P.C. ought to share equal parenting responsibilities for P. I have set out the terms of my order with respect to parenting arrangements at the end of these Reasons for Judgment.

[127]   C.W. seeks ongoing and retroactive child support for P. She does not claim any Section 7 expenses, although P. does attend day care.

[128]   Section 147(1) of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (“FLA”), stipulates that each parent and guardian of a child has a duty to provide support.

[129]   In Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, para. 10, the Supreme Court of Canada restated the principles governing child support articulated in D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; L.J.W. v. T.A.R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37:

[130]   In this case, both parents are employed fulltime and earn a modest living. P.C. has himself and three children to support; C.W. has herself and one child to support.

[131]   As C.W. has the majority of parenting time with P., P.C. must pay her child support pursuant to Child Support Guidelines.

[132]   Pursuant to s. 150(1) of the Family Law Act, the amount of child support must be determined in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. Section 1 of the Family Law Act and Part 4 of the Family Law Act Regulation, BC Reg. 347/2012, define the Child Support Guidelines to mean the Federal Child Support Guidelines under s. 26.1 of the Divorce Act (Canada).

[133]   Section 3(1) of the Guidelines sets out the presumptive rule that child support for children under the age of 19 is payable in the amount set out in the applicable child support table scheduled to the Guidelines. This amount is set according to the annual income of the payor parent. There are exceptions to the presumptive rule contained in s. 3(1) of the Guidelines, but none of which are applicable in this case.

[134]   The objectives of the Guidelines are set out in s.1:

[135]   The first step in determining the payor parent’s child-support obligation is to calculate their income. In order to do this fairly and accurately, Section 21 of the Guidelines requires applicants and respondents to disclose to the court and each other information relevant to the child-support proceedings.

[136]   Rule 25 of the Provincial Court Family Rules requires the payor parent and often the recipient to file a financial statement in Form 4 when child support is in issue. In this case, both parents have filed a Form 4 Financial Statement. Typically, the court determines the parents’ respective Guideline income from Line 150 of their most recent income tax return. For this reason, the court generally calculates the parents’ child-support obligations based on the previous year’s income of each spouse: J.(K.M.) v. N. (J.H.D.), 2014 BCSC 1895, at para. 114.

[137]   Section 2(3) of the Guidelines holds:

[138]   This suggests the court can calculate the parents’ income based on their most recent statements of earnings where their income stream is relatively certain.

[139]   Both C.W. and P.C. filed financial statements in Form 4 current to 2020.

[140]   On July 11, 2018, C.W. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement declaring a Guideline income of $56,315.76. She attaches her: (a) 2017 Income Tax Return and Notice of Assessment indicating a Guideline income of $45,927.37; (b) 2016 Income Tax Return and Notice of Assessment indicating a Guideline income of $58,247.40; and (c) 2016 Income Tax Return and Notice of Assessment indicating a Guideline income of $58,247.40.

[141]   On September 20, 2019, C.W. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules, declaring an annual Guideline income of $60,619 (CEIS Document 49).

[142]   On August 27, 2020, C.W. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement in which she declared an annual Guideline income of $58,435.38. C.W. attached to the Form 4: (a) her 2019 Notice of Assessment indicating her total income for that taxation year was $61,201; (b) her 2018 Notice of Assessment indicating in that year she earned a total income of $48,636; and (c) her 2017 Notice of Assessment indicating she earned $45,927.37 (CEIS Document 63).

[143]   On March 12, 2018, P.C. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement attaching: (a) T4 and T4E slips and a 2014 Tax Summary indicating that in 2014 he earned a Guideline income of $50,722; (b) a Notice of Assessment for 2015, indicating a Guideline income for 2015 in the amount of $64,509.

[144]   On April 11, 2018 (CEIS Document 13), Judge Galbraith made an interim consent order at a Family Case Conference requiring P.C. to pay to C.W. support for P. in the amount of $330, commencing May 1, 2018, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter.

[145]   This matter came before Judge Galbraith on October 28, 2019. At that time, the court made the following orders concerning child support:

[146]   On November 26, 2019, P.C. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement in which he declared a Guideline income of $73,354.17 (Line 150 income less union dues of $1,001.64).

[147]   This matter came before Judge Galbraith again on November 26, 2019, for a further Family Case Conference. At that time Judge Galbraith made the following child support orders:

[148]   On August 12, 2020, P.C. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement attaching his 2019, 2018, 2017 and 2016 individual Income Tax Returns (CEIS Document 63) which indicate:

[149]   At trial, P.C. tendered as Exhibit 2 a copy of his 2020 Tax Assessment indicating his total income for 2020 was $61,048. He does not indicate what he paid in union dues. Assuming his union dues in 2020 are roughly similar to what he paid in 2021, P.C.’s Guideline income for 2020 is $60,105.45 ($61,048 - $942.55 = $60,105.45).

[150]   At trial, P.C. tendered as Exhibit 3 his Statement of Earnings and Deductions from [omitted for publication] for the pay period starting on September 19, 2021 and ending on October 2, 2021. This statement indicates that P.C.’s year-to-date gross earnings totalled $58,827. He paid union dues for that 275-day period in the amount of $710.14, for a Guideline income of $58,116.86 for the first 275 days of 2021. Extrapolating this sum to December 31, 2021, P.C.’s annual Guideline Income for 2021 is approximately $77,137 ($58,117 ÷ 275 days x 365 days = $77,137).

[151]   As C.W. has had and will continue to have the majority of parenting time with P., P.C. is obligated to pay to her child support for the benefit of P. according to the Child Support Guidelines.

[152]   P.C. has made no claim of undue hardship. I do note, however, he is the primary caregiver for E.H. and L.H. As C.H. is not working, P.C. receives no child support for E.H. and L.H.

[153]   P.C. works on his family ranch from time to time. He typically raises two to three cows per year which he sells for $800 to $1,200 each. It is not entirely clear whether this is all profit or whether he has to pay for feed and animal husbandry expenses. He also has to invest some of his profit to buy another cow to maintain his micro herd. Given the small amount he earns from this endeavour, it is best described as a hobby. I am not going to impute any additional income for the purposes of assessing his Guideline income. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered:

[154]   C.W. is entitled to receive child support for P. pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines retroactive to February 1, 2018. I have concluded P.C.’s child-support obligations ought to be based on his actual Guideline income for the years in which it is calculated.

[155]   As I have extrapolated P.C.’s 2021 income from Exhibit 3, I will allow either party to apply for a readjustment of child support in the event his actual income is significantly higher or lower than what I have projected for 2021.

[156]   C.W. says she is not seeking any contribution from P.C. for special or extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines and I will make no order in this regard.

[157]   I leave it to the Family Maintenance Enforcement Program to calculate P.C.’s arrears of child support, if any. The arrears will be fixed as of the date of this judgment, exclusive of any interest or statutory default fees. P.C. will pay any arrears of child support owing at the rate of $100 per month commencing February 1, 2022.

[158]   I will also make an order for ongoing financial disclosure from P.C. for so long as he is the payor parent.

[159]   The court makes the following final orders:

[160]   C.W. and P.C. are the biological parents of P., who turned three in [omitted for publication] 2020. Their relationship came to a cataclysmic end on January 7, 2018, when P. was eight months old. Since then P. has resided primarily with C.W., with P.C. having very little parenting time. Between January 7, 2018, and March 26, 2019, the only parenting time P.C. had with P. was five or so one and one-quarter hour visits supervised by the Axis Resource Centre in Quesnel. Between April 2019 and December 10, 2019, P.C. had a number of short visits with P. which either C.W. or her family supervised. P.C. now has two or three unsupervised midweek visits of approximately two hours in length. He still has no overnight parenting time with P.

[161]   This matter came before me for trial on October 5, 2020. At the end of the fourth day it was clear the trial would not conclude. By that time I had heard the direct evidence and cross-examination of C.W. and four of her witnesses. Her case is on-going. P.C. has not yet called any evidence in the trial. As the trial is unlikely to continue in the near future, P.C. asks for an interim order increasing his parenting time with P., which C.W. opposes.

[162]   The sole issue before me in this interim application is whether the Court ought to increase P.C.’s parenting time with P., and if so, by how much.

[163]   Guardianship is not an issue. On April 11, 2018, Judge Galbraith ordered C.W. and P.C. were guardians of P. pursuant to s. 39 of the Family Law Act (CEIS Document #13 & 15).

[164]   The evidence I have on which to determine this application is: (a) the oral evidence I have heard at trial, (b) the information and affidavits contained in Quesnel Court File F-17472 and CFCSA File 17584; and (c) submissions of counsel. The only exhibit entered at trial was a copy of P.C. and C.H.’s parenting time order of October 22, 2019, in FLA File F-16331. Because he has not had an opportunity to answer C.W.’s case against him, P.C. is the party who suffers the greatest disadvantage in this interim application.

[165]   C.W. was born [omitted for publication] and is now 38 years old. C.W. resides at [omitted for publication] Street in Quesnel, B.C. She has lived in Quesnel her entire life. Members of C.W.’s immediate family also live in the Quesnel area, including her mother, S.W., her father, J.W., her step-mother, CL.H.

[166]   C.W. works with [omitted for publication] as a [omitted for publication] in Quesnel, BC. She has worked for [omitted for publication] for 20 years.

[167]   P.C. was born on [omitted for publication] and is now 27 years old. He is a long-term employee of [omitted for publication] in Quesnel. He sometimes works the graveyard shift and at other times, the day shift.

[168]   P.C. is also from the Quesnel area. His father, D.C., owns a cattle ranch locally and P.C. often assists him with that enterprise. P.C. also has a sister, K.O., who lives in the Quesnel area.

[169]   C.W. and P.C. formed an intimate relationship in February 2015. They began cohabitating in April 2015, and married on [omitted for publication] 2016. Their daughter, P., was born [omitted for publication], 2017. P. is P.C.’s third child and C.W.’s only child.

[170]   Prior to his relationship with C.W., P.C. was in an intimate relationship with C.H. for about a year and one-half, until they separated in 2014.

[171]   C.H. was born on [omitted for publication] 1996, and is now 24 years old. P.C. and C.H. are the biological parents of E.C., born [omitted for publication], 2014, who is now six years old, and L.C., born [omitted for publication] 2015, who is now five. C.H. also has a child from a previous relationship, T.H., born [omitted for publication], 2012, who is now eight years old.

[172]   When C.W. and P.C. entered into their intimate relationship in 2015, C.H. was pregnant with L.C. At that time C.H. was 19 years old, P.C. was 21 years old, and C.W. was 32.

[173]   Prior to separating P.C. and C.W. resided at [omitted for publication] Road, Quesnel, BC. I understand this home was [omitted for publication] and is a 45 minute drive from Quesnel.

[174]   C.W. and P.C. initially separated on October 5, 2017. They attempted to reconcile on December 4, 2017. On December 5, 2017, they entered into a separation agreement. C.W. and P.C. more or less agreed they would keep what assets they brought into the relationship. C.W. would continue to occupy the family home at [omitted for publication] Road, and P.C. moved into his condominium at [omitted for publication] Drive, Quesnel, BC. As both were long-term employees of [omitted for publication], neither sought spousal support.

[175]   C.W. and P.C.’s relationship ended permanently on January 7, 2018, when P. was eight months old. While at the [omitted for publication] Road residence, P.C. and C.W. got into verbal argument which escalated into a physical altercation. P. was present at the time. P.C. called the police, who attended the residence. The police allowed P.C. to enter the residence to obtain his work gear and he left.

[176]   C.W. blamed P.C. for the altercation although no charges arose as a result of the incident. On January 7, 2018, C.W. reported the incident to the Ministry of Child and Family Development (“MCFD”) (see the Fransen April 24, 2018 Affidavit in CFCSA 17584, CEIS Document #25).

[177]   On January 8, 2018, C.W. attended at the Court Registry in Quesnel, BC and filed a copy of the December 5, 2017 Separation Agreement (CEIS Document #1) and an affidavit in support of her application for a Protection Order. (CEIS Document # 2). In her affidavit C.W. states:

[178]   On January 9, 2018, C.W. filed, (a) an application to obtain a protection order (CEIS Document # 3); (b) a Notice of Motion for a protection order (CEIS Document #4); and (c) an application to proceed without notice. C.W. indicates her residential address was [omitted for publication] Road, Quesnel, BC, [omitted for publication], and P.C.’s was [omitted for publication] Drive, Quesnel BC, [omitted for publication], Tel. [omitted for publication].

[179]   On January 9, 2020, Judge Galbraith approved C.W. proceeding ex parte with her application for a protection order. That same day, Judge Adams heard C.W.’s application and ordered:

[180]   On January 11, 2018, at the request of the Quesnel Court Registry, process server Ron Friesen personally served P.C. at [omitted for publication] Drive, Quesnel, BC with the protection order (CEIS Documents ##5 and 6).

[181]   C.W. stayed with her mother for two weeks until MCFD changed the locks on the [omitted for publication] Road residence. C.W. then returned to that residence with P. and P.C. moved into his condominium at [omitted for publication] Drive, Quesnel, BC.

[182]   C.W. contacted C.H. about the January 7, 2018 incident. Although they had clashed in the past, C.W. sought and obtained C.H.’s support in these proceedings.

[183]   As a result of the January 7, 2018 altercation at the [omitted for publication] Road residence, the MCFD social workers determined there was a likelhood of physical harm with respect to P. who was present during the incident. MCFD opened a familiy service file to address those concerns and provide support services: (see CEIS Document # 20). Social Worker Corina Fransen states in her March 15, 2019 affidavit:

[184]   On January 10, 2018, P.C. signed a MCFD safety plan in which he agreed to complete a random drug screening and have no access to his children until January 24, 2018, or until otherwise notified by MCFD. SW Fransen explained in her April 24, 2018 affidavit the safety plan allowed MCFD time to assess the situation and make referrals to support services. P.C. did not attend the random drug screening test scheduled for later that day. Initially, P.C. refused to cooperate with MCFD in its investigation of C.W.’s complaints. According to SW Fransen, P.C. said he would resolve MCFD’s dometic violence concerns by “no longer having relationships” and did not want to see his children “if he had to jump through hoops.” Given P.C.’s obstinance, MCFD cautioned C.W. and C.H. against facilitating his parenting time with any of his three children.

[185]   On January 19, 2018, C.W. filed an Application to Obtain an Order seeking guardianship, parenting time, allocation of parental responsibilities, primary residence of P., and child support retroactive to October 5, 2017 (CEIS Document # 7). CL.H. personally served this document on P.C. on January 21, 2018 (CEIS Document 8). C.W. again states her address is [omitted for publication] Road, Quesnel BC, and P.C.’s address is [omitted for publication] Drive, Quesnel, BC. The document server, CL.H., is married to C.W.’s father, J.W.

[186]   On January 23, 2018, C.W.’s protection order expired by the effluxion of time and was not renewed.

[187]   On January 29, 2018, another copy of the signed Separation Agreement (CEIS Document # 9) was filed with the Quesnel Provincial Court Registry in these proceedings.

[188]   On February 9, 2018 P.C. filed a Reply, stating his address was [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC. He agreed with C.W.’s January 19, 2018 application for guardianship, parenting time, allocation of parenting responsibilities, child support and primary residence (CEIS Document #10). He states:

[189]   P.C. disagreed with retroactive child support to October 5, 2017, and states:

[190]   P.C. counterclaimed for guardianship, parenting time and allocation of parental responsibilities.

[191]   C.W.’s January 19, 2018 Application and P.C.’s February 9, 2018 Reply with Counterclaim came before the Court for a first appearance on March 14, 2018 (CEIS Document #11). C.W. attended in person and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. K. Thompson. P.C. attended in person and represented by duty counsel, Ms. D. O’Leary. At that time, the parties’ reciprocating applications were adjourned to a Family Case Conference (“FCC”) at 2:00 pm on April 11, 2018.

[192]   C.W. states in her March 22, 2019 Affidavit (CEIS Document #25), that P.C. texted her on February 14, 2018, and asked to see P., however, she refused his request on the advice of SW Corina Fransen.

[193]   On April 11, 2018 (CEIS Document #13) C.W. attended the FCC in person and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. K. Thompson; P.C. attended in person and self-represented. At the conclusion of the FCC, Judge Galbraith made an interim consent order as follows:

[194]   On April 20, 2018, Corina Fransen filed an application for a protective intervention order under s. 28 of the Child, Family and Community Services Act (“CFCSA”), in Provincial Court CFCSA File 17584, Quesnel Registry. Ms. Fransen is a social worker in the employ of MCFD in Quesnel, BC, and a Delegate of the Director of the CFCSA in that matter.

[195]   On April 24, 2018, Ms. Fransen filed an affidavit in support of the Director’s application in CFCSA File 17584. A copy of this affidavit is exhibited to C.W.’s affidavit filed in these proceedings on March 22, 2019 (CEIS Document #25). SW Fransen states that MCFD has been involved with P.C. at various times for various reasons. In her affidavit, Ms. Fransen states:

[196]   SW Fransen states at paras. 18 and 19:

[197]   The Director’s s. 28 CFCSA protective intervention application filed April 20, 2018, commenced on May 1, 2018. Ms. K. Surcess appeared as counsel for the Director and agent for Mr. Thompson and C.W. SW Fransen appeared at the hearing as social worker and Delegate for the Director and P.C. appeared on his own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Galbraith made an interim order pursuant to s. 28(5.1) and s. 28(5) of the CFCSA and adjourned the matter to the Judicial Case Manager on May 23, 2018, to fix a one-half day hearing of the Director’s April 20, 2018 application. The order prohibited P.C., on an interim basis, from contacting E.C., L.C. or P. until the conclusion of the protective intervention hearing.

[198]   On May 23, 2018, the Director withdrew its April 20, 2018 application for a protective intervention order in CFCSA File 17584, thus concluding that proceeding.

[199]   SW Fransen states in her March 15, 2019 affidavit that in order to address MCFD protection concerns, P.C. was required to participate in and complete a number of services. She confirms (at para. 5), P.C. completed the following:

[200]   While C.W. worked, P. attended the [omitted for publication] day care in Quesnel, BC, operated by A.L.B. (see: CEIS Document #16). P.’s daycare cost $443.77, per month of which $156.23 was subsidized by the BC Child Care Subsidy Plan.

[201]   MCFD arranged for P.C. to have parenting-time visits with P. supervised by Axis on a weekly basis. These supervised parenting-time visits occurred between June 21, 2018, and August 23, 2018. Ms. Fransen states in her March 15, 2019 affidavit (CEIS Document #20):

[202]   I glean from C.W.’s affidavit sworn March 22, 2019 (CEIS Document #25), the missing and cancelled visits arose because:

[203]   I understand the Axis visits were approximately one hour and 15 minutes in length.

[204]   C.W. says that after the August 23, 2018 parenting time visit she developed concerns with the Axis visits because P. had been returned to her with “poopey diapers” and unfed even though she was supplying food for P. Moreover, on August 23, 2018, P. was returned to C.W. with a large bruise below her eye and no explanation as to its origin. C.W. relayed her concerns about the Axis visits to SW Fransen.

[205]   Because SW Fransen did not respond to her concerns, C.W. refused to allow P. to attend any further supervised parenting-time visits with her father at Axis.

[206]   C.W. has not provided the Court with any records from Axis or a medical practitioner in relation to the bruise.

[207]   On September 11, 2018, C.W. and P.C. met to discuss his parenting time with P. Their affidavits express opposing views on what happened at the meeting; see: C.W.’s March 22, 2019 Affidavit (CEIS Document #25) and P.C.’s March 22, 2019 Affidavit (CEIS Document #22).

[208]   MCFD ceased having protection concerns with respect to P.C. and P. in October 2018: see SW Fransen’s March 15, 2019 affidavit (CEIS Document # 20). MCFD closed its family service file which it confirmed in a letter to P.C. dated November 9, 2018 (CEIS Document # 20).

[209]   After P.C. received the November 9, 2018 MCFD letter, he texted C.W. asking to see P.

[210]   On November 16, 2018, C.W. agreed to meet with P.C. at Tim Horton’s at 4:30 p.m. on November 19, 2018, to discuss his parenting time with P.

[211]   On November 16, 2018, P.C. filed a Notice of Motion returnable December 12, 2018, for a hearing on his February 9, 2018 counterclaim for parenting time (CEIS Document #18).

[212]   On November 19, 2018, P.C., accompanied by his sister, K.O., met with C.W., who, in turn, was accompanied by her mother, S.W., at Tim Hortons, in Quesnel. P.C. sought to negotiate his parenting time with P.  C.W. advised P.C. she would only consent to P. having parenting time with him if one of C.W.’s family members supervised it. P.C. was not prepared to exercise parenting time on these terms. By all accounts, the meeting did not go well.

[213]   On December 12, 2018, P.C.’s November 16, 2018 Notice of Motion came before Judge Galbraith for a first appearance. Mr. K. Thomson appeared as counsel and agent for C.W.; P.C. appeared in person and represented by his present legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. At that time, Judge Galbraith adjourned P.C.’s November 16, 2018 Notice of Motion to March 22, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. for a one day hearing. Judge Galbraith ordered the witnesses’ direct evidence be tendered in affidavit form and opposing counsel had leave to cross-examine on those affidavits.

[214]   On March 7, 2019, the Quesnel Court Registry notified C.W. and P.C. their family law matter was scheduled for hearing in Quesnel Provincial Court on July 12, 2019 (CEIS Document #19).

[215]   On March 15, 2019, Ms. Corina Fransen filed an affidavit (CEIS Document #20) confirming:

[216]   On March 22, 2019, P.C. filed an affidavit in which he states, among other things, that he had no parenting time with P. from January 7, 2018 until June 21, 2018, or from August 23, 2018, to March 22, 2019. He also sets out the difficulties he had trying to negotiate parenting time issues with C.W.

[217]   On March 22, 2019, C.W. filed an affidavit setting out a chronology of the parenting P.C. had with P. since January 7, 2018. C.W. agrees P. did not have parenting time with her father since her parents’ separation except for the one hour and 15 minute supervised visits at Axis on June 21, 2018, July 5, 2018, August 2, 16 and 23, 2018. C.W. claimed that after P.’s first supervised visit with P.C. on June 21, 2018, “P. was completely changed and would cry if she lost sight of me.” C.W. set out in her affidavit the various reasons she had withheld or refused P. having parenting with P.C. for the past 14 months.

[218]   On March 22, 2019, Ms. Hauser’s legal assistant, Christa Champagne filed an affidavit setting out a chronology of Ms. Hauser’s attempts to schedule a one day hearing of P.C.’s application for parenting time with P. (CEIS Document #23).

[219]   On March 22, 2019, S.W. filed an affidavit (CEIS Document # 24) setting out her version of the meeting which occurred in Tim Horton’s on November 19, 2018, involving P.C., C.W., K.O., and S.W.

[220]   P.C.’s November 16, 2018 Notice of Motion came before Judge Bayliff for a one-day hearing on March 22, 2019, as scheduled. C.W. attended in person and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. K. Thompson; P.C. attended in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. The parties agreed to convert the hearing into a lengthy FCC. At its conclusion, the parties consented to a without prejudice order on the following terms:

[221]   On April 4, 2019, C.W. filed a Notice of Motion seeking to amend Judge Bayliff’s March 22, 2018 Order to permit her to continue to supervise P.’s parenting time with P.C. (CEIS Document # 27).

[222]   In support of her April 4, 2019 Notice of Motion, C.W. filed an affidavit on April 4, 2019 (CEIS Document # 26), in which she states P.’s parenting time with P.C. did not go well. Specifically, C.W. claims P. was hesitant, anxious, upset, and hysterical during her visits with P.C. As a result of this experience, P. became anxious and clingy, crying at day care, and distant to her loved ones. She stopped sleeping and woke during the night multiple times, crying out “mommy.”

[223]   On April 4, 2019, R.H. filed an affidavit (CEIS Document #28), in which he states that he supervised P.C.’s one hour parenting-time visits with P. on March 26, 27, 2019, April 2, 2019 and April 3, 2019. R.H. states that in her first visits with P.C., P. did not interact well with her father. The fourth visit on April 3, 2019, went “fairly good”, and P.C.’s sister (K.O.) was with him and that helped with the visit. R.H. opined it “wouldn’t hurt” to have C.W. stay 20 minutes into the visit just to see how P. was going to respond to the visit.

[224]   On May 8, 2019, C.W. filed a Notice of Motion (CEIS Document #34), returnable May 9, 2019, in Quesnel Provincial Court seeking an order that Judge Bayliff’s March 22, 2018 Order be varied to, (a) suspend P.C.’s unsupervised parenting time with P.; (b) limit P.C.’s parenting time to one hour (between 4:00 – 5:00 p.m.), Tuesday and Wednesday each week; (c) require P.C.’s one hour parenting time with P. be supervised by either R.H., J.W. or any such other person as may be agreed upon by the parties in writing; (e) P.C.’s exercise his parenting time with P. in a public place.

[225]   On May 9, 2019, C.W.’s Notice of Motion came before Judge Galbraith for hearing. C.W. attended in person and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. G. Petrisor; P.C. attended in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. On that date, Judge Galbraith ordered on an interim without prejudice basis:

[226]   On May 16, 2019, J.W. filed an affidavit (CEIS Document # 37), detailing his supervision of P.C.’s one hour parenting-time visits with P. on April 9, April 10, April 17, April 23, April 24 and April 30, 2019. J.W. concluded :

[227]   On July 10, 2019, C.W. filed her own affidavit (CEIS Document #42) as well as affidavits from CL.H. (CEIS Document #40), S.W. (CEIS Document #41).

[228]   In her July 10, 2019 affidavit C.W. set out the history of her relationship with P.C. She alleged P.C., (a) was physically and verbally abusive to her; (b) threatened her; (c) when angry, slammed door, destroyed furniture and punched holes in walls; (d) drove dangerously to frighten her; (e) abused alcohol and cocaine; (f) physically abused and neglected his sons, E.C. and L.C.; and (g) ignored P. when she was a baby. C.W. details in her affidavit her perception of P.C.’s parenting-time visits with P. on March 26 and 27, 2019, April 2, 3, 9, 10, 16, 17, 23, 24, 30, May 1, 7, 8, 15, 16, 22, 23, 29, 30, June 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, 26. C.W. also particularizes P.’s adverse reaction to having parenting time with her father. C.W. concludes at para. 50:

[229]   CL.H. is C.W.’s step-mother and a person C.W. asked to supervise P.C.’s parenting-time visits with P. on May 15, 22, 29, June 5, 12, 19, 26, 2019. CL.H provided an extremely detailed account of those visits and at para. 4 of her affidavit, stated:

[230]   S.W. is C.W.’s mother, and a person C.W. asked to supervise P.C.’s parenting-time visits with P. on May 7, 16, 23, 30, June 6, 13,19, 20, 2019. S.W. also provided extremely detailed account of those visits with particular emphasis on what she perceived as P.C.’s short-comings.

[231]   This matter came on for hearing on July 12, 2019. C.W. attended in person and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. G. Petrisor. P.C. attended in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Galbraith made an interim consent without prejudice order:

[232]   The FCC was scheduled for November 26, 2019 (CEIS Document #44). The trial was scheduled for March 2, 3, 4, 5, 2020, with a Pre-Trial Conference on January 15, 2020 (CEIS Document #45).

[233]   On September 20, 2019, C.W. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules, including all attachments listed on Page 2 of that Form. This document indicates C.W. earned an annual Guideline income of $60,619 from her employment as a [omitted for publication] in Quesnel. She also receives $3,960 annual child support from P.C. (CEIS Document #49).

[234]   On September 20, 2019, C.W. filed a Notice of Motion (CEIS Document #50) seeking the following interim orders:

[235]   On September 20, 2019, C.W. filed an affidavit in support of her Notice of Motion of that same date (CEIS Document #48).

[236]   On October 28, 2019, C.W.’s Notice of Motion came before Judge Galbraith for hearing. C.W. appeared in person and represented by Ms. S. Elson, as agent for C.W.’s legal counsel, Mr. G. Petrisor. P.C. appeared in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. At that time, Judge Galbraith made an interim consent order that:

[237]   On November 26, 2019, P.C. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement in which he stated his annual Guideline income for child support purposes is $73,354 (CEIS Document # 52). He also indicated in his expenses he paid to C.H. $9,600 annually for child support (for L.C. and E.C.) and $3,960 in child support to C.W. for P.  P.C. attached to his Financial Statement three of his most recent pay statements from [omitted for Publication], together with his 2016, 2017 and 2018 Individual Income Tax Returns.

[238]   This matter came before Judge Galbraith on November 26, 2019, for a FCC (CEIS Document #53). C.W. attended in person and represented by Mr. J. Tryczynski, agent for her legal counsel, Mr. G. Petrisor. P.C. attended in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. At that time, Judge Galbraith ordered by consent:

[239]   This matter came before Judge Gray on January 15, 2020, for a Pre-Trial Conference. Mr. Petrisor appeared as counsel and agent for C.W. and P.C. appeared in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. Hauser. On that date, the matter was adjourned to February 25, 2020, for an FCC.

[240]   On or about January 31, 2020, C.H. made a complaint to MCFD that P.C. was physically disciplining E.C. and L.C. MCFD instructed C.H. and C.W. to refuse P.C.’s parenting time with E.C., L.C. and P. while they investigated the complaint. After a week, MCFD closed its files and took no further action.

[241]   On February 25, 2020, this matter came before Judge Galbraith for a further FCC. C.W. appeared in person and represented by her legal counsel Mr. G. Petrisor; P.C. appeared in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. At that time Judge Galbraith made the following interim consent:

[242]   On March 2, 2020, this matter came before Judge Mengering for the commencement of a four-day trial. Mr. J. Tryczynski appeared as agent for Ms. Hauser, legal counsel for P.C.  C.W. was present and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. G. Petrisor. On that day the existing trial dates (March 2 to 5, 2020) were cancelled by consent and the matter was referred to the Judicial Case Manager to reschedule the four-day trial with a pre-trial conference 60 days in advance for the first trial date.

[243]   On March 17, 2020, BC Provincial Health Officer Dr. Bonnie Henry issued an order declaring a state of emergency pursuant to s. 52(5) of the Public Health Act in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. This declaration has been extended a number of times and remains in effect. C.W. began working from home and P.C. was laid off. C.W. and P.C. agreed to suspend his visits with P. in the early months of the pandemic. After a couple of weeks P.C. began having electronic parenting time with P. by telephone.

[244]   On August 12, 2020, P.C. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement attaching his 2019, 2018, 2017, and 2016 Individual Income Tax Returns (CEIS Document #63). These returns indicate P.C. earned $80,645.86 in 2019, $74,355.81 in 2018, $62,050.74 in 2017, and $66,761.11 in 2016. P.C. declared his annual Guideline income for 2020 as $84,493.98. P.C. continued to work as a labourer at [omitted for publication] in Quesnel, BC. He indicated he paid $22,980 per year in child support.

[245]   This matter came before Judge Galbraith on August 12, 2020, for a Pre-Trial Conference. C.W. attended in person and represented by her legal counsel, Mr. G. Petrisor; P.C. attended in person and represented by his legal counsel, Ms. C. Hauser. On that date, Judge Galbraith ordered the parties to exchange their list of witnesses and any documents and financial statements with attachments they intend using at the trial by September 4, 2020.

[246]   On August 27, 2020, C.W. filed a Form 4 Financial Statement, in which she declared an annual Guideline income of $58,435.38 and incurred expenses totalling $62,874.24 (which include savings in the amount of $2,700). C.W. attached to the Form 4, (a) a copy of her Pay Statement from [omitted for publication] for the period August 1, 2020 to August 14, 2020, (b) her 2019 Notice of Assessment indicating her total income for that taxation year was $61,201; (c) her 2018 Notice of Assessment indicating in that year she earned a total income of $48,636; (d) and her 2017 Notice of Assessment indicating she earned $45,927.37. (CEIS Document # 63).

[247]   On or about September 14 or 15, 2020, C.H. made a complaint to MCFD that P.C. was physically disciplining E.C. and L.C. MCFD asked C.H. and C.W. to refuse P.C.’s parenting time with any of his children while they investigated this latest complaint. MCFD social workers interviewed E.C. and L.C. and after a week and one-half, closed its file and took no further action.

[248]   The trial of this matter commenced before me on October 5, 2020, and continued on October 6, 7 and 8, 2020. On October 5, 6 and 7, 2020, I heard the evidence-in-chief and cross-examination of the applicant, C.W. On October 6, 2020, I heard the evidence-in-chief and cross-examination of P.’s day-care provider, A.S. On October 7 and 8, 2020, I heard the evidence-in-chief and cross-examination of C.H., the mother of P.C.’s sons, E.C. and L.C. On October 8, 2020, I heard the evidence-in-chief and cross-examination of C.W.’s mother, S.W. and mother-in-law, CL.H.

[249]   I do not intend to provide a summation of evidence of each witness. Suffice to say, that I have considered all the written and oral evidence available to me in the context of determining what is in P.’s best interests. I am acutely aware that P.C. has not yet had an opportunity to respond to the applicant’s evidence.

[250]   P.C. seeks an interim order allowing him to have increased parenting time with P. pending the conclusion of this trial. This necessitates a termination or variation of Judge Galbraith’s February 25, 2020 interim order which was made by consent at a FCC hearing.

[251]   Section 216 of the FLA authorizes the Court to make interim orders for temporary relief. It states:

[252]   The primary purpose of interim orders in family law proceedings is to preserve the status quo: Kouznetsova v. Kouznetsov, 2014 BCCA 160 at para. 44. Interim orders provide short‑term solutions until the best interests of the child can be fully canvassed at trial: Fitzgibbon v. Fitzgibbon, 2014 BCCA 403, Justice D. Smith states [citations omitted]:

[253]   J. T. v. J. A. S., Mr. Justice Weatherill noted at para. 21 that interim proceedings are purposefully summary and are intended to bridge the gap between the commencement of an action and trial.

[254]   In I.F. v. R.J.R. 2015 BCSC 793, Madam Justice Ballance in the course of dealing with an interim application for spousal support made the following general remarks about interim orders:

[255]   When the Court is faced with an application to vary or suspend an interim order, the focus is on protecting the status quo, unless there is a relevant change in circumstances or new evidence. In B.K. v. J.B., 2015 BCSC 1481, Holmes J. was asked to consider the applicability of s. 216 and s. 47 of the FLA to an application to vary a consent parenting order made at a judicial case conference. She notes at para. 27 that while interim orders dealing with parenting must consider the best interests of the children, it will “not usually be practicable to conduct a complete consideration of those best interests within the inherently limited context of an interim application.” At paras. 28 and 29, she explains the proper application of s. 216 to interim orders:

[256]   A change of circumstances or new evidence sufficient to engage s. 216(3) must be material to the best interests of the children. It must be change, such that, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms. If the matter which is relied on as constituting a change was known at the relevant time, it cannot be relied on as the basis for variation: S.M.C. v C.B, 2020 BCSC 226 (CanLII), at para. 18.

[257]   In C.T.H. v C.H.H., 2018 BCSC 189 (CanLII), Justice Pearlman considered an interim application in which the claimant sought (a) share equal parenting time with two children of the marriage; (b) defined parenting time for holidays and family vacations and events; (c) a declaration that the parties share joint guardianship of the children; (d) an order that each party is entitled to exercise all of the parental responsibilities set out in s. 41 of the FLA; and (e) an order for child support. Justice Pearlman canvassed the authorities on interim applications and goes on to state at para. 44:

[258]   Although ultimately rejecting the claimant’s application in favour of the status quo, Justice Pearlman did consider all the s. 37(2) factors necessary for determining the child’s best interests.

[259]   When Judge Galbraith made his February 25, 2020 interim consent order, the trial was scheduled to proceed on March 2-5, 2020. The trial was adjourned on the first day of trial (March 2, 2020) and rescheduled for October 5-8, 2020. The trial proceeded on October 5, 2020, but did not complete. I note that since March 22, 2019, the parties had addressed P.C.’s parenting time in court on a number of occasions. P.C.’s parenting time with P. progressed incrementally, given her young age and P.C.’s absence for much of her life. I am satisfied that Judge Galbraith’s February 25, 2020 Order was not intended to be the new status quo for over a year. The delay in proceeding to and completing the trial is a significant change of circumstance.

[260]   As the February 25, 2020 Order was made in a Family Case Conference, I do not have a benefit of an evidentiary record. What I have before me is the entire Court file and the oral evidence of five of the applicant’s witnesses. P. is only three years old, so a. s. 211 Views of the Child report is not appropriate. I can say emphatically the Court has significantly more evidence about P.’s circumstances now than it did on February 25, 2020. I conclude there is evidence of a substantial nature that was not available at the time Judge Galbraith made his February 25, 2020 interim consent order. I am satisfied that if Judge Galbraith had this information before him on February 25, 2020, absent the parties’ consent, he would likely have made a different order.

[261]   I am mindful of Justice Balance’s comments about underdeveloped or unavailable evidence. Accordingly, I intend to deal with the evidence in a summary manner and will only make findings of fact as necessary to determine the issues on this application. These are not findings which will bind me for the purposes of adjudicating the case on its merits at the conclusion of the trial.

[262]   This Court’s overarching duty in this matter is P.’s best interests. Section 37(1) of the Family Law Act requires that when a Court makes an Order respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child “the court must consider the best interests of the child only.” Section 37(2) provides a non‑exhaustive list of factors the court must consider in determining the best interests of the child:

[263]   Under s. 37(3):

[264]   Section 37 goes on to provide in subsection (4) that “in making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out in subsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor.”

[265]   Section 39 of the FLA creates a presumption of guardianship in each parent, subject to a contrary agreement or court order. 

[266]   Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the FLA govern parenting arrangements and responsibilities. Section 40(1) provides that only a guardian may have parenting time and parenting time with respect to a child. Section 40(2) creates a presumption that each guardian will exercise all parental responsibilities in consultation with the other guardian, unless consultation would be unreasonable or inappropriate in the circumstances, and again subject to contrary agreement or court order. Section 40(3) provides for the allocation of parental responsibilities between guardians by agreement or order based on the best interests of the child, as defined by the factors set out in s. 37. Section 40(4) states that there is no requirement that parental responsibilities should be allocated equally among guardians, and that no particular parenting arrangement is presumed to be in the best interests of a child.

[267]   Parental responsibilities are specifically listed in s. 41 of the FLA. They include, among other things, (a) making day-to-day decisions affecting the child; (b) making decisions respecting where the child will reside, with whom the child will live and associate; (c) the child’s education and participation in extracurricular activities; (d) and consenting to medical and other health-related treatments.

[268]   Section 42 of the FLA provides that “parenting time” is the time a child is with a guardian, as allocated under an agreement or order. During parenting time, a guardian may exercise the parental responsibilities of making day-to-day decisions affecting the child and having day-to-day care, control, and supervision of the child.

[269]   Much of P.C.’s parenting time in 2018 and 2019 was supervised, with the result that although he had “visits” with P., he had very little, if any, decision-making authority affecting P.’s care.

[270]   Section 45(3) of the FLA states that a court may order that parenting time be supervised if supervision is in the best interests of a child. In Q.B. v. W.I.M., 2014 BCSC 219 (CanLII), Justice Fleming made the following comments about supervised parenting time at para. 42:

[271]   In J.J.T. v. J.A.S., 2015 BCSC 628 (CanLII), Justice Weatherill states:

[272]   Recently, in C.M. v N.L, 2020 BCSC 3 (CanLII), Justice Dillon referenced Q.B. v. W.I.M, in her discussion of supervised parenting time:

[273]   Incrementally, P.C. has obtained court-ordered unsupervised parenting time with P. The existing parenting time order is that set out in Judge Galbraith’s February 25, 2020 consent order, which provided P.C. have parenting time with P.: (a) every second Tuesday between 4:00 p.m. - 6:15 p.m.; (b) every Wednesday from 3:45 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.; and (c) every Thursday from 4:00 p.m. - 6:15 p.m.. This parenting arrangement was frustrated temporarily by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is ongoing.

[274]   Judge Galbraith’s February 25, 2020 Order was an interim consent order. As the trial of this matter is not going to conclude anytime soon, P.C. seeks to vary the order to increase his parenting time with P.

[275]   I have significant anecdotal evidence of P.’s health and well-being, but no medical records corroborating C.W.’s allegations of injuries, allergies or trauma. I accept P. is ordinarily a healthy, fun-loving, happy-go-lucky child.

[276]   I have heard extensive evidence on C.W.’s exacting standards of child care and how much P. loves to be with her. I accept C.W. is a competent, loving and nurturing guardian to P.

[277]   I also received extensive evidence from C.W. and her witnesses (S.W., CL.H., J.W. and R.H.) that P. was traumatized by her supervised visits with P.C. in the spring of 2019. This surprises me given these visits were for only one hour and supervised in a public place by P.’s loved ones. The veracity of this negative evidence is contradicted by, (a) SW Fransen, who says she received positive reports from Axis of P.C.’s interaction with P.; (b) A.S. [day-care provider] who did not find anything particularly untoward about P.C.’s interactions with P.; and (c) C.H. who supervised at least one of P.C.’s visits with P. and thought it went fine. However, I do accept that by the time he was able to obtain some court-ordered parenting time, P.C. was a stranger to P. I would not expect a two-year-old to instantly bond with a parent she likely did not recognize.

[278]   I have heard evidence from C.W., her mother and step-mother, that when not traumatized, P. was either indifferent to or disinterested in spending time with her father. I note that immediately upon her separation from P.C. in January 2018, C.W. enlisted her family and C.H. as allies in these proceedings. I am left with the impression that P.’s mother and grandparents see little value in P. having a meaningful relationship with her father. As their animus against P.C. is so acute, and P. is so young, I am not prepared to afford much weight to the W. family’s hearsay evidence as to what P. said or felt about her parenting time with her father.

[279]   The evidence indicates that P. has a close and loving relationship with her maternal family, which includes C.W., S.W., J.W., CL.H., and perhaps even S.W.’s now estranged partner, R.H. I gather P. has somewhat of a nascent relationship with P.C., but has bonded with E.C., L.C. and K.O.  P. is blessed by having many people from her maternal and paternal families who love and care for her, including her parents, grandparents, siblings, aunts, uncles and cousins.

[280]   C.W. has been P.’s primary caregiver since birth. When C.W. returned to work, P. began attending daycare. P.’s maternal grandmother, S.W., also assists with child care.

[281]   After a lengthy absence, P.C. attempted to reintegrate into P.’s life in the spring of 2019. This process began as a series of supervised one-hour visits in public places, with the expectation P.C.’s parenting time would evolve into more substantive unsupervised parenting time. This did not happen and on May 9, 2019, Judge Galbraith granted C.W.’s application to suspend that portion of Judge Bayliff’s March 22, 2019 Order allowing P.C.’s some unsupervised parenting time with P.  P.C. eventually obtained unsupervised parenting time with P. on December 10, 2019. P.C. has not had any overnight or weekend parenting time with P., nor any visits over 2 ½ hours.

[282]   With the onset of COVID-19, C.W.’s daycare provider (A.S.), has asked that only two people be involved transitioning any particular child to or from her daycare. C.W. notified the daycare that she and her mother, S.W., would be the two people who transitioned P.  C.W. chose S.W. as the second person entitled to pickup P. after daycare because she is generally available. A.S. also asks that parents refrain from picking up a child before 3:00 p.m. because it is too disruptive to the other children. Presently, P.C. is unable to pickup P. from daycare because of A.S.’s restrictions and C.W.’s choices.

[283]   P.C. has consistently sought increased parenting time with P. through the courts. He has unfailingly attended all court appearances. Until the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic, I am not aware of P.C. missing any of his court-ordered visits with P.  P.C. and C.W. agreed to suspend P.C.’s visits with P. at the end of March 2020, to reduce the child’s potential exposure to the virus. These visits resumed at the end of June 2020. P.C. even attempted to spend time with P. while she was at daycare, but A.S. could not accommodate his request.

[284]   P. is still very young, so she requires a stable and consistent parenting schedule with both her guardians.

[285]   I have no doubt that C.W. is capable of exercising her parenting responsibilities to P. I have less information about P.C.’s circumstances, however, I note that P.C.:

[286]   C.W. testified that while they were a couple, P.C. regularly drank alcohol, sometimes to excess. He also used cocaine on occasion. C.W.’s allegations of substance misuse concerned SW Fransen, and she asked him to submit to a random drug test, which he initially refused to do. I note in 2018, P.C. attended drug and alcohol counselling at the Quesnel Tillicum Society to SW Fransen and the clinician’s satisfaction. I heard evidence from CL.H. she observed a beer can in close proximity to P.C.’s truck while it was parked in the Safeway parking lot while transitioning P.  CL.H. assumed P.C. had consumed and discarded the beer can. She photographed it and provided this evidence to C.W. I have not yet heard P.C.’s response to these allegations and I do not share CL.H.’s assumptions.

[287]   I accept P.C.’s initial parenting-time visits with P. in the spring of 2019 did not go well; however, I am not prepared to hold him solely responsible for their lack of success. I am troubled by the manner in which C.W. and her family members supervised P.’s parenting time with her father. P.C. was not on bail or probation or subject to a MCFD supervision order. The supervised visits were intended to reintroduce P.’s father into her life after a significant absence. The lay supervisors seem to have regarded these visits as an opportunity to collect evidence to use against P.C. in these proceedings rather than to facilitate his reunification with his daughter. In my view, the degree to which every second of his visit was scrutinized and documented is disturbing.

[288]   I am left with the impression that C.W. and her supervisors never missed an opportunity to cast P.C. in the worst possible light. For example, in her affidavit of July 10, 2019, C.W. criticizes P.C. for leaving L.C., who was ill, in his vehicle on June 26, 2019. She said it was a hot day and the windows were up and the vehicle was not running. In CL.H.’s affidavit filed the same day, she said (at para. 3(g)) that June 26, 2019, was “a wet and cold day.”

[289]   C.W. claims that P. was exposed to family violence when P.C. assaulted her on January 7, 2018, when she was holding P. I gather from the tenor of Ms. Hauser’s cross-examination, P.C. does not agree with C.W.’s version of the altercation. In any event, the police investigated the incident and declined to forward charges to the Crown against P.C. (or C.W.). I am not prepared to make any findings with respect to this incident until I have heard all the evidence. I gather P. was not injured because C.W. left her with S.W. and went to the hospital to attend to her own injuries. Once again, I have not been provided with any medical records which corroborate C.W.’s version of events.

[290]   C.W. says that one of the reasons she refused any further Axis visits was because P. was returned to her with a bruise under her eye on August 23, 2018. She also testified that P. had a bruise under her eye after a parenting-time visit with P.C. sometime in 2019. At these times, all of P.C.’s visits were extremely short and supervised. I have no evidence from the supervisors that P. was injured during P.C.’s visits. Neither parent nor the daycare provider appear to know the origins of the bruise P. displayed in 2019. C.W. testified that P. is a clumsy child who often sustains bruises when she is in her care. All but an hour or two of P.’s time preceding the appearance of the bruise was spent in the care of persons other than P.C.  C.W. has never sought medical care for these bruises. It does not follow that because C.W. does not know the origin of the bruise, it must have been P.C.’s fault.

[291]   Both C.W. and C.H. testified that when angry, P.C. has damaged furniture or walls. Neither has been in a relationship with P.C. for some time. I recognize that P.C. was very young when he first became involved with C.H. and C.W. For the purposes of this application, I accept on the limited evidence before me, there were times when P.C. behaved like a petulant young man. When he separated from C.W. in January 2018, P.C. was a father to three children: E.C., who was three years old, L.C., then two, and P. who was eight months. P.C. was only 24 years old. He had been a labourer in a [omitted for publication] mill and a farmhand on his father’s cattle ranch for a number of years. He barely had time to mature and refine his parenting or relationship skills.

[292]   Far more troubling for this Court are C.H.’s allegations of P.C. physically disciplining E.C. and L.C. However, I note that in her March 15, 2019 affidavit, SW Fransen states MCFD had no further child protection concerns vis-à-vis P.C. and his children after October 2018. After a few months of resistance, P.C. engaged with MCFD and completed various programs the social workers thought necessary. C.H. has complained to MCFD at the end of January 2020 and again in mid-September 2020 about P.C.’s parenting skills. C.W. supported C.H.’s MCFD complaint. Each time C.H. complained, MCFD opened a file, suspended P.C.’s parenting time with all of his children, including P., interviewed the boys, investigated the complaint, and within a week to 10 days, closed its file and took no further action.

[293]   I have not heard from P.C. and his witnesses about these allegations. I understand P.C. is also calling SW Fransen as a witness. I am confident she will explain to the Court why it was MCFD did not initiate proceedings under the CFCSA against P.C. as a result of the January and September 2020 complaints.

[294]   Both C.W. and C.H. are embroiled in litigation against P.C.  C.W. testified she kept detailed notes of every interaction she ever had with P.C. I gather her mother, father, and step-mother followed suit. It goes without saying that a witness’ motive to give evidence is a relevant factor in assessing his or her credibility. I am not in a position to assess the veracity of C.W. and C.H.’s allegations without having heard all the evidence. Still, I cannot simply ignore that domestic violence has been a recurring theme in P.C.’s relationships.

[295]   C.W. blames P.C. for their marital discord. I suspect P.C. will also have something to say about their short and tumultuous relationship. I am mindful that in N.R.G. v. G.R.G., 2017 BCCA 407, at para. 44, the Court emphasized the correct approach in analysing issues regarding parenting time is a full and generous consideration of the best interests of the child, as opposed to the attitudes and behaviours of the parents. I am not convinced that all the issues giving rise to C.W. and P.C.’s separation need to be thoroughly thrashed out in order to determine an appropriate parenting arrangement for P.

[296]   Because of the manner in which P.’s parenting time with each of her parents evolved, P.C. had very little input in her upbringing. C.W. considers herself the arbiter of how P. ought to be cared for with little regard to anything P.C. might have to say about the matter. I accept C.W. is a caring, loving and competent parent with firmly entrenched views on what she considers is in P.’s best interest. Nevertheless, P. is entitled to have a meaningful relationship with both her parents. C.W. and P.C. are entitled to parent in their own fashion provided they have P.’s best interests at heart. Obviously, they should work together to address significant issues impacting P.’s life. I am not convinced, however, that P.’s need for stability demands seamless consistency between C.W. and P.C.’s day-to-day parenting routines and preferences.

[297]   I am not aware of any other criminal, civil or child protection proceedings involving C.W., P.C. and P. I understand P.C. and C.H. are involved in family law proceedings with respect to E.C. and L.C. I do not know the status of that proceeding or how it might impact on P.’s safety, security or well-being. C.W. and C.H. facilitate visits with E.C. and L.C. and P. and I accept the siblings enjoy one another’s company.

[298]   I am satisfied that P.C.’s parenting time with and parenting responsibilities for P. needs to increase, albeit incrementally. Therefore, I make the following orders: