IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

[1]           L.R. is before the Court for sentencing after pleading guilty to four offences on two Informations. On April 17, 2020, L.R. pled guilty to the sole count of driving while prohibited on August 8, 2019, on the Nisga'a Highway (Highway 113) near New Aiyansh (Gitlax̱t'aamik), BC. He has also pled guilty to three offences charged under Information 34703-1-K, as a result of a violent altercation with his former spouse, C.L., and the investigating RCMP officers on February 18, 2020, at [omitted for publication], BC. Specifically, L.R. pled guilty to assaulting C.L., threatening Constables Peel and Stepec, and while carrying a knife and baton assaulting Corporal Gill.

[2]           L.R. is a relatively youthful offender with no prior criminal record. The Crown and Defence jointly submit the Court impose the statutory minimum sentence for the Motor Vehicle Act offences and a 90 day global sentence for the Criminal Code offences followed by one year probation with a number of mandatory ancillary orders.

[3]           The salient issue today is whether the Court ought to accept the Crown and Defence joint submission as to sentence for the Criminal Code offences.

[4]           Count 1 of Information 34532-1 charges L.R. on August 8, 2019, at or near New Aiyansh, BC, with driving a motor vehicle of a highway or industrial road, knowing he was prohibited from doing so under s. 251(4) of the Motor Vehicle Act, RSBC 1996 (“MVA”) contrary to s. 95(1) of the MVA.

[5]           On August 8, 2019, Constable Woods of the Nass Valley detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) conducted a traffic stop of a GMC Pickup on the Nisga’a Highway (Highway 113) near New Aiyansh (Gitlax̱t'aamik), BC. L.R. was driving the vehicle and Constable Woods recognized him from previous police interactions. When Constable Woods asked for his driver’s licence, L.R. admitted he had none. L.R.’s driver’s abstract (Exhibit 1) indicates that between 2013 and 2016 he had been convicted of four previous violations for driving without a licence contrary to s. 24 (1) of the MVA and one for driving without insurance contrary to s. 24(3). On February 16, 2016, the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles imposed upon L.R. an indefinite driving prohibition pursuant to s. 251(4) of the MVA.

[6]           Information 34703-1-K charges L.R. with eight violent offences which allegedly occurred on February 18, 2020 at or near [omitted for publication], BC. On April 17, 2020, L.R. pled guilty to the following three offences:

[7]           It is anticipated at the conclusion of this sentencing hearing, the Crown will direct a stay of proceedings of the remaining counts on Information 34703-1, charging L.R. with the following offences, also alleged to have occurred on February 18, 2020, at or near [omitted for publication] BC:

[8]           L.R. and C.L. resided in [omitted for publication], BC. They had a twelve-year relationship and are the biological parents of two children, X.R., who is four years old, and R.R. who is two. On February 12, 2020, their relationship, always tumultuous, came to a cataclysmic end.

[9]           Shortly before 2:00 pm on February 18, 2020, L.R. came to the [omitted for publication], elementary school with his son J.R. to attend X.R.’s birthday party. L.R. encountered C.L. in the school parking lot. L.R. learned C.L. had sent nude or “near nude” photographs of herself to a number of friends and relatives. L.R. was angry and began arguing with her. He grabbed C.L.’ phone and pulled off her necklace. C.L. picked up J.R. and ran to the school office and asked the receptionist to call the police.

[10]        Enraged, L.R. chased after C.L. When he caught up with her in the school office, he grabbed C.L.’ hair and began punching her in the head, even though at the time she was holding J.R. L.R. threw C.L. on the floor and began kicking her in the ribs. Throughout this assault, L.R. was yelling at and threatening C.L.

[11]        Two school staff members witnessed the altercation and tried to intervene, but L.R. pushed them away. Eventually they succeeded in separating L.R. from C.L. L.R. took J.R. and left the school. The staff complained to the RCMP, who came to the school where they found C.L.

[12]        C.L. and the staff member provided Constable Peel with formal statements of the altercation. The staff members observed L.R. punching C.L. in the head while she was holding J.R. and kicking her while she was on the floor. They also heard L.R. threaten C.L.

[13]        L.R. left the school with J.R. He drove to his parents’ residence where he was living and dropped off J.R. unharmed. He asked his parents to keep J.R. safe. L.R. picked up a collapsible baton and a hunting knife at his residence and drove to a friend’s house.

[14]        In an attempt to find him, the police called L.R.’s cell phone. L.R. answered the phone. He told the police he was watching for them in town. He said it would not end this way. He would kill C.L. and her family and then himself. He said he would not cooperate with the police and hung up the phone.

[15]        The police attended the friend’s residence where they believed L.R. might be hiding. When they arrived the officers saw fresh footprints in the snow leading to a smoke shack behind the residence. Constable Peel announced the police presence and drew his firearm. Constable Peel was concerned L.R. may be in possession of weapons given his previous threats.

[16]        Constable Peel entered the smoke shack and found L.R. standing in the corner with his hands behind his back. When he brought them forward from behind his back L.R. was holding a fully extended baton in his left hand and a large hunting knife in his right. Constable Peel ordered L.R. to drop the weapons. L.R. began to cry and yelled at Constable Peel to shoot him. Constable Stepec also drew her firearm, but remained in the doorway of the smoke shack.

[17]        Corporal Gil arrived on the scene and tried to talk to L.R. L.R. refused to drop his weapons and told the officers to shoot him. He said if the officers allowed him to leave he would kill C.L. and her family. L.R. also said he knew where the officers lived, he knew they had families, and that he would get them too if they allowed him to leave the scene and didn’t shoot him.

[18]        As he carried on this conversation with the police, L.R. was sometimes calm, and sometimes enraged and making threats towards the police.

[19]        Eventually L.R. held his weapons up and took a half step forward. Corporal Gill discharged his OC spray (“oleoresin capsicum” or "pepper spray”) on L.R. L.R. took several swings at Corporal Gill with his baton, but did not make contact with Corporal Gill. L.R. eventually dropped both his weapons and the police took him into custody. The police seized and photographed the baton and hunting knife.

[20]        While in custody L.R. fully cooperated with the police. He gave a warned statement in which he admitted to becoming angry and punching C.L. at the elementary school, dropping off J.R. and grabbing his knife and baton from his residence. He denied any recollection of what occurred in the smoke shack except for being pepper sprayed.

[21]        While in custody, L.R. wrote apology letters to C.L., his friend, and his parents. The police took copies of these letters and forwarded them to the Crown Counsel.

[22]        On February 20, 2020, L.R. was detained after a bail hearing and has been in custody now since February 18, 2020.

[23]        L.R. does not dispute the facts as read in by the Crown. I am satisfied the provisions of s. 606(1.1) of the Criminal Code have been complied with and the facts as asserted by the Crown and not disputed by the defence support the charges to which L.R. has entered guilty pleas.

[24]        L.R. is a member of the [omitted for publication] nation. He is also a descendant of the [omitted for publication] nation. He was 27 years old at the time of the offence and at the time of sentencing. He was born and raised in [omitted for publication] BC, and much of his extended family resides in the Nass Valley. He has two siblings, a sister who lives in Kitimat and a brother who is in the process of moving to Terrace, BC.

[25]        Both L.R.’s parents attended residential school. Nevertheless, he did not have a difficult upbringing. His past was not troubled with domestic violence or addictions. He is actively engaged in fishing and hunting and helps provide for elders in the [omitted for publication] community.

[26]        L.R. acknowledges he needs some distance from C.L. He plans to relocate to Terrace to reside with family members for the duration of his one-year probation.

[27]        L.R. is engaged in construction. He has Grade 11, however intends to look into completing his high school education. L.R.’s scholastic efforts have been hindered because of his dyslexia. He does not report any other cognitive issues or mental illness.

[28]        L.R. has the support of his family who are prepared to assist him relocate outside of the Nass Valley for the duration of his probation.

[29]        Neither C.L. nor any of the police officers provided a formal written impact statement, although invited to do so. After the sentencing hearing of this matter which began on April 17, 2020, the Crown Counsel was able to contact the victims to advise them of the proposed disposition of these matters. She was able to speak to C.L. and Constable Stepec about the matter and provided Defence Counsel with a summary of their comments. The Crown Counsel relayed their comments to the Court with their consent and the consent of the Defence Counsel.

[30]        C.L. says she is not concerned for her safety if L.R. were to be released from jail in the near future. She feels safe in the Nass Valley because she has family around her. C.L. is aware L.R. is not welcome in Nass Valley if he were to be released. She says the police have been communicating with her and she feels they are helpful. C.L. does not fear L.R. might breach his conditions to stay away from her. C.L. believes L.R. has learned from this incident and will not risk going back to jail by contacting her. She believes L.R. seeking treatment is a good idea to help him with his emotional issues. C.L. has been working with social worker to facilitate visits between L.R. and X.R. and J.R. C.L. says she did not want to provide a written Victim Impact Statement to the Court because she wants to move on and not think about this matter anymore.

[31]        Ms. Mullins also spoke to Constable Sarah Stepec who is not concerned for her safety if L.R. were to be released in the near future. She believes the Crown’s proposed condition of release would reduce L.R.’s risk of reoffending.

[32]        I have set out below the sections of the Criminal Code relevant to this sentencing hearing:

[33]        This sentencing hearing proceeded before me on April17, 2020, as a joint submission. The Crown and Defence agree to a mandatory minimum sentence on the MVA offence charged under Information 34532-1, which is a $500 fine and a one year driving prohibition pursuant to s. 98 of the MVA. The Court accepts this is an appropriate sentence for the MVA offence.

[34]        On the offence charged under Information 34703-1-K, the Crown and Defence propose a sentence 90 days jail on each of Counts 1, 3, and 5, to be served concurrently, for a global sentence of 90 days jail. Following his release, L.R. would be subject to a one year probation order which, among other things, would highly restrict his contact with C.L. and banish him from the Nass Valley. The sentence order would also include two mandatory ancillary orders attached to Count 5, the offence under s. 270.01(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. These ancillary orders include a DNA order and a mandatory weapons prohibition with exceptions for sustenance hunting under s. 113.

[35]        Supreme Court of Canada held in R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43 a sentencing judge should follow the joint submission unless to do so would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or would otherwise be contrary to the public interest. The public interest test is a high standard and a joint submission should not be rejected lightly:

[36]        At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing on April 17, 2020, I advised counsel I was not persuaded the sentence proposed on Information 34703-1-K was in the public interest.

[37]        The Supreme Court in Anthony-Cooke provided guidance to judges on the approach to take when they have concerns about a joint submission:

[38]        The Supreme Court in R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 and R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, makes it clear that sentencing is a highly individualized process. Nevertheless, the ultimate sentence must be proportional to the seriousness of the offences of which L.R. has been convicted and his degree of responsibility.

[39]        In this case the Crown’s evidence is strong, if not overwhelming. It includes independent eye witnesses, such as the intervening staff members and three police officers, physical evidence, including the baton and knife, L.R.’s warned to statement to the police, and his letters of apology written while in custody. In exchange for an early guilty plea, the Crown agreed to direct a stay of proceedings for half of the offences charged.

[40]        The Crown Counsel who conducted the sentencing hearing was not the Crown who negotiated the plea resolution with the Defence. Accordingly, it is difficult for me to conclude L.R.’s guilty plea was a product of any significant or prolonged plea negotiations between the Crown and Defence.

[41]        After listening to counsel and L.R. at the sentencing hearing on April 17, 2020, I expressed concerns as to the appropriateness of the proposed sentence and adjourned the hearing to the JCM to fix a date for a continuation for further submissions.

[42]        I find the circumstances of the February 18, 2020 offences shocking. Specifically:

[43]        At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing on April 17, 2020, I was troubled by the proposal for concurrent sentences for the offences against C.L. and the police officers, particular in light of s. 270.03 of the Criminal Code which holds a sentence imposed for the offence of assault of a police officer using a weapon must be consecutive to any other punishment imposed for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events.

[44]        I was also troubled about the dearth of information about the victim. The Court had received no victim impact statement from C.L., either in writing or orally. I did not know C.L.’ age or whether she is indigenous or if she has any support in the community. I do not know if she suffered any physical, emotional, or psychological injury. Defence counsel describes L.R. and C.L. as having a tumultuous relationship, which exacerbates my concern for C.L.’ safety. I understood from the Crown that as of April 17, 2020, C.L. is not even aware of the proposed resolution.

[45]        Subsequent to the April 17, 2020 court date, the Crown Counsel was able to contact C.L. and the police officers involved in the February 18, 2020 incident. The Court is now comforted the victims do not assert the incident had a significant impact on their physical or psychological well-being.

[46]        None of the victims have expressed significant safety concerns if and when L.R. is released from custody. Still, I am troubled by L.R. having disavowed any knowledge of his conduct in the smoke shack. All he recalls is being pepper sprayed. He has seemingly forgot wielding weapons, threatening to kill C.L., her family, the police and their families, or demanding the police shoot him. I have no medical evidence to explain this selective memory and despite his professed remorse, I conclude L.R. has little insight into his own motivations and conduct.

[47]        These offences, were violent, prolonged, and uninhibited. There are a myriad of aggravating factors, which include violence against an intimate partner, assaulting police officers with a weapon, and L.R.’s attempted “suicide by cop.” This scenario forces the police to deal violently with the accused. If they discharged their firearms, it may well have cost L.R. his life. It also has the potential to significantly impact the officers, who are not infrequently subjected to public opprobrium for using lethal force.

[48]        On April 20, 2020, Counsel have provided the Court with three cases in support the joint proposal: R. v. Lance, 2018 BCSC 1883, R. v. Delgren, 2019 BCSC 396, R. v. Geraghty, 2019 BCPC 202 (CanLII).

[49]        Lance is a 2018 sentencing decision of Madam Justice Ker. In that case Mr. Lance was convicted after a trial of one count of assault causing bodily harm to a peace officer, contrary to s. 270.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. Like L.R., Mr. Lance had no criminal record. Mr. Lance, intoxicated and unhappy, tackled a police officer lawfully investigating a complaint about an erratic driver operating a truck in an unsafe manner on the town bridge. The officer hit the back of his head on the pavement in the ensuing struggle and sustained some scrapes and bruises and a bite mark.

[50]        Justice Ker considered a number of cases, including R. v. Schur, 2015 BCSC 1406; R. v. Leclerc, 2017 BCCA 228; R. v. Ponticorvo, 2009 ABCA 117.

[51]        In Schur, the offender struggled with the officer during his arrest and pepper sprayed the officer in the face. Another perpetrator struck the officer once in the back. The officer was off work for a month and required multiple treatments to remove the noxious spray from his eyes. The accused had a troubled childhood, was subjected to alcohol and physical abuse in the home, and was in foster care for four years. He became addicted to methamphetamines in his twenties and had attended treatment four times without lasting success. He had a criminal record for property crimes and breaches of court orders and a weapons offence. He was on bail for a conditional sentence order breach at the time of the offence. Justice Blok, the sentencing judge, held that the range of sentence in the circumstances of the offence before him was nine to 18 months' jail. He concluded (at para. 60) that in cases of violent assaults on police officers, a substantial term of imprisonment is usually necessary, though much turns on the nature of the assault and weapon used. Justice Blok found that pepper spray, while noxious, is not a potentially deadly weapon like a gun or knife, and accepted as sincere, the offenders expression of remorse and desire to turn his life. Justice Blok found a sentence of 14 months' jail would have been appropriate for that offence, but reduced it to 12 months to reflect the totality principle in light of that sentence being imposed consecutively to a 12 month sentence for break and enter.

[52]        In Leclerc, the BC Court of Appeal held, barring exceptional circumstances, violent assaults on police officers attract a sentence of one to five years imprisonment (para. 48). Leclerc involved a driver and passenger who attacked a lone police officer who made a demand for a roadside breath sample at a road block on a rural road near Pritchard, BC. The driver refused to comply with the roadside breath demand. He and his male passenger attacked the police officer, punching and stomping the officer. Leaving the officer alone and unconscious, the offenders fled the scene. The entire incident was caught on the officer's dashboard camera.

[53]        The trial judge in Leclerc imposed conditional sentence orders of two years less a day and two years’ probation, which the Crown appealed. The Court of Appeal set aside the conditional sentence orders for the two offenders and imposed conventional jail terms of 12 months imprisonment for the driver, and 15 months imprisonment for the passenger (Mr. Leclerc), who had stomped on the police officer. Justice Saunders for the appellate court commented that police officers hold positions for the protection of the public and are exposed to frequent and significant dangers in the course of their work. Section 718.02 recognizes that offences against police officers are particularly egregious offences against the community itself.

[54]        The Court of Appeal in Leclerc noted (at para. 32) the standard mitigating factors such as the offender’s remorse, lack of criminal record, familial obligations, and employment, while mitigating, were not exceptional circumstances, unusual, or special. These factors did not rise to any unusual levels that might justify deviating from the range.

[55]        Still, in Lance, Justice Ker distinguished Leclerc finding Mr. Lance’s moral culpability much less than the two offenders in Leclerc. Referencing R. v. Voong, 2015 BCCA 285, Justice Ker in Lance found the following factors sufficiently exceptional to justify sentencing below the otherwise range:

[56]        Most of these factors Justice Ker cites are present in the case before me. It bears reiteration that L.R. is charged with assaulting a peace officer with a weapon under s. 270.01(a) and not assault causing bodily harm under s. 270.01(b). In this case there were three peace officers and one offender and none of the peace officers were injured or even contacted with L.R.’s weapons.

[57]        In Delgren the Mr. Justice Harvey dismissed a Crown appeal of a conditional discharge and a two‑year probation order against an offender who pled guilty to assaulting his intimate partner. The assault involved Mr. Delgren straddling the victim while she was lying in bed. Mr. Delgren head-butted then choked her for approximately 30 seconds. The sentencing judge found aggravating the fact the acts of violence were against Mr. Delgren’s intimate partner and were repeated and intensified over the course of four days. The sentencing judge found mitigating the fact Mr. Delgren had no criminal record, demonstrated genuine remorse and insight, had been compliant with his bail conditions for over a year, was an indigenous offender, and was receptive to probationary terms aimed at his rehabilitation and redirection.

[58]        In R. v. Geraghty, 2019 BCPC 202 (CanLII) Judge Crockett imposed a conditional sentence followed by 12 months’ probation on an offender who pled guilty to mischief, uttering threats and assault, and assault causing bodily harm. She ordered a five month conditional sentence for the offence of assault causing bodily harm with one month concurrent conditional sentence for each of the other three counts, followed by 12 months’ probation and restitution. There was no offence against any police officer.

[59]        The victim, Mr. Jones, was a man Mr. Geraghty discovered having an affair with his wife. Judge Crockett described the offences as follows:

[60]        As a result of the assault Mr. Jones suffered a broken bone under his eye, a broken front tooth, head trauma, and a sore shoulder and elbow. He required medical and dental care and took two months to recover and then continued to suffer headaches, nightmares, and anxiety. This assault was prolonged and carried out in the presence of Mr. Geraghty’s spouse and a neighbour. Judge Crockett found Mr. Geraghty’s actions were not only an attempt to deter and inflict harm on Mr. Jones, but also to control his wife.

[61]        Mr. Geraghty had no criminal record and was in good physical and mental health. Although he pled guilty he was unremorseful and demonstrated little insight into his behaviour or its impact on Mr. Jones.

[62]        I also reviewed the decision of R. v. Chaston, 2017 BCCA 430, a Crown appeal of two concurrent 18 month conditional sentences for breaking and entry and assault of a police officer with a weapon (pepper spray). Both sentences were illegal as they were precluded by ss. 742.1(e)(iii)) and (s. 742.1(f)(ix)) of the Criminal Code. In Chaston, as in Lance, the Crown relied on R. v. Leclerc, 2017 BCCA 228; R. v. Ponticorvo, 2009 ABCA 117, and R. v. Schur, 2015 BCSC 1406 in support of its submission that the offence of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty and using a weapon in committing the assault is a serious offence attracting significant incarceration, with general deterrence and denunciation being the paramount sentencing objectives in accordance with s. 718.02 of the Criminal Code.

[63]        In Chaston police officers responded to a call from security personnel reporting of a break and entry into the secure parking lot of a residential complex in Surrey, BC. A police service dog and its handler tracked Mr. Chaston from the parkade and located him concealed in nearby shrubberies. As Mr. Chaston ignored the officer’s command to show himself, the officer deployed his police service dog. The offender sprayed both the dog and the handler with a significant amount of pepper spray. All parties were deleteriously affected by the pepper spray. Mr. Chaston pled guilty and apologized to the police officer at the scene and gave a written apology later.

[64]        The sentencing judge found aggravating, (a) Mr. Chaston’s substantial and related criminal history of property offences, much of it due to his long struggle with substance abuse; (b) the statutorily aggravating factor of assaulting a police officer; and (c) the fact Mr. Chaston was on probation for other property offences when he committed these offences. The sentencing judge found mitigating, (a) Mr. Chaston’s early guilty pleas; (b) the substantial gains Mr. Chaston had made in addressing his drug addiction; and (c) the support Mr. Chaston had from the Vision Quest treatment program, his common law partner, and his grandmother. Mr. Chaston fully complied with his bail conditions which included residing at Vision Quest. He had done well at Vision Quest and rehabilitation had progressed farther than any previous effort. Mr. Chaston became a mentor and a role model and earned the respect of other Vision Quest residents.

[65]        MacKenzie J.A. concluded (at para. 35) Mr. Chaston’s case was not one that justified giving primacy to rehabilitation over deterrence and protection of the public. Parliament has statutorily recognized that assault of a police officer is an aggravating factor for which “the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence” (Criminal Code, s. 718.02). Justice MacKenzie states at para. 34:

[66]        The appellate court confirmed the assault of a police officer with a weapon would justify a 12 month jail sentence as the lower end of a fit sentence. MacKenzie J.A. deducted two months for the mitigating factors of Mr. Chaston’s immediate apology and his very significant efforts at rehabilitation. From the ten remaining months she deducted a further three months for time served on the conditional sentence, leaving seven months. She then deducted 18 days for enhanced pre-sentence custody and a further 12 days for the hardship of the change of sentence, netting a final jail sentence of six months. In light of s. 270.01 Criminal Code restriction on concurrent sentences, the appellate court imposed a suspended sentence with probation for one year for the conviction for the break and enter.

[67]        There is no issue as to the proposed sentence for the driving while prohibited charge under Information 34532-1, which is the statutory minimum sentence.

[68]        As to Counts 1, 3, and 5 of Information 34703-1-K, the sentence for Count 5 cannot be served concurrent to Counts 1 and 3 or either of them. Moreover, the BC Court of Appeal has held for an offence under s. 270.01 of the Criminal Code, barring exceptional circumstances, the range of sentence is one to five years’ incarceration.

[69]        Accordingly I cannot and will not accept the joint submission for sentence on Information 34703-1-K. I invited Counsel to have further discussions and address the issue of whether L.R. ought to be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.

[70]        After a brief adjournment, Defence counsel request I pass sentence on the MVA offence charged under Information 34532-1 and adjourn the continuation of the sentencing hearing on Information 34703-1-K to facilitate the preparation of a Pre-Sentence report, a Gladue report, and a Psychiatric risk assessment report. If the Court granted Defence’s application for an adjournment, L.R. says he will not apply to withdraw his guilty pleas to Counts 1, 3, and 5 of Information 34703-1-K.

[71]        I found the Defence application reasonable and appropriate and the Crown consented to this disposition.

[72]        The sole count of Information 34532-1 charges L.R. on August 8, 2019, at or near New Aiyansh, BC, with driving a motor vehicle on a highway or industrial road, knowing he was prohibited from doing so under s. 251(4) of the Motor Vehicle Act contrary to s. 95(1) of the MVA. I accept his guilty plea to that offence and I find him guilty of that offence. I sentence L.R. to a fine in the amount of $500 and to a one year driving prohibition under s. 98 of the Motor Vehicle Act. There is also a victim fine surcharge associated with this conviction. Both the fine and the surcharge will be payable within one year.

[73]        Also at the request of the Defence and with the consent of the Crown, I order Community Corrections to prepare a Pre-sentence report with a Gladue component and the Forensic Psychiatric Commission to prepare a psychological or psychiatric risk assessment. As L.R. is in custody, I asked these reports be prepared on an expedited basis.

[74]        At the request of the Defence and with the consent of the Crown, the sentencing hearing of Information 34703-1-K, is adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager at 9:30 am, June 16, 2020, to fix a date for its continuation.

[75]        Defence Counsel indicated he will also seek legal aid funding for the preparation of an independent Gladue report.

[76]        L.R. is not applying to withdraw his guilty plea.

[77]        I am seized of this sentencing hearing.

[78]        I confirm that s. 516(3) of the Criminal Code holds that any non-communication order made under s. 515(2) remains in force until it is varied or revoked or the accused is released or acquitted or sentenced.