IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

[1]           A.M.V. and J.R.M. separated in March 2016, after a 13 ½ year relationship. They have three children, C.O.M., who is now 15 years old, C.J.M., who is 13, and G.M.M., now 11. A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s parenting arrangements with respect to the children has changed more than once in the last four years. The parties have sought the assistance of the Court from time to time to resolve various parenting and support issues. On January 29, 2019, A.M.V. and J.R.M. entered into a comprehensive consent order with respect to parenting time, child support, spousal support and parental conduct. As of that date, A.M.V. and J.R.M. agreed to share equal parenting time and responsibilities for the children. J.R.M. was to pay A.M.V. child support pursuant to a simple setoff formulae as well as spousal support.

[2]           On January 25, 2019, C.J.M. went to live full-time with J.R.M. after an altercation with his mother. On June 25, 2019, C.O.M. followed suit, and now lives with her father full-time as well. A.M.V. has had no parenting time with C.J.M. or C.O.M. since they decided to live with their father. A.M.V. and J.R.M. continue to share equal parenting time with G.M.M. A.M.V. blames J.R.M. for C.J.M. and C.O.M.’s ongoing refusal to have parenting time with her. She seeks monetary penalties from J.R.M. for what she says are breaches of the January 29, 2019 order. Initially A.M.V. sought enforcement of the shared parenting arrangement and makeup parenting time but now concedes C.J.M. and C.O.M. will continue to live with J.R.M. full-time for the time being.

[3]           As J.R.M. now has two of his three children living with him full-time and one half-time, he seeks an order terminating the January 29, 2019 order. He asks the Court to make new orders relevant to the present parenting time arrangement, with retroactive adjustments to child support and prospective adjustments to spousal support. A.M.V. acknowledges her obligation to pay child support prospectively, however, says to do so, she will require an increase in spousal support.

[4]           This matter came before me for hearing in Terrace Provincial Court on October 17, 2019, November 25, 2019, and February 28, 2020. I heard oral evidence from A.M.V. and J.R.M. I received into evidence the following documentation and exhibits:

[5]           I heard from Mr. S. Davidson, A.M.V.’s legal counsel, on her behalf, and A.M.V. and J.R.M. on their own behalf. By agreement I also received in camera recorded evidence from C.O.M., C.J.M. and G.M.M. in the presence of the Court clerk and the sheriff, but in the absence of A.M.V., her counsel and J.R.M. C.J.M.’s adult brother, C.M.K., sat as a support person with him during the judicial interview.

[6]           As this matter will continue beyond my decision today, I have included in my Reasons for Judgment a comprehensive review of its procedural history. As J.R.M. is self-represented, I have reproduced the relevant legislation and jurisprudence for ease of reference.

[7]           A.M.V. is 46, old having been born on [omitted for publication] J.R.M. is 49 years old, having been born on [omitted for publication].

[8]           A.M.V. and J.R.M. began dating in October 2001. At that time A.M.V. lived and worked in Terrace, J.R.M. lived and worked in [omitted for publication], BC.

[9]           J.R.M. had been married previously and has three adult sons from that relationship.

[10]        A.M.V. and J.R.M. began cohabitating in October 2002 and separated permanently on March 8, 2016. During this period they both lived in the Terrace area and continue to do so.

[11]        A.M.V. and J.R.M. are the biological parents of C.O.M., born [omitted for publication] 2005 (“C.O.M.”), C.J.M., born [omitted for publication] 2007 (“C.J.M.”), and G.M.M., born [omitted for publication] 2008 (“G.M.M.). I will refer to C.O.M., C.J.M. and G.M.M. collectively as the “children” and to A.M.V. and J.R.M. sometimes individually by their proper name and sometimes as the “parent” or collectively as the “parents”.

[12]        Both A.M.V. and J.R.M. have a high school education. Both are gainfully employed full-time.

[13]        After they separated, A.M.V. and J.R.M. shared equally parenting time of and parenting responsibilities for the children. Initially this arrangement was by agreement, later it was formalized in court orders.

[14]        A.M.V. resides in a four bedroom duplex in [omitted for publication], BC. J.R.M. lives in a three bedroom house in [omitted for publication]. J.R.M.’s residence is the former family home.

[15]        A.M.V. is the manager of [omitted for publication], a large [omitted for publication] store in [omitted for publication], BC. J.R.M. works for his father’s business, M.L. Ltd. in [omitted for publication], BC.

[16]        A.M.V. initiated these family law proceedings on August 30, 2016, seeking orders with respect to guardianship, parenting time, parenting responsibilities, spousal support, child support, a s. 211 FLA report and police enforcement of parenting time. She also filed a Notice Motion on August 30, 2016, seeking an interim order for parenting time on a week on / week off basis and RCMP enforcement of the order.

[17]        A.M.V.’s Notice of Motion came on for hearing before Judge T. Wright on September 7, 2016. A.M.V. was represented by legal counsel, Mr. Brian Crampton, and J.R.M. was represented by legal counsel, Mr. Zachary Blanche. On September 7, 2016, Judge Wright formalized the parents week on / week off shared parenting time regime in an interim consent order. It stated:

[18]        On December 1, 2016, J.R.M. filed a Reply agreeing to shared guardianship and a s. 211 FLA report. He disagreed with A.M.V.’s application for parenting time, allocation of parenting time responsibilities, spousal support, child support and police enforcement of parenting time. He counterclaimed for guardianship, parenting time, allocation of parenting time responsibilities, child support and retroactive support. J.R.M. stated that he paid A.M.V. $600 per month in child support and for most of the children’s special and extraordinary expenses.

[19]        On February 6, 2017, A.M.V. filed a Notice of Motion seeking an order under ss. 61 and 62 of the FLA that J.R.M. had wrongfully withheld the children during her parenting time in the week of February 5 to 11, 2017. She also sought a RCMP apprehension order under s. 231 of the FLA.

[20]        A.M.V.’s February 6, 2017 Notice of Motion came before Judge T. Wright on February 14, 2017. At that time, Judge Wright ordered by consent on an interim basis:

[21]        On February 14, 2017, Judge Wright also ordered a full report under s. 211 of the FLA with respect to all children.

[22]        On March 20, 2017, A.M.V. filed her Form 4 Financial Statement with the Court and on May 30, 2017, J.R.M. filed his Form 4 Financial Statement.

[23]        On July 7, 2017, A.M.V. filed a Notice of Motion seeking makeup parenting time with the children with respect to parenting time she claims J.R.M. withheld on June 29, 2017, when he tried to return the children to her that evening and she was not home. A.M.V. describes this incident in para. 21 of her July 22, 2019 affidavit.

[24]        On July 13, 2017, A.M.V. filed a Notice of Motion seeking disclosure of third party records from the Ministry of Child and Family Development (“MCFD”).

[25]        A.M.V.’s July 7, 2017 Notice of Motion came before Judge Struyk for hearing ex parte on July 14, 2017. A.M.V. was represented by Mr. Crampton. J.R.M. did not appear in person or by agent or counsel. At the hearing, A.M.V. complained J.R.M. (or his father, G.D.M.) had taken the children to Haida Gwaii without her knowledge or consent. On July 14, 2017, Judge Struyk ordered:

[26]        A.M.V.’s Notices of Motion filed February 6, 2017, and July 13, 2017, came before Judge Wright on July 24, 2017. A.M.V. was represented by Mr. Crampton. J.R.M. was represented by Mr. Blanche. At that time, Judge Wright made an interim without prejudice consent order for, among other things: (a) allocating parenting time; and (b) police apprehension of the children if parenting time is wrongfully withheld.

[27]        On October 17, 2017, Family Justice Counsellor Anne Reuvekamp filed her s. 211 report with the Court. Ms. Reuvekamp recommended the continuation of the shared parenting regime and counselling. In that report Ms. Reuvekamp makes some observations that are relevant to the matter before me:

[28]        On July 27, 2017, when Ms. Reuvekamp interviewed each of the children separately and privately, C.O.M. indicated she wanted to live with her father and see her mother every second weekend. C.J.M. wanted to continue living with each parent on a week on, week off basis. G.M.M. said he wanted to live at this father’s home and see his mother for four or five hours after school on Thursdays, but not on the weekend. All the children expressed distress over their parents’ conflict. Ms. Reuvekamp reports C.O.M. as saying it was “sad and hard to see her parents argue after they separated.” C.J.M. told Ms. Reuvekamp, he finds it hard, frustrating and scary when his parents argue and his one wish was his parents “wouldn’t argue and fight and could get along.” G.M.M. also heard his parents argue with each other.

[29]        Ms. Reuvekamp express concern about J.R.M.’s making negative comments about A.M.V. in circumstances where the children might overhear. J.R.M. believed that when he had this conversation with Ms. Reuvekamp, the children were not within ear shot.

[30]        The family law matter came before Judge Struyk on October 11, 2017. A.M.V. was represented by Mr. Crampton. J.R.M. was represented by Mr. Blanche. At that time the Court made a further interim consent without prejudice order for, among other things: (a) allocating parenting time between the parents; and (b) police apprehension of the children if parenting time is wrongfully withheld.

[31]        This matter next came before Judge Struyk on November 14, 2017. A.M.V. was represented by Mr. Crampton. J.R.M. was represented by Mr. Blanche. At that time the Court made a further interim consent and without prejudice order for, among other things: (a) allocating parenting time between the parents; and (b) police apprehension of the children if parenting time is wrongfully withheld.

[32]        A.M.V. originating application (August 30, 2016) and J.R.M.’s reply and counterclaim (December 1, 2016) came before the Court on January 29, 2019, for the commencement of a two-day hearing before Judge Struyk in the Terrace Provincial Court. Both parents were represented by legal counsel, A.M.V. by Mr. Crampton and J.R.M. by Mr. Blanche. At the outset of the hearing A.M.V. and J.R.M. entered into a comprehensive final consent order with respect to the outstanding issues between them, including guardianship of the children, parenting time, allocation of parenting responsibilities, child support, parental conduct and spousal support. The January 29, 2019 order included, among other things, the parents’ agreement as follows:

[33]        On January 29, 2019, C.O.M. was living with A.M.V. full-time, and had done so since March 27, 2018. C.J.M. was living with J.R.M. full-time since January 25, 2019. G.M.M. was the only one of the three children who lived with each parent one week on, one week off, transitioning on Fridays at 3:00 p.m.

[34]        C.J.M. continued to reside with J.R.M. full-time since January 25, 2019. Since then, C.J.M. has refused any parenting time with A.M.V. He returned to her home briefly on one occasion in the spring of 2019 when he fell ill at school.

[35]        C.O.M. continued to live full-time with A.M.V. until June 25, 2019. Since that date she has lived full-time with J.R.M. and refused parenting time with A.M.V., except that over Christmas she had a brief visit with her mother.

[36]        G.M.M. has equal parenting time with A.M.V. and J.R.M. as provided in the January 29, 2019 order.

[37]        On July 22, 2019, A.M.V. filed with the Court an Application to Obtain an Order, Notice of Motion and supporting Affidavit. A.M.V. seeks:

[38]        On July 22, 2019, A.M.V. filed a Notice of Motion seeking an interim order under s. 216 or 217 of the FLA and an order to enforce the January 29, 2019 order. A.M.V. further seeks orders:

[39]        Section 211(1) states:

[40]        At the outset of the hearing J.R.M. advised the Court that C.J.M. and C.O.M. preferred to attend Court in person and speak to me directly rather than participate in yet another s. 211 report. A.M.V. agreed, but asked that I interview G.M.M. as well. Given the lengthy delays in obtaining s. 211 reports in the northern region, I agreed to interview the children in the absence of the parents and counsel, but in the presence of the court clerk and the sheriff. I invited the parties to provide me with any questions they wished put to the children with the caveat I would only do so if I thought it appropriate. It was not my intention to conduct a discovery or inquisitorial inquiry of the children, but only to get a sense as to their views on parenting time.

[41]        The children’s judicial interviews were recorded as an in camera voir dire. No transcripts can be made of those interviews without further order of this court. I was guided by Justice Skolrood in M.H. v P.S.W, 2018 BCSC 1318 (CanLII), wherein he states:

[42]        On November 20, 2019, J.R.M. filed a reply opposing A.M.V.’s July 22, 2019 Application, and counterclaimed for the termination of the January 29, 2019 order. He sought orders with respect to the new parenting arrangements which the older children had themselves imposed. J.R.M. seeks changes to the allocation of parenting time and parenting responsibilities, child support, retroactive child support and the termination or reduction of spousal support.

[43]        A.M.V. seeks an order under s. 61 of the FLA, for financial compensation for J.R.M. wrongly denying her parenting time with the children. A.M.V. also seeks some unspecified compensatory parenting time, albeit, no longer with C.O.M. and C.J.M.

[44]        The FLA provisions governing compliance with parenting time orders is set out in ss. 61 and 62, which I have reproduced below for ease of reference:

[45]        Before the Court can grant her application, A.M.V. must show she was entitled to parenting time which was wrongfully denied, and her application must be made within 12 months after she was denied parenting. The term “wrongfully denied” is defined in s. 62 by providing circumstances of when it does not occur:

[46]        In K.R. v. J.W., 2016 BCSC 225 (CanLII), Justice Betton considered how ss. 61 and 62 of the FLA ought to be interpreted. He held (on para. 65):

[47]        In K.R. v. J.W., the father claimed the mother had actively and passively denied his parenting time with his 12 year old daughter. He argued the mother’s hostility resulted in his daughter’s reluctance to have parenting time with him, which the mother then used to justify breaching the court-ordered parenting regime. The mother argued that the child was negatively affected by the father’s conduct and she could not ignore her daughter’s reluctance or reaction to parenting time. Justice Betton referenced Boychuck v. Singleton, 2008 BCCA 355 (CanLII) (at paras. 16-19) in which the BC Court of Appeal emphasizes the importance of a child having significant parenting time with each parent unless there are exceptional circumstances. Parenting time incorporated into a court order must be respected. If the order is not appealed or varied, the parents cannot view compliance with the order optional.

[48]        The Court in K.R. v. J.W. found that there had been a wrongful denial of parenting time. Since counselling and a shared parenting schedule were already in place, Justice Betton ordered the mother pay to the father $2,500 for the benefit of the child.

[49]        In this case, A.M.V. blames J.R.M. for alienating her two oldest children, C.O.M. and C.J.M. J.R.M. suggests they have become estranged from A.M.V. as a result of her own behaviour. In C.J.J. v. A.J., 2016 BCSC 676, Mr. Justice Blok states (at para. 1), “. . . the terms “alienation” and “estrangement” have specific psychological meanings as well as significance in terms of remedial action.” In Williamson v. Williamson, 2016 BCCA 87, at paras. 40-41, the Court adopted the legal meaning of parental alienation as stated in D.S.W. v. D.A.W., 2012 BCSC 1522:

[50]        The Court in Williamson held at paras. 47-48 that a finding of alienation is a serious allegation that must be supported by proper expert evidence.

[51]        I have considered below whether J.R.M. has wrongfully denied A.M.V. parenting time for any and all of their three children. Firstly, I will address specific incidents which A.M.V. said occurred in 2017, 2018 and 2019, and then I will address her application as it relates to each of the children generally.

[52]        In para. 20 of her July 22, 2019 Affidavit, A.M.V. refers to an incident which occurred on February 5, 2017, and in paras. 21 and 22 to an incident which occurred on June 29, 2017. At trial A.M.V. testified the year in her affidavit was misstated as 2017 when it was actually 2019. I disagree. The February 5, 2017 incident, in which A.M.V. contacted the RCMP gave rise to her February 6, 2017 Notice of Motion which was heard and decided by Judge Wright on February 14, 2017. On that date, Judge Wright made a number of interim orders by consent. In para. 19 of her July 22, 2019 Affidavit, A.M.V. attaches as Exhibit “C” a calendar she created where she had colour-coded the days on which J.R.M. had the children, she had the children, or J.R.M. withheld the children. The week of February 5, 2017, is coded red, indicating a period of time when says J.R.M. withheld the children. There is no red coding for the week of February 5, 2019.

[53]        The June 29, 2017 incident referred to in paras. 21 and 22 of A.M.V.’s July 22, 2019 Affidavit, gave rise to her July 7, 2017 Notice of Motion seeking interim parenting time. It could not have occurred in June 29, 2019, as she suggests because on that date, neither C.J.M. nor C.O.M. were residing in her home. Also, in Exhibit “C” to her June 22, 2019 Affidavit, A.M.V. has colour-coded June 29 and 30, 2017, in red to indicate a period of time when J.R.M. had withheld the children from her. There is no such coding for June 29 and 30, 2019. The July 7, 2017 Notice of Motion came before Judge Struyk for hearing on July 14, 2017, and again before Judge Wright on July 24, 2017.

[54]        I conclude the incidents referred to in paras. 20, 21, and 22 of A.M.V.’s July 22, 2019 Affidavit occurred in 2017 as stated and did not and could not have constituted a breach of the January 29, 2019 order.

[55]        A.M.V. also complains of a time in the summer of 2017 when G.D.M. (J.R.M.’s father) took the children to Haida Gwaii without A.M.V.’s permission. J.R.M. says A.M.V. had agreed to his having parenting time with the children while she was under investigation by MCFD for leaving G.M.M. home alone while he was ill. J.R.M. allowed his father to take the children on a vacation to Haida Gwaii. On July 14, 2017, A.M.V. attended court and obtained an ex parte order for compensatory parenting time and a police assist clause. G.D.M. was forced to terminate the children’s Haida Gwaii vacation short as a result of Judge Struyk’s July 14, 2018 order. I infer from this series of events that A.M.V. does not agree with J.R.M.’s version of events.

[56]        I find that all the 2017 incidents to which A.M.V. refers have been subject to previous Notices of Motion and dealt with by pre-existing orders. Moreover, s. 61(1)(b) requires an application to be made within 12 months of the denial of parenting time. A.M.V.’s application in this regard was made over two years after the incidents. I will not consider A.M.V.’s allegations made in paras. 20 to 22 of her July 22, 2019 Affidavit or the Haida Gwaii incident because firstly, they have already been judicially determined, and secondly, they fall outside the statutory time limit.

[57]        In the early summer of 2018, J.R.M. took the children for a camping trip in northern BC in the Watson Lake region. At the time, J.R.M. was working for M. L. in [omitted for publication]. While up north, J.R.M. learned that because of forest fires, he would not have to return to work in the near future. There were no forest fires prior to his embarking on this trip. J.R.M. contacted A.M.V. and asked if he could extend their trip given he no longer had to return to work. Initially A.M.V. refused because it would encroach on her parenting time with the children. J.R.M. then asked A.M.V. if he could take his summer vacation time with the children. She refused because he had not given her 45 days’ notice as required under the January 29, 2019 order. J.R.M. pointed out to A.M.V. that if he returned home immediately as she insisted, the children would simply be sitting at home while she worked. A.M.V. relented and agreed J.R.M. could have his holiday time with the children. I gather A.M.V. felt pressured to consent to J.R.M. having holiday time with the children because they were already up North and excited about continuing their adventure.

[58]        I don’t find J.R.M.’s attempt to negotiate holiday time with the children in the circumstances amounts to a wrongful denial of parenting time. J.R.M. said if A.M.V. steadfastly refused his request to extend their vacation, he would have returned the children for her parenting time immediately, however inconvenient that may have been. Even if I were to find this 2018 incident constituted a denial of parenting time, which I do not, it occurred outside the 12 month limitation period set out in s. 61(1)(b) of the FLA.

[59]        Mr. Davidson submits the 2017 and 2018 incidents illustrate a pattern of J.R.M.’s non-compliance with the terms of the January 29, 2019 order. J.R.M. says A.M.V. has also breached the January 29, 2019 order on various occasions, but he just lets it go. For example, he says upon returning from Watson Lake in 2018, A.M.V. had her compensatory parenting time, however, she subsequently denied J.R.M. parenting time as retaliation for his not providing her with sufficient notice of his intention to exercise his right to a summer vacation with the children.

[60]        G.M.M. still adheres to the shared parenting regime which has been in place since his parents’ separation. A.M.V. makes no suggestion he is alienated or estranged from her. In fact the opposite is true: A.M.V. asserts G.M.M. has expressed his desire to reside with her full-time. J.R.M. says depending on the day, G.M.M. also expresses a desire to live with him, as the s. 211 report attests.

[61]        At A.M.V.’s request and with J.R.M.’s consent, I interviewed G.M.M. in the absence of the parents and legal counsel. G.M.M. told me he was happy with the current arrangement where he spends one week with his mother and one week with his father. He enjoys the outdoor activities at his father’s house. I gather he enjoys the respite from his older siblings when he is at his mother’s house. G.M.M. described in detail his activities, including his use of electronic devices at both his father and mother’s home.

[62]        A.M.V. asserts J.R.M. has wrongfully withheld G.M.M. from her during her scheduled parenting last summer when J.R.M.’s father, G.D.M., took G.M.M. and C.J.M. to Kinaskan Lake Provincial Park to go camping and fishing. Although this outing was scheduled during J.R.M.’s parenting time week, it would necessarily encroach on G.M.M.’s Tuesday afternoon visit with his mother. If the camping trip was extended into the weekend, it would also encroach on A.M.V.’s parenting time scheduled for Friday and Saturday, July 5 and 6, 2019: see Exhibit “C” of A.M.V.’s July 22, 2019 Affidavit. J.R.M. understood that G.M.M. had sought and obtained his mother’s permission to go on this camping trip with his grandfather. G.M.M. did text her as the messages attached as Exhibit “B” to A.M.V.’s July 22, 2019 Affidavit attest. A.M.V. says she did not agree. In fact, it does not appear that she responded to G.M.M.’s text message.

[63]        In cross-examination A.M.V. agreed that upon G.M.M.’s return from the camping trip, she received compensatory parenting time:

[64]        J.R.M. says he genuinely believed G.M.M. had sought and received A.M.V.’s permission to go camping with his brother and grandfather at Kinaskan Lake. It was not until later G.M.M. admitted to J.R.M. he did not obtain his mother’s permission because he wanted to go on the trip and she would have said, “No.” J.R.M. says he learned from this incident not to take his children’s word in these matters and to deal directly with A.M.V.

[65]        A.M.V. complains that in the summer of 2019, J.R.M. took G.M.M. to his family reunion in [omitted for publication] during her parenting time. (At this time, C.J.M. and C.O.M. chose not to have any parenting time with A.M.V.) J.R.M. says they discussed this outing in advanced and A.M.V. agreed G.M.M. could go with him and the other children to the reunion. A.M.V. would have compensatory parenting time with G.M.M. the following weekend. J.R.M. returned G.M.M. as agreed and G.M.M. spent not only the following weekend with his mother, but the entire week which was supposed to be J.R.M.’s scheduled parenting time. Although A.M.V. was over-compensated for her missed parenting time, she was nevertheless upset that J.R.M. not only went to the [omitted for publication] reunion but also made a side trip to Smithers.

[66]        According to Term 25 of the January 29, 2019 order, J.R.M. ought to have informed A.M.V. in advance of his plans to travel to Smithers. A.M.V. says that if there had been an emergency, she would not know of the children’s whereabouts. J.R.M. says he had no plans to travel to Smithers at the outset. The reunion started in [omitted for publication] as planned, but because so many of his relatives were from out of the country, it concluded early in [omitted for publication] and continued for one day in Smithers.

[67]        J.R.M. claims A.M.V. has taken the children on trips to Prince George or 100 Mile House without letting him know or securing his consent.

[68]        I agree J.R.M. ought to have let A.M.V. know he and the children were leaving [omitted for publication] and spending a day in Smithers. Nevertheless, I do not regard this incident as a denial of parenting time. As J.R.M. and A.M.V. ordinarily communicate via cell phone, I do not understand how being in Smithers as opposed to [omitted for publication] would frustrate her ability to contact the children in an emergency.

[69]        I do not find G.M.M.’s camping trip with his grandfather to Kinaskan Lake or for his side trip to Smithers during the [omitted for publication] family reunion constitutes wrongful denial of parenting time.

[70]        It is uncontested that on January 25, 2019, C.J.M. left A.M.V.’s residence after a physical altercation with his mother. He went to live full-time at J.R.M.’s home and refuses parenting time with his mother. A.M.V. attributes C.J.M.’s refusal to the fact she has far more house rules than his father who she characterizes as a “Disneyland Dad”. J.R.M. says A.M.V.’s January 25, 2019 altercation with C.J.M. was her third act of violence against the child and C.J.M. has had enough.

[71]        J.R.M. says he has tried to encourage C.J.M. to spend time with his mother, but C.J.M. refuses. When he came and spoke to me in Court on November 25, 2019, C.J.M. cited a number of reasons why he does not want to go to his mother’s house: (a) she has hurt him in the past; (b) he does not feel comfortable at her house; (c) he and his mother do not get along; (d) whenever he is in contact with her, his mother pesters him to return to live with her; and (e) he is happy living with his father, who is calm. He enjoys the outdoor activities in which he is engaged at his father’s house, which includes swimming, dirt biking, trampolining, and camping. He also enjoys his video games and spending time with his cousins who live nearby.

[72]        J.R.M. cites three incidents of family violence against C.J.M. The first occurred in 2015, prior to A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s separation. J.R.M. describes A.M.V. as “having a fit”. A.M.V. lost her temper and began kicking C.J.M. while he lay on the bed in the foetal position. She only stopped when J.R.M. intervened.

[73]        The second incident occurred in the fall of 2018. C.J.M. started screaming and A.M.V. placed her hand over his mouth to try and stop him. C.J.M. told his school counsellor that he could not breathe and his mother was trying to choke him. The counsellor reported the incident to the police who notified MCFD. Neither the police nor MCFD took any action as a result of this complaint beyond securing A.M.V.’s promise the incident would not repeat itself.

[74]        The third incident occurred on January 25, 2019. It arose in the context of A.M.V. attempting to curtail C.J.M.’s personal time because he was falling behind in his school work. A.M.V. says C.J.M.’s teacher, Ms. O., told her C.J.M. was not completing his math and French assignments. A.M.V. decided to invigilate C.J.M.’s personal time until he had caught up with his school work. A.M.V. determined that in interim, C.J.M. was to have no access to his electronics (cell phone or tablet) or participate in his school sports of basketball and volleyball.

[75]        On January 24, 2019, A.M.V. wrote a letter to J.R.M. about her decision to restrict C.J.M.’s activities, which is attached as Exhibit “A” to her July 22, 2019 Affidavit. In this letter, A.M.V. complained of C.J.M.’s poor attitude and performance at school. She states:

[76]        A.M.V. did not discuss with J.R.M. beforehand her directive to Ms. O. that C.J.M. no longer play basketball until he caught up on his school work. A.M.V. did not explain why she thought C.J.M. ought to quit basketball and take up swimming instead.

[77]        On January 25, 2019, A.M.V. told C.J.M. her new restrictions on his activities. C.J.M. became upset and began screaming. A.M.V. forcibly “dragged” C.J.M. upstairs to his room, but he continued screaming, so she forced him downstairs and outside, where he sat on her porch. A.M.V. sent J.R.M. a text telling him she had “lost her shit” on C.J.M. and kicked him outside. She told J.R.M., “Something needs to be done about this child.” J.R.M. told her he would pick up C.J.M. He drove to A.M.V.’s residence at 7:30 pm, which is a 10 to 15 minute drive. It was January and cold and raining and C.J.M. had been outside for 20 minutes without a coat or shoes.

[78]        A.M.V. denies perpetrating any violence toward C.J.M. She says C.J.M. has his facts wrong; others have cultivated his misconceptions; and C.J.M. may benefit from counselling.

[79]        Mr. Davidson submits that J.R.M. failed to cross-examine A.M.V. on the first alleged incident of family violence in 2015, thereby violating the rule in Browne v. Dunn. This confrontation rule requires the opposing party give a witness an opportunity to explain evidence which will be called later to impeach the credibility or testimony of that witness. The confrontation rule is one of fairness - to the witness, the parties and the judge: R. v. Quansah, 2015 ONCA 237 [CanLII]. It is fair to a witness whose credibility is under attack to be given an opportunity to explain why the contradictory evidence, or any inferences to be drawn from it, should not be accepted. It is fair to a party whose witness is impeached to have notice of the precise aspects of the contested testimony so that party can decide whether or what confirmatory evidence to call. Finally, it is fair to the trial judge, who, without the rule, would be deprived of information which might show the impeachment to be unfounded and thus compromise the accuracy of the verdict: Quansah, para. 77.

[80]        I agree it wasn’t until November 25, 2019, J.R.M. raised the 2015 incident alleging A.M.V. lost her temper and began kicking C.J.M. Still, A.M.V. was present in the court room and represented by counsel. As J.R.M. is self-represented, I have presided over this case with as much informality and flexibility as fairness allows. On November 25, 2019, I invited Mr. Davidson to recall A.M.V. to address various issues not raised in cross-examination. Mr. Davidson did not ask the Court to give A.M.V. an opportunity to respond to J.R.M.’s allegation of violence against C.J.M. in 2015. Nevertheless, I accept that had he done so, A.M.V. would have denied it.

[81]        After the January 25, 2019 incident, C.J.M. went to live with J.R.M. and has not returned to A.M.V.’s residence. Since then A.M.V. has texted C.J.M. occasionally, but for five months after he relocated she never contacted C.J.M. to speak to him in person.

[82]        A.M.V. provided J.R.M. with C.J.M.’s unfinished school work. J.R.M. says he did take steps to get C.J.M. back on track with respect to his school work. He sent A.M.V. a series of text messages explaining his efforts. These text messages were entered into evidence as Exhibit 8.

[83]        In her July 22, 2019 Affidavit A.M.V. states at paras. 6 and 8, in part:

[84]        A.M.V. said she forced C.J.M. outside because he was screaming and she wanted to spare the young child who lived in the adjoining duplex the drama.

[85]        J.R.M. says that the following day (January 26, 2019), he advised A.M.V. that a result of the most recent altercation, C.J.M. decided he wanted to reside with him full-time. J.R.M. states he raised with A.M.V. concerns about her troubled relationship with C.J.M. He told her that as they were scheduled to go to court in a few days and they should vary the court ordered parenting time arrangements to show C.J.M. was now primarily residing with him.

[86]        J.R.M. says C.J.M. relocating to live with him full-time was a contentious issue in his negotiations with A.M.V. at the January 29, 2019 hearing before Judge Struyk. J.R.M. reluctantly agreed to the “four month” clause set out in Term 8 of Judge Struyk’s order in order to secure an agreement.

[87]        In early August 2019, prior to school recommencing for the 2019 fall term, A.M.V. sent J.R.M. a text in which she stated:

[88]        J.R.M. replied:

[89]        Exhibit 4 is an exchange of text messages between A.M.V. and C.J.M. sent August 2, 2019:

[90]        A.M.V. says this text message shows J.R.M. had been discussing their legal matters with C.J.M. contrary to Term 24 of the January 29, 2019 order.

[91]        A.M.V. says she had a scheduled surgery on September 24, 2019. She texted the children asking them to come and visit her while she was in the hospital after surgery. J.R.M. brought G.M.M. to see her in the hospital. When he arrived, J.R.M. told A.M.V. that C.O.M. and C.J.M. were ill and would not be coming.

[92]        A.M.V. said she invited all the children for Thanksgiving dinner, but they declined, saying their father had already planned dinner at his home. Given Thanksgiving is a three day weekend, it is not clear to me why A.M.V. and J.R.M. could not have arranged to each have a Thanksgiving dinner on different days.

[93]        A.M.V. cites J.R.M.’s permissiveness as a reason for C.J.M.’s refusal to have parenting time with her. One of the examples A.M.V. says illustrates J.R.M.’s undue leniency is an incident which occurred on February 13, 2019, where C.J.M. was accused of bullying a girl at school. A.M.V. referred to this incident on para. 7 of her Affidavit and in her oral evidence in court. She states she inquired with J.R.M. on the phone about how he was going to punish C.J.M. because she took bullying very seriously. A.M.V. states in her affidavit J.R.M. refused to tell her how he “took care of it.” She does admit telling J.R.M. the girl was a “trouble maker.” J.R.M. says he did explain to A.M.V. the incident was not school-related; he told her what had happened and how he resolved the issue with the girl’s parents and there has been no problems since.

[94]        A.M.V. blames C.J.M.’s refusal to return to a shared parenting time to J.R.M.’s conduct and not to anything she has done. She has said repeatedly that allowing a 12 year old boy (now 13) to decide which parent he wishes to live with gives the child too much power. J.R.M. and C.J.M. ought to simply comply with the terms of the January 29, 2019 order, even thought it was made after C.J.M. had already self-relocated to J.R.M.’s full-time care.

[95]        As children mature, their views on parenting time carry increasing weight. The law no longer renders children powerless pawns in their parents’ post-separation machinations. As parenting time is the right of the child, C.J.M. is entitled to voice his concerns about spending time with his mother. Having said that, I am mindful the law requires the parents to do what is reasonably necessary to give effect to court-ordered parenting time arrangements. But there is a limit, and in my view the circumstances in this case are not comparable to that in those in Praught v. Praught (October 2, 2017) Terrace Docket 17140, (BCSC) or K.R. v. J.W. where the child has a benign objection to spending time with the rejected parent.

[96]        Clearly C.J.M. and A.M.V.’s have a very troubled relationship. I agree that since January 25, 2019, J.R.M. has not made even a half-hearted effort to encourage C.J.M. to spend parenting time with his mother, but then, neither has she. I am not convinced J.R.M. orchestrated the break down in C.J.M. and A.M.V.’s relationship or that he can fix it. I fear C.J.M. has become estranged from A.M.V. and she needs to find a way to reconcile their differences.

[97]        I do not find J.R.M. has wrongfully denied A.M.V. parenting time with C.J.M. under s. 61(2) of the FLA. A.M.V. withdrew her application for reinstatement of the shared parenting arrangement with respect to C.J.M. Even if she had not, I would not order it reinstated over C.J.M.’s protestations. I am guided by Justice Affleck comments in K.L.S. v. K.M.S., 2017 BCSC 1315 (CanLII), where he states that in a circumstance of parental estrangement, compelling an objecting child to resume a relationship with the estranged parent “is a recipe for getting nowhere.”

[98]        C.O.M. participated in A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s shared parenting arrangement from the time of their separation until late March 2018, when she began living full-time with her mother. I have no evidence as to why this transition occurred other than it was C.O.M.’s choice to which J.R.M. reluctantly acquiesced. In March 2018, C.O.M. would have been 13 years old.

[99]        In the spring of 2019, although she was only 14 years old, A.M.V. arranged for C.O.M. to obtain a job as a dishwasher at [omitted for publication] in Terrace. C.O.M. worked five hour shifts, three to four times per week, including during the school week. It was a fair commute to A.M.V.’s residence and the restaurant. There was no nighttime public transit from the restaurant to the area in [omitted for publication] where A.M.V. resides.

[100]     C.O.M. says she got up at 6:30 am to get ready for school and catch the bus. After school she went to her swim club, and when that was over she worked a five hour shift at [omitted for publication]. Sometimes she worked as a hostess and other times, as a dishwasher. C.O.M. returned home at 10:30 pm, at which time she walked her dog and did her homework. She went to bed exhausted somewhere between 11:30 pm and midnight.

[101]     A.M.V. states in her June 22, 2019 Affidavit (para. 28) that her boyfriend at the time, D.C., picked up C.O.M. after she had finished work and spoke to her about “doing the dishes and keeping the house clean in general.”

[102]     On Tuesday, June 25, 2019, C.O.M. called her father after she had finished work and asked him to pick her up because her mother had made other plans and C.O.M. had no ride home. J.R.M. went and retrieved C.O.M. and brought her back to his home. C.O.M. did not go to school the following day and never returned to A.M.V.’s house to live.

[103]     A.M.V. believes the only reason C.O.M. chooses to stay with her father is because A.M.V. enforces house rules and J.R.M. does not. According to A.M.V., C.O.M.’s dilatoriness in performing her assigned chores increased when she was working at the restaurant. I query how much time C.O.M. had for household chores given her combined school, swim and work schedule.

[104]     A.M.V. acknowledges that she encouraged C.O.M. to get a job so C.O.M. could pay for luxuries she wanted which A.M.V. could not afford. With respect to picking up C.O.M. after work, A.M.V. states:

[105]     A.M.V. testified as to a verbal dispute she had with C.O.M. on June 25, 2019, when she was driving her to work. A.M.V. wanted C.O.M. to buy her a Starbuck’s coffee and C.O.M. did not want to pay for it. A.M.V. testified:

[106]     If there was no night-time bus service from downtown Terrace to [omitted for publication], I do not know how C.O.M. could have taken the bus home after work.

[107]     One of A.M.V.’s examples of J.R.M. being a “Disneyland Dad”, was his decision to buy C.O.M. a new iPhone 8. When C.O.M. moved out of her mother’s home, A.M.V. cancelled C.O.M.’s cell phone plan, but paid the $300 bill which was outstanding at the time. J.R.M. testified his cell phone broke and needed replacing. He was able to get C.O.M. and himself new cell phones on a shared plan. In cross-examination, A.M.V. testified as follows:

[108]     A.M.V. cites as further example of J.R.M.’s inappropriate indulgence was permitting C.O.M. to have a belly-button ring. She said she would have never approved of C.O.M. having such a piercing therefore it must have been J.R.M. who permitted it. She states in cross-examination:

[109]     C.O.M. says her mother became really angry about the belly-button piercing because she didn’t know about it and A.M.V. invited comments from her Facebook friends on its inappropriateness for a girl of C.O.M.’s age.

[110]     C.O.M. has cited a number of reasons why she does not want to return to her mother’s home. Broadly speaking, C.O.M. says:

[111]     C.O.M. says that J.R.M. parents her and her younger brothers. He is always home, rarely drinks alcohol, and does not bring new partners into their lives. She enjoys living at her father’s home and the close proximity to her older brother and her cousins.

[112]     C.O.M. does not believe she or her brothers use electronic devices at their father’s home any more than they did at their mother’s place.

[113]     In cross-examination, A.M.V. admitted threatening to get rid of LX if C.O.M. did not return JY by the next morning. A.M.V. said that JY was not C.O.M.’s cat but her cat she had rescued from the shelter when C.O.M. was two years old.

[114]     I note in the Section 211 report, its author, Family Justice Counsellor Anne Reuvekamp, states on page 5 that, “At her dad’s home C.O.M. has her own bedroom, two cats named K. and J.Y., and 15 chickens.

[115]     A.M.V. also agreed that she since C.O.M. left, she had texted C.O.M.’s friends to obtain information about C.O.M.:

[116]     In sum, C.O.M. believes that while at her mother’s home, she had to be her own parent and a parent to her younger brothers. She believes A.M.V. put her own wants above the children’s needs. C.O.M. believes in his household, J.R.M. makes the children his priority. C.O.M. is reluctant to spend time with her mother because she feels pressured to return to live with her which she does not want to do.

[117]     I understand that over the Christmas holidays and more recently, C.O.M. has had brief visits with her mother.

[118]     C.O.M. is 15 years old. She has decided to live full-time with her father. In K.M.H. v P.S.W, 2018 BCSC 1318 (CanLII), Mr. Justice Skolrood had to grapple with a case involving the ongoing estrangement of a 14 year old daughter from her father. Justice Skolrood comments are apposite of the application before me:

[119]     Justice Skolrood concluded (at para. 55) in the case before him on the basis of expert evidence and his own interview of the child, that two things needed to occur to progress and improve the child’s relationship with the rejected parent: (1) the child had to come to terms with the issues she had with her estranged parent; and (b) the parents had to resolve their ongoing acrimony and mistrust and learn to coexist and co‑parent their children.

[120]     I do not get the sense that C.O.M. is estranged from her mother to the same degree as C.J.M. Despite her shopping list of A.M.V.’s shortcomings, I get the sense that with the passage of time, C.O.M. will re-establish her relationship with her mother.

[121]     A.M.V. seeks monetary penalties under s. 61(2)(c) and (g) FLA arising from J.R.M. breaching the January 29, 2019 order. She relies on Justice Punnett’s decision in Praught wherein the mother refused to deliver to the father their 12 year old son for his father’s scheduled parenting time because the child said he did not want to go. The child claimed he didn’t like his father fighting with his step-mother, but admitted to the s. 211 report writer he preferred his mother’s house because she allowed him to do whatever he wanted. The father was not as lenient. Justice Punnett held that the mother’s failure make it clear to the child that it was not his choice whether to spend time with his father constituted a wrongful denial parenting time with the father. Justice Punnett ordered the existing shared parenting arrangement resume forthwith and the mother pay to the father $3,000 for the benefit of the child within 60 days.

[122]     The Praught case is distinguishable from the one before me. Most significantly, for the reasons set out above, I do not find J.R.M. has breached the January 29, 2019 order by wrongfully withholding parenting time from A.M.V. As I noted above, A.M.V. has already received pre-arranged compensatory parenting time for the few times J.R.M. or G.D.M. had custody of G.M.M. during A.M.V.’s parenting time.

[123]     A.M.V. has persistently asserted the children prefer their father’s house because of his leniency. I do not accept that to be the case. In my view C.O.M. and C.J.M. have refused parenting time with A.M.V. because of their own experiences living with her. The reasons for their refusal are neither illogical nor irrational. If J.R.M. was the truly the agent of their mother’s estrangement, then I query why C.O.M. chose to live with her mother up until June 25, 2019, or why G.M.M. is still happily spending his time with both parents. Accordingly, I decline to order any penalty under s. 61(2)(g).

[124]     A.M.V. also seeks compensation for J.R.M. breaching the parental conduct provisions of the January 29, 2019 order. Her application engages ss. 228(1) and 230 of the FLA which state:

[125]     In A.J.F. v N.L.S, 2020 BCSC 26 (CanLII), Justice Skolrood, considered s. 228, in the context of an FLA application in which the claimant sought a number of orders to address the respondent’s alleged “repeated, prolonged and unrepentant failures and refusals” to abide by multiple court orders. Justice Skolrood states at para. 73:

[126]     Justice Skolrood went on to discuss ss. 228 and 230 of the FLA at paras: 83 to 87 [citations omitted in part]:

[127]     A.M.V. cited the following incidents as breaches of January 29, 2019 parental conduct orders:

[128]     J.R.M. says the “truck incident” occurred at the time when he was dealing with his bank trying to arrange financing to purchase A.M.V.’s interest in the family home. A.M.V. was pressuring him to have it sold. J.R.M. had some papers he wanted to show A.M.V. in this regard. She rolled down her window; he leaned on her door; they had a conversation. G.M.M. came out of the house and J.R.M. asked him not to get into the vehicle so he could continuing speaking with his mother. G.M.M. left. Two minutes later, A.M.V. directed G.M.M. to get into the vehicle so she could leave. G.M.M. got in the front seat. He covered his ears; he wasn’t crying. J.R.M. stepped away from the vehicle and walked away.

[129]     J.R.M. says there was no second incident the following week as A.M.V. alleges. He learned from a previous incident not to be in the vicinity of A.M.V.’s vehicle when she was trying to leave. The year before, he approached the passenger side of her vehicle. He tried speaking to her through the open passenger door about why she had not picked up the children on time. A.M.V. placed her vehicle in reverse, slammed the throttle, and hit J.R.M. with the passenger-side door. A.M.V. denies slamming the throttle, but does not deny hitting J.R.M. with the passenger door.

[130]     In response A.M.V.’s allegation he entered her home without permission, J.R.M. says that he went to A.M.V.’s house to pickup G.M.M. He wanted to speak to A.M.V. about G.M.M. J.R.M. wasn’t angry or agitated. He called, “A.M.V.” from the porch. A.M.V. was in the living room at the time; she responded, “Yes?” J.R.M. stepped inside the doorway and walked four or five feet inside the residence so he could see A.M.V. in the living room. As soon as he saw A.M.V., she said to him, "Get out of my house”, perhaps twice in rapid succession. He left immediately and stood outside to wait for A.M.V. to come outside so he could have a conversation with her about G.M.M.

[131]     In response to A.M.V.’s allegations he failed to use his best efforts to have the children follow the January 29, 2019 parenting time order, J.R.M. says he has never discouraged the children from spending time with their mother. He points out from time-to-time G.M.M. wants to spend time at A.M.V.’s residence during his parenting time. He never objects. For over a year, from March 2018, to June 25, 2019, C.O.M. chose to live with her mother full-time. Although C.O.M.’s decision saddened him, J.R.M. acquiesced. There is no suggestion A.M.V. ought to have used her best efforts to have C.O.M. comply with the shared parenting regime prior to C.O.M. going to live with J.R.M. on June 25, 2019.

[132]     J.R.M. says he did not and will not force the children to spend time with their mother. He says A.M.V. occasionally sends C.O.M. or C.J.M. text messages asking them to do something with her. Usually she asks they come to her house, which is something neither child wants to do. J.R.M. tells the children they can do what they want. They don’t have to be at his house; they don’t have to be at their mother’s house. He feels there is not a lot he can do to encourage recalcitrant adolescents to spend time with their mother if they have decided otherwise.

[133]     Counsel for A.M.V. suggested to J.R.M. he could ground the children or take away their electronic devices unless they agreed to spend time with their mother. J.R.M. responded:

[134]     J.R.M. points out that when G.M.M. and C.O.M. wanted to remain with their mother during his parenting time, he agreed without demanding compensation. In his view, Term 8 of the January 29, 2019 order contemplates the children are allowed to make changes to the shared parenting regime.

[135]     With respect to A.M.V.’s allegation J.R.M. discussed legal issues in the children’s presence, I accept this is likely true. I also accept that on one occasion J.R.M. briefly entered A.M.V.’s home without her express invitation. Further, I am satisfied J.R.M. has not used his best efforts to encourage the older children to spend parenting time with their mother – but then, neither has A.M.V.

[136]     J.R.M.’s professed willingness to be flexible in his dealings with A.M.V. is not reciprocated. She demands strict adherence to the terms of the January 29, 2019 order. J.R.M. acknowledges his deficits and promises to be more vigilant in complying with its terms. A.M.V. now wants all communication with J.R.M. in writing and restricted to issues directly related to the children. J.R.M. says he prefers to speak to A.M.V. in person; also, he and A.M.V. have property issues they need to discuss. Nevertheless, J.R.M. agrees to this further restriction on the mode and substance of their communication. In my view, as the wall between these two parents grows ever higher and thicker, their ability to co-parent their three children becomes increasingly difficult.

[137]     I am satisfied J.R.M. now understands A.M.V. seeks strict adherence to any court-imposed restrictions on their contact and communications and will conduct himself accordingly.

[138]     Frankly, I don’t think either parent uses their best efforts to give effect to the shared parenting regime. I conclude A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s animus is too entrenched for the Court to expect them to readily cooperate with each other in the best interests of the children. The Court will have to be content with A.M.V. and J.R.M. behaving civilly to one another and reframing from actively turning the children against the other parent.

[139]     In the circumstances, I am not prepared to impose a monetary penalty under ss. 228 and 230. I am not going to include a “best efforts clause” in this order, because I think it is unrealistic and unenforceable.

[140]     Section 47 of the FLA empowers the court to change, suspend or terminate orders respecting parenting arrangements. It states:

[141]     The first step in the s. 47 FLA analysis is to consider whether there has been a material change in the needs or circumstance of the child: Williamson v. Williamson, 2016 BCCA 87 at paras. 29-34, citing Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC). The Court of Appeal in Williamson adopts the material change in the circumstances test from Gordon. To succeed with an application under s. 47, J.R.M. must establish:(1) a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet the needs of the child; (2) which materially affects the child; and (3) which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order.

[142]     The test for material change is based on what the parties actually contemplated at the time of the initial order, rather than what was known or could have been reasonably foreseen: Dedes v. Dedes, 2015 BCCA 194 at paras. 24-26. 

[143]     J.R.M. asked the January 29, 2019 order be terminated and replaced with orders which reflect the current parenting regime. There has been a major sea change in parenting arrangements since January 2019. Although it was true that C.J.M. had gone to live with his father at the time this order was made, it was a very recent event. There would be no other reason to require J.R.M. to continue to pay A.M.V. child support for C.J.M. unless the parties considered C.J.M.’s relocation to J.R.M.’s house temporary. Certainly, A.M.V. expected C.J.M. would “cool off” and return to the shared parenting arrangement. This did not happen. Neither parent foresaw that C.O.M. would decide to change her primary residence from A.M.V.’s home to J.R.M.’s.

[144]     I am satisfied J.R.M. has met the test for change of circumstances as articulated in Williams. In my view the January 29, 2019 order ought to terminated and replaced with an order in accordance with these reasons for judgment.

[145]     In N.R.G. v. G.R.G., 2017 BCCA 407, at para. 44, the Court emphasized the correct approach in analysing issues regarding parenting time is a full and generous consideration of the best interests of the child, as opposed to the attitudes and behaviours of the parents. The best interest of the child are set out in s. 37 of the FLA, which I have sent out below for ease of reference.

[146]     Whatever the parenting arrangements, A.M.V. and J.R.M. are and will remain guardians of the children. In determining the issues before me I am mindful that parenting time, like child support, is the right of the child: J.B.D.K. v T.A.B., 2017 BCSC 1186 (CanLII), aff’d in King v. Borserio, 2018 BCCA 308 (CanLII); D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37(CanLII). These fundamental principles require a child-focused analysis which is codified in s. 37 of the FLA set out above.

[147]     C.O.M. presents as a remarkably industrious, although somewhat anxious young lady. She has developed a problem with her shoulders which she believes is swimming related. She was forced to quit her job and swim club until they heal. J.R.M. says C.O.M. has difficulty raising her arms and lifting items. Her physician obtained an MRI which indicated no specific injury to her shoulder and arms and her impairments can be addressed through physiotherapy. A.M.V. believes C.O.M. exaggerates her shoulder condition and an MRI was unnecessary.

[148]     On July 30, 2019, A.M.V. brought C.J.M. to be assessed by Dr. Adlam, a Paediatrician with the Sleeping Beauty Medical Clinic. C.J.M. had been struggling with math and French and Dr. Adlam made an initial assessment based on SNAP profiles completed by A.M.V., J.R.M. and C.J.M.’s teacher, Ms. O. Clearly the profilers have divergent views as to C.J.M.’s behavioural deficits. Dr. Adlam opines that based on A.M.V. and Ms. O.’s SNAP profiles, C.J.M. met the criteria for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He did not meet the criteria from J.R.M.’s profile. Dr. Adlam suggested medicating C.J.M., which J.R.M. opposed, unless there were no other options. J.R.M. attributed C.J.M.’s problems, in part, to his conflicts with his mother and teacher. As a result J.R.M. did not medicate C.J.M. J.R.M. reports this year, C.J.M. is doing well in school. He even received a “B” in math on his last report card. C.J.M. now enjoys school; he likes his teacher and is learning to ask for additional help as needed. J.R.M. meets with his teacher to ensure C.J.M. receives the extra help he needs.

[149]     If G.M.M. suffers from any physical or mental or emotional issues, I was not made aware of them. In my brief interview with him, he presented as a happy, good-natured and engaged child.

[150]     Of particular relevance in this case is s. 37(2)(b) which requires the Court to consider the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to do so. Generally, a child’s views are considered inappropriate where the child is very young or suffers from serious cognitive impairment. Neither of those concerns are present in this case. Typically, the child’s views are presented to the court in the form of a “views of the child report” prepared pursuant to s. 211 of the FLA. In fact, the court had just such a report in this case prepared by the Family Justice Counsellor on September 18, 2017 (Exhibit 13). C.O.M., C.J.M. and G.M.M. have expressed a desire to speak to the court directly. Given the lengthy delay in the receiving of these reports and the age and willingness of the children to attend court, the parties agreed a judicial interview was an appropriate and timely method of obtaining the views of the children.

[151]     As Justice Butler noted in G.A.G.R. v. T.D.W., 2013 BCSC 586 (CanLII), the concept of giving effect to the views of a child, where appropriate, is consistent with Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 states:

[152]     Canada signed the Convention on May 28th, 1990. Although it has never been implemented, it was ratified on December 13th, 1991.

[153]     Although the courts are encouraged to take account of the views of children, this does not mean that the children’s views are determinative or even presumptively so. A child’s view is not synonymous with a child’s best interest. Still, the child’s view provide “context in which to understand better the whole of the evidence that must be weighed”: M.H. v P.S.W, 2018 BCSC 1318 (CanLII), referencing Rupertus v . Rupertus, 2012 BCCA 426 (CanLII) at para. 13.

[154]     The question as to whether a child has reached an age and degree of maturity where it is appropriate to take his or her views on parenting time into account must be determined on all the evidence, with particular attention to the nature, strength and reasons for the child’s views. It goes without saying, a court should consider whether a child’s views have been unduly influenced by someone else.

[155]     In this case, C.O.M., C.J.M. and G.M.M. are all of sufficient age and maturity that I can give weight to their views on parenting time. As C.O.M. is 15, her age and maturity, requires I give considerable weight to her views. C.O.M. and C.J.M. say they want to live with their father full-time and G.M.M. is happy with the shared parenting arrangement. Having interviewed the children, I am satisfied the views they hold are their own. There is nothing in their demeanour or statements that suggests to me they are been unduly influenced by others.

[156]     As I have indicated previously in my reasons for Judgment, C.J.M.’s relationship with his mother is strained, perhaps to the breaking point. C.O.M.’s resistance in spending time with her mother is tempering. G.M.M. appears to have a good relationship with both parents. The children have extended family in the Terrace area with whom they are close, including their older brother and cousins.

[157]     The history of the children’s care is set out in the s. 211 FLA Report.

[158]     The children had been cared for by both parents prior to A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s separation in March 2016. Until March 23, 2018, the children adhered to a shared parenting regime. From March 23, 2018 until June 25, 2019, C.O.M. lived full-time with her mother, with J.R.M. acquiescence. Since then she has lived exclusively with her father and spends little parenting time with her mother. C.J.M. has lived exclusively with his father since January 25, 2019. He spends no parenting time with his mother. G.M.M. divides his time equally between the two parents as set out in the January 29, 2019 order.

[159]     Despite the fluctuating parenting time arrangements, the children’s lives are reasonable stable. They continue to live in the Terrace area, as they have since birth. They attend local schools, which only change when the child moves on from elementary school to middle to high school. They have extended family in the area, with whom they are close. It goes without saying that parental separation generally has a destabilizing effect on children. Since A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s separation in March 2016, the greatest threat to the children’s stability is the parents’ inability to interact and communicate with each other in a manner consistent with the children’s best interest.

[160]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. both work full-time and provide adequate homes for their children. They have different parenting styles, but that is not unusual. I have not heard any evidence that either parent is unable to exercise his or her parental responsibilities beyond their inability to interact with each other in a manner which best assures the children’s sense of safety, security and well-being.

[161]     “Family Violence” is defined in s. 1 of the FLA:

[162]     J.R.M. and C.J.M. accuses A.M.V. of acts of family violence against C.J.M. She says their version of events are either untrue or exaggerated. C.J.M. went to live with his father as a result of the January 25, 2019 incident with his mother and refuses to return to her home or spend any parenting time with her.

[163]     A.M.V. does admits to threatening C.O.M. she would destroy her cat LX:

[164]     Threatening to kill a child’s pet is an act of family violence. It is obvious to me that C.O.M. loves animals, and in particular, her cats. She told Ms. Reuvekamp that she wants to be a veterinarian. A.M.V. acknowledged to Ms. Reuvekamp that C.O.M. suffers from anxiety. C.O.M. began to cry when she relayed this incident to the Court.

[165]     J.R.M. says that on one occasion when he tried to speak to A.M.V. through the open front passenger door of her vehicle she backed up full throttle and hit him with the passenger door. This incident relates to A.M.V.’s allegations set out in paragraphs 26 and 27 of her June 19, 2019 Affidavit. This incident too is an act of family violence against a former spouse.

[166]     There is no evidence before me that J.R.M. has acted violently against the children or A.M.V., however, A.M.V. perceives some of J.R.M.’s behaviours as aggressive or threatening or bullying.

[167]     Assessing family violence

[168]     A.M.V.’s actions suggest she can lose her temper and lash out. Ms. Reuvekamp in her report she quotes C.O.M. as saying her one wish is by going through the s. 211 process, her “mom won’t get as mad all the time.” C.J.M. is quoted as saying he was angry with his mother because “she gets mad when we don’t do our chores and threatens to split our tablets in half. Tablets we bought with our own money.”

[169]     As I had stated in N.M.B. v. K.D.B., 2019 BCPC 291 (CanLII), it is impossible for the Court to craft a functional parenting time schedule which does not require the parent’s good faith participation and cooperation. The Court is not a parent and cannot make an intricate flow chart of orders which anticipates every conceivable issue that might arise in the children’s lives.

[170]     J.R.M. seeks a parenting time schedule which is reasonably flexible, especially for holidays. A.M.V. does not. For example, para. 5(b) of the January 29, 2019 order provides the children spend each Tuesday from 3:00 pm to 8:00 pm at the house of the parent not exercising parenting time that week. J.R.M. proposes changing this mid-week visit to an overnight visit to eliminate having to transition the children twice between residences in a five hour period. A.M.V. does not agree to this variation because it would be disruptive to her household routine. In my view, given the children’s ages, there is no longer any need for a mid-week visit and I am not going to order one.

[171]     Also, as set out in above, para. 5(c) of the January 29, 2019 order allows A.M.V. and J.R.M. summer parenting time with the children for two consecutive weeks provided they give 45 days’ notice to the other parent of his or her intention to do so. J.R.M. asks this notice period be reduced given that historically, each parent holiday fairly close to home. They get in their motor vehicle and go swimming or camping or boating or kayaking or fishing. They visit with friends and family. Neither parent has the resources to take the children on extravagant international holidays. J.R.M. does not always know 45 days in advance when he will have holidays. I agree a more flexible notice period is appropriate given J.R.M. and A.M.V.’s financial resources and lifestyles.

[172]     A.M.V. opposes J.R.M. departing on the fly from a pre-arranged schedule or parenting time. This is exemplified by her negative reaction to J.R.M. taking the children on a side trip to Smithers following the [omitted for publication] family reunion in [omitted for publication] and to his request to extend his Northern vacation at Watson Lake with the children in the summer of 2018. J.R.M. argues that A.M.V. has taken the children on trips to Prince George and 100 Mile House, without his prior knowledge or permission. A.M.V. disagrees: see Exhibit “E” to her July 19, 2019 Affidavit. J.R.M. says that if A.M.V. and the children want to do something together during his parenting time, he generally agrees. When he wants to do something with the children during A.M.V.’s parenting time, her default position is, “No.”

[173]     J.R.M. has to accept that he and A.M.V. have different tolerances for spontaneity. Although adherence to rigid schedules can minimize the potential for parental conflict, it also can work to deny the children valuable opportunities and experiences. J.R.M. and A.M.V. have imposed upon themselves increasingly complex parenting time orders. These seem to have exacerbated rather than alleviated their interpersonal conflict.

[174]     Perhaps one strategy for reducing the type of conflict which has arisen in this case is to impose less, not more, court order restrictions on parenting time. Hopefully, by eliminating the children’s mid-week visit and shortening the notice period for summer vacations, the parents’ can plan outings with the children without having to secure the cooperation and consent of the other parent.

[175]     I have no evidence of there being any outstanding civil or criminal proceedings relevant to an of the children’s security or well-being.

[176]     Taking into consideration all of the evidence before me, the best interests of the children with particular regard to their views and wishes, I find the Court ought to make orders reflecting the new status quo. C.J.M. and C.O.M.’s primary residence will be with J.R.M. A.M.V. will have parenting time with C.J.M. and C.O.M. as A.M.V. and J.R.M. may from time-to-time agree. G.M.M. will continue the shared parenting arrangement currently in place, except for the mid-week visits, which I am eliminating.

[177]     I intend to impose a bifurcated notice period for summer vacation of two weeks for vacations within the Province and 30 days outside the province. I am not going to order any police apprehension provisions or conduct orders beyond having J.R.M. and A.M.V. communicate in writing. Given their disparate views on various events and issues, I believe written communication will reduce the uncertainty as to what was said, who said it and when it was said. Moreover, because these messages often become attached to affidavits or tendered as exhibits in court proceedings, it will be in the parents’ best interests to keep those written communications civil, relevant and concise.

[178]     While A.M.V. and J.R.M. shared parenting responsibilities for the children, they also shared parenting responsibilities. Unfortunately, this has been challenging given their mutual distrust and profound disconnect between how they perceive events.

[179]     In N.R.G., the Court of Appeal interpreted ss. 40, 41 and 45 of the FLA as limiting judicial intervention in parenting decisions, not just in alienation cases but generally. A trial judge cannot take on parental responsibilities assigned to the guardians under the FLA. In other words, Judge should not issue detailed directions on how parents exercise their parenting responsibilities. The appellate Court states at para 40 in part:

[180]     This means that I cannot mandate or restrict the children's activities, including their use of electronic devices. It is up to the parent who has the child in their care to decide this issue. If the parents cannot agree, then the Court can determine which parent will have the final decision-making authority on the disputed issue.

[181]     I conclude that A.M.V. and J.R.M. ought to continue to share parenting responsibilities equally. They will consult each other about any important decisions that must be made and will try to reach agreement concerning these important issues. If they cannot agree on a parental responsibility respect to C.O.M. or C.J.M., then J.R.M. will make the decision and A.M.V. may apply for a review of that decision under s. 49 of the FLA. If they cannot agree on an important parenting responsibility with respect to G.M.M., then either parent can apply to the Court which will either assist them in resolving the issue or designate the final decision maker.

[182]     J.R.M. is seeking child support retroactively and prospectively.

[183]     The applicable legislation is as follows:

[184]     The relevant section of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 provides as follows:

[185]     The threshold test for variation of an order is a material change of circumstance as set out in Willick v. Willick, 1994 CanLII 28 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670 at para. 21:

[186]     In W. (G.M.) v. W. (D.P.), 2014 BCCA 282, the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered the threshold test in Willick, and stated (at para. 33):

[187]     The cessation of a shared parenting arrangement in the circumstances of this case would result in a significantly different child support order than that previously in place. Hence, C.J.M. and C.O.M. going to live full-time with J.R.M. is clearly a change of circumstances set out in s. 152(a) of the FLA and s. 14 of Federal Child Support Guidelines.

[188]     In D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 (CanLII), the Supreme Court of Canada set out the law to be applied when retroactive child support is sought. The Court said that with parenthood comes financial responsibility. The Court held that retroactive child support orders are not exceptional and are justified by the fact that the payer parent has failed to meet the financial obligation due to the child. It held that child support is the right of the child and cannot be waived.

[189]     J.R.M. seeks a retroactive variation on the basis of 152(a) and (b). The January 29, 2019 order for support was predicated on A.M.V. and J.R.M. sharing equally parenting time with C.J.M. and G.M.M. and C.O.M. living primarily with A.M.V. Since then C.J.M. has lived with his father full-time and since June 25, 2019, C.O.M. has lived with her father full-time. The parents maintain a shared parenting regime with G.M.M.

[190]     Pursuant to the terms of the January 29, 2019 order, J.R.M. paid A.M.V. child support for C.J.M. for February, March, April, and May 2019, even though C.J.M. lived with him full-time. Until May 31, 2019, J.R.M. paid A.M.V. $1,057 for child support, which is actually $51 more per month than set out in the January 29, 2019 order. Beginning in June 2019, J.R.M. paid A.M.V. $605 per month in child support. He reduced the total sum by $401 to adjust for C.J.M. living with him full-time.

[191]     When C.O.M. went to live with J.R.M. full time on June 25, 2019, J.R.M. told A.M.V. he could not afford to pay her child support for four months full support for C.O.M. when he was supporting her and C.J.M. living with him full-time and G.M.M. half-time.

[192]     A.M.V. receives the Universal Child Care Benefit of $1,200 per month for all the children. A.M.V. did not give any portion of the UCCB to J.R.M. nor did she pay for any of the children’s expenses while they were living in his home. The only monies A.M.V. spent on C.J.M. directly after he went to live with J.R.M. was on some shirts she bought for him from the Salvation Army Thrift Shop, which he never received. A.M.V. also paid $300 towards C.O.M.’s cell phone for the period when C.O.M. still lived with her. When C.O.M. relocated to J.R.M.’s house, A.M.V. terminated the contract for C.O.M.’s cell phone.

[193]     In 2019 A.M.V. received $4,885 in child support from J.R.M. and $14,400 in the Universal Child Care Benefit for all three children.

[194]     Using “My Support Calculator” application, J.R.M. determined that based on their estimated respective 2019 Guideline incomes of $82,296 (J.R.M.) and $45,000 (A.M.V.), A.M.V. owed him $124 per month in child support as of July 1, 2019. As he was ordered to pay A.M.V. $150 per month toward his arrears in child support, J.R.M. offset $124 from that payment for the months of July, November, December, 2019, and January and February 2020. This meant J.R.M. paid A.M.V. $26 per month towards the arrears during those months. J.R.M. credits A.M.V. with having paid $620 in child support for five months between July 1, 2019 and February 28, 2020.

[195]     J.R.M. also paid A.M.V. $2,014 in spousal support last year.

[196]     A.M.V. submits that pursuant to Term 8 of the January 29, 2019 order she is entitled to child support for C.J.M. until May 31, 2019, and for C.O.M. until November 30, 2019.

[197]     I find it unfair to the children and J.R.M. to require him to pay to A.M.V. support for children who are 100% in his care and to exempt A.M.V. from paying any support. I am mindful J.R.M. is also liable to pay to A.M.V. arrears of child support by virtue of Term 12 of the January 29, 2019 order. As Justice Scarth commented in R.M.E. v. R.A.E., 2003 BCSC 2 (CanLII), parents have a joint and continuing legal obligation to support their children. It is the children who have a legal right to support. “Child support is not spousal support in disguise.” I am prepared to order A.M.V. pay child support to J.R.M. based on her Guideline income retroactive to February 1, 2019.

[198]     A.M.V. says she has not yet received her 2019 T4 Statement from her employer but expects her 2019 and 2020 income will be $45,000 as it was in 2018.

[199]     Section 7 expenses do not appear to be a contentious issue between A.M.V. and J.R.M. at this time. For their guidance, I have set out below the legal considerations for determining what are and what are not special or extraordinary expenses.

[200]  The basic Guideline table amounts of child support are designed to cover all the “ordinary” costs of raising a child. This include food, shelter, clothing as well as many educational, extracurricular and recreational expenses: McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 1998 CanLII 5558 (BC CA). Section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines gives the court the discretion to order payment of an amount over and above the regular table amount. However, in order to qualify for an s. 7 order, the expenses must be proven to be “special” or “extraordinary” in some way. Sections 7 states:

[201]     In Clarke v. Clarke, 2014 BCSC 824 (CanLII), Justice Baird states (at para. 51) the list set out in s. 7 is exhaustive. If the expense does not fit into any of the enumerated categories, it cannot be a special or extraordinary expense complicated. Still, what is and is not an extraordinary expense is not always straightforward. Section 7.1, provides some guidance, which states:

[202]     In Bodine-Shah v. Shah, 2014 BCCA 191, the Court of Appeal distinguished between special expenses, as listed in in ss. 7(1)(a)-(c) and (e) from extraordinary expenses referred to in ss. 7(1)(d) and (f). Justice D. Smith for the appellate court explains in para. 66:

[203]     In L.A.M. v S.C.M, 2020 BCSC 67 (CanLII), Justice Weatherill, canvassed the law on what constitutes an “extraordinary” expense. He states, at para. 30:

[204]     Under s. 7 of the Guidelines, J.R.M. will pay 64% of the children’s special or extraordinary expenses and A.M.V. will pay 36%, provided that such expenses have been approved in advance by both parents.

[205]     On January 29, 2019, J.R.M. and A.M.V. consented to the following prospective terms:

[206]     J.R.M. asks the Court to terminate spousal support or, in the alternative, order it be payable at the low or moderate end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines. J.R.M. says A.M.V. had worked much of their relationship. The only reason the January 29, 2019 order stated spousal support would be reviewed and payable at the high end of the SSAG was because if it were calculated at the lower or mid-range, A.M.V. would not be entitled to any spousal support. J.R.M. says he did not agree to this term. Be that as it may, I cannot go behind the terms of the order.

[207]     Spousal support is governed by s. 160 to 162 of the FLA. Section 160 sets out the duty to provide spousal support where entitlement is established. Section 161 deals with determining entitlement to spousal support and s. 162 deals with determining its amount and duration:

[208]     Spousal support may be compensatory, non-compensatory (needs based) or contractual support or a combination of thereof.

[209]     Section 167 of the FLA empowers the court to change, suspend or terminate an order respecting spousal support prospectively or retroactively. The application’s judge must be satisfied that since the last order respecting spousal support was made, there has been a change in circumstances, there is available substantial evidence that was previously unavailable at the hearing, or that evidence of lack of financial disclosure by a party has been discovered.

[210]     At the time of the January 29, 2019 order, J.R.M. had shared parenting time with C.J.M. and G.M.M. C.O.M. was living full-time with A.M.V. Now, C.J.M. and C.O.M. live full-time with J.R.M., who continues to share parenting time with G.M.M. Also, J.R.M. and A.M.V. are working towards a division of family debts and assets. I am satisfied that if these circumstances were known on January 29, 2019, the parties would have made a different agreement which would have resulted in a different order. As C.J.M. has now lived with J.R.M. for over one year and C.O.M. for seven months, these are significant and long lasting changes.

[211]     I am satisfied J.R.M. has established a material change of circumstances since the January 29, 2019 order as it relates to spousal support. As I am terminating Judge Struyk’s order as of the date of this judgment, I must consider whether I ought to make an order for spousal support retroactively or prospectively, if at all.

[212]     I am not satisfied that I have sufficient information to make a principled decision as to issue of spousal support. I am cognizant that family property division (ss. 81 and 95) and spousal support orders are closely connected. Issues respecting family assets and family debts are not within the jurisdiction of this court. Also, other adjustments come into play beyond the parties Line 150 income for the purposes of determining spousal support.

[213]     I am adjourning the issue of spousal support to the Judicial Case Manager to schedule a one day hearing before me at which time I can receive more fulsome evidence. Specifically, I will require A.M.V. and J.R.M. file an updated financial statement, completing all sections of those statements. I will also require them to provide income tax returns not previously provided and documentation relating to the UCCB or any other benefits received. I will also require them to provide documentation proving their more significant expenses.

[214]     In the interim, J.R.M. will continue to pay A.M.V. $157 per month spousal support on a without prejudice basis to either party.

[215]     I am not going to make any conduct orders beyond directing A.M.V. and J.R.M. communicate in writing. Neither will I make any police assist orders at this time. I am hopeful A.M.V. and J.R.M. can reach a détente in their conflict. The Court expects parents to communicate with each other in a mature and respectful manner. A.M.V. and J.R.M. are hard-working law abiding citizens and in my view a FLA order should not begin to resemble a Recognizance of Bail or a Probation Order.

[216]     The Order of the Honourable Judge Struyk made January 29, 2019, is terminated effective March 3, 2020.

[217]     A.M.V. (“A.M.V.”) and J.R.M. (“J.R.M.”) are the guardians of the C.O.M., born [omitted for publication], C.J.M., born [omitted for publication], and G.M.M., born [omitted for publication] (“G.M.M.” and collectively with C.O.M. and C.J.M., the “Children”);

[218]     From and after February 1, 2019, C.J.M.’s primary residence is with J.R.M.;

[219]     A.M.V. will have parenting time with C.J.M. at times and dates as A.M.V. and J.R.M. may agree;

[220]     From and after July 1, 2019, C.O.M.’s primary residence is with J.R.M.;

[221]     A.M.V. will have parenting time with C.O.M. at times and dates A.M.V. and J.R.M. may agree;

[222]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. will share parenting time with G.M.M. equally as follows:

[223]     Except as elsewhere provided in this Order, A.M.V. and J.R.M. will share equally parenting responsibilities for the Children under s. 40(2) of the FLA;

[224]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. will advise each other of any matters of a significant nature affecting the Children;

[225]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. will consult with each other about any important decisions that must be made about the Children and will try to reach agreement concerning these important issues;

[226]     If A.M.V. and J.R.M. cannot agree on an important parenting responsibility with respect to C.O.M. or C.J.M., then J.R.M. must make the decision and A.M.V. may apply for a review of that decision under s. 49 of the FLA;

[227]     If A.M.V. and J.R.M. cannot agree on an important parenting responsibility with respect to G.M.M., then either parent can apply to the Court for assistance with making the decision or to designate a final decision maker;

[228]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. may vary parenting time arrangements for the Children through written agreement;

[229]     The Court finds J.R.M. to be a resident of British Columbia having a gross annual income of $78,515 as of February 1, 2019;

[230]     The Court finds A.M.V. to be a resident of British Columbia and imputed to have a gross annual income of $45,000 as of February 1, 2019;

[231]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. have a shared custody arrangement for G.M.M. as defined in s. 9 of the Guidelines;

[232]     A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s child support obligations set out in the Order of Judge Struyk made January 29, 2019 are retroactively adjusted as of February 1, 2019, as follows:

[233]     The Court acknowledges A.M.V. has paid to J.R.M. $124 in child support for the months of July 2019, November 2019, December 2019, January 2020, and February 2020, for a total of $620;

[234]     Any credit accruing to J.R.M. as a result of the retroactive adjustment of child support to February 1, 2019, will be applied towards J.R.M.’s arrears in child support owing to A.M.V. If J.R.M. is still in arrears upon applying this credit, then any child support payable to him by A.M.V. will be offset until his arrears have been paid in full;

[235]     For as long as the Children eligible to receive child support, A.M.V. and J.R.M. will exchange: (a) copies of their respective income tax returns for the previous year, including all attachments, not later than June 1 each year; and (b) copies of any Notice of Assessment or Reassessment provided to them by Canada Revenue Agency, immediately upon receipt;

[236]     A.M.V. and J.R.M. will ordinarily communicate with each other in writing, which may include email and text messaging;

[237]     Either A.M.V. or J.R.M. can apply to settle or clarify the terms of this order upon reasonable notice to the other;

[238]     A.M.V. and J.R.M.’s reciprocating issues with respect to spousal support are adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager to schedule a one day hearing;

[239]     At least two weeks prior to the spousal support hearing date, A.M.V. and J.R.M. will:

[240]     The Court will draft the order and neither party nor counsel is required to approve it as to form.