E.D. v. B.L., 2020 BCPC 114 (CanLII)
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2020 BCPC 114 |
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Date: |
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File No: |
19-31177 |
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Registry: |
Vancouver |
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IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
IN THE MATTER OF
THE FAMILY LAW ACT, S.B.C. 2011 c. 25
BETWEEN:
E.D.
APPLICANT
AND:
B.L.
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
OF THE
HONOURABLE JUDGE W. LEE
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Counsel for the Applicant: |
F. Arbabi |
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Counsel for the Respondent: |
R. Pryer |
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Place of Hearing: |
Vancouver, B.C. |
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Date of Hearing: |
March 24, 2020 |
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Date of Judgment: |
June 5, 2020 |
BACKGROUND
[1] This application involves two children born [omitted for publication] and [omitted for publication]. The biological mother of the children is B.L. The biological father is S.W.C.J. (“Mr. S.”).
[2] On July 10, 2019, the applicant E.D. applied to be appointed a guardian of the children, and for orders relating to parenting time, parental responsibilities and travel. She also sought a protection order against Mr. S., who is not a party to these proceedings.
[3] B.L. filed a Reply and Counterclaim on August 8, 2019. She opposed the application and by way of counterclaim sought orders for guardianship, parenting time, protection and parental responsibilities.
[4] On October 28, 2019, the Honourable Judge Wingham made an order that the children’s residence not be relocated from the Province of British Columbia without further court order.
[5] A trial in this matter was set to commence March 24, 2020.
[6] On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization classified COVID-19 as a pandemic. Thereafter, the Federal Government and the BC Provincial Health Officer issued a number of orders and advisories in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic.
[7] On March 19, 2020, the Provincial Court of BC issued the first of its Notice to the Profession and Public dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, which notice has been subsequently amended. Pursuant to that notice, existing trials and applications set for hearing from March 16 to May 16, 2020 were adjourned. Until the COVID-19 restrictions are lifted, no further in-person hearings are to be conducted.
[8] Counsel for B.L. advised that on March 16, 2020, the Robson Square Court judicial case manager advised his office that the March 24, 2020 trial was adjourned. As a result, Mr. S., who was to testify at the trial, cancelled his flight from Hong Kong to Vancouver.
[9] These were the early days of the new and evolving court procedures put into place due to the COVID-19 pandemic. There was clearly some confusion on the part of the Court Registry about the procedures because the registry subsequently told the parties that the March 24, 2020 trial was proceeding. As a result, Counsel for B.L. filed three notices of motions on March 23, 2020. The motions sought the following orders:
1. To allow Mr. S. to testify by video at the trial.
2. To adjourn the trial.
3. For a s. 211 report to assess the impact of family violence, if any, allegedly caused by Mr. S. on the children.
[10] This matter came before me on March 24, 2020.
[11] I dismissed the request for the s. 211 report. Section 211 allows the court to order a report to assess the ability of a party to the proceedings to parent. As Mr. S. was not a party to the proceedings, this court had no power to order a s. 211 report to assess Mr. S.’s ability to parent.
[12] Because of Provincial Court Notice to the Profession and Public: Covid-19: Suspension of Regular Court Operations (NP19), any hearings would only be conducted by telephone. I found that there were serious issues of credibility that could not be resolved by way of evidence given by telephone.
[13] I also took into consideration the direction from the Office of the Chief Judge found in NP19 that only urgent matters proceed to hearing at this time. I found that the issues of guardianship and parental responsibilities were not urgent matters. There was no evidence that the safety or well-being of the children was at risk from either of the parties. I adjourned the trial to a fix date of June 23, 2020. I also adjourned generally the notice of motion to allow Mr. S. to testify by video.
[14] The issue of parenting time or alternatively contact with the children was more pressing. I held that a E.D.’s application for time with the children could proceed because it was urgent. Given the uncertainty of when normal court operations would resume, any delay in dealing with this issue might mean E.D. would have no communication with the children for months. This was potentially contrary to the best interests of the children. As such, I ordered that this issue be dealt with by way of affidavit evidence and submissions, with a written decision to follow. Specifically, I ordered that E.D. provide an affidavit in support of her application on or before April 14, 2020. B.L. was to provide a responding affidavit within 3 weeks after receipt of E.D.’s affidavit. E.D. could then file an affidavit in reply. E.D.’s submissions were due by May 19, 2020 and B.L.’s submissions were due by June 2, 2020. A written decision would follow.
[15] In a subsequent notice dated May 14, 2020, the Court Registry informed the parties that these proceedings were further adjourned to September 29, 2020 for a fix date. This adjournment was due to the continuing issues with COVID-19.
THE EVIDENCE
[16] Since the start of these court proceedings, both parties have filed numerous affidavits. Until my order of March 24, 2020, this court did not grant permission to file affidavit evidence, as required under Provincial Court (Family) Rule 13(3). It is not common for affidavit evidence to be used in the Provincial Court. Unlike the BC Supreme Court, there is no process for a Summary Trial or Summary Judgement application in the Provincial Court.
[17] I have reviewed the following affidavits:
1) Affidavit of B.L. filed August 8, 2019
2) Affidavit of S.W.C.J. filed August 9, 2019
3) Affidavit of M.L.B. filed August 8, 2019
4) Affidavit of L.C.G. filed August 8, 2018
5) Affidavit of E.D. filed September 5, 2019
6) Affidavit of E.D. filed September 16, 2019
7) Affidavit of E.D. filed October 22, 2019
8) Affidavit of B.L. filed October 24, 2019
9) Affidavit of E.D. filed December 13, 2019
10) Affidavit of H.T.V.W. filed March 19, 2020
11) Affidavit of E.D. filed April 14, 2020
12) Affidavit of B.L. filed May 5, 2020
13) Affidavit of S.W.C.J. filed May 5, 2020
14) Affidavit of E.D. filed May 14, 2020
15) Affidavit of B.L. filed May 28, 2020
[18] I must comment on B.L.’s affidavit filed on May 28, 2020, which was in response to E.D.’s affidavit filed May 14, 2020. My order of March 24, 2020 did not permit the filing of B.L.’s most recent affidavit.
[19] The affidavit of B.L. filed May 28, 2020 also contained a significant amount of hearsay evidence. Exhibit B to the affidavit is a series of questionnaires completed by various persons, which B.L. relies on as evidence that E.D. owes money to loan sharks. These same questionnaires are also attached as exhibits to B.L.’s affidavit filed August 8, 2019. These questionnaires are not sworn evidence and attaching them as exhibits does not make the information admissible.
[20] One of the questionnaires was completed by M.L.B. M.L.B. also supplied an affidavit filed August 8, 2019 and she makes no mention of the information set out in her questionnaire.
[21] Each of the questionnaires contains the following statement:
Note: In signing this document, you are bound to the confidentiality of the contents and everything written in this document and keep it between you and B.L. only and in ensuring that this is not leaked to E.D.
[22] It appears that B.L. did not feel bound by this statement of confidentiality since she included the questionnaires in two of her affidavits.
[23] In my view, the information set out in the questionnaires is not reliable because the information is not sworn. Furthermore, hearsay evidence does not become admissible simply because it is set out in an affidavit. For these reasons, I will not rely on this affidavit.
[24] I turn to what is not in dispute. Both E.D. and B.L. agree that they commenced a common law relationship in May 2009.
[25] B.L. says the common law relationship ended in mid-2013.
[26] The first child was born [omitted for publication].
[27] The second child was born [omitted for publication].
[28] E.D. says the parties separated March 2019 (see para. 4 of the E.D. affidavit filed September 5, 2019; and para. 4 of the E.D. affidavit filed April 14, 2020).
[29] Both parties agree that E.D. stayed in the L. home until May 2019 (see para. 145 of the B.L. affidavit filed August 8, 2019; and para. 4 of the E.D. affidavit filed April 14, 2020).
[30] In E.D.’s affidavit filed April 14, 2020, she described her relationship with the first child as follows:
19. I took a major part in the care of Child A. I woke up in the middle of the night to bottle feed the baby, change his diaper and burp him. Child A and I have a very close mother/son relationship. Child A would sleep in the same bed as the respondent and me. The respondent was also having difficulty in nursing Child A because her nipples were hurting so she asked me to nurse Child A to sooth and comfort him. I mostly took over nursing him from this moment on because he would fall asleep right away at the same time.
20. Since the time Child A could talk he calls the Respondent “Mommy” and he calls me “Mamu”.
21. In have been involved in all aspects of Child A’s life, including doctor’s appointments, taking him to strong start or preschool, church, activities, and to see friends.
[31] In the same affidavit, E.D. described her relationship with the second child as follows:
32. Since the time Child B could talk, he called the Respondent “Mommy” and he calls me “Mamu”.
33. I have been involved in all aspects of Child B’s life, including his doctor’s appointments, daycare, church, activities, and friends. I interact with Child B very often. I also bottle-fed Child B in the middle of the night to give the respondent a break. I took on this night time responsibility because I had to go to work during the day and she cared for the children throughout the day.
[32] B.L. states in her affidavit filed May 5, 2020 at paragraphs 53 and 56 that E.D. was helping with the care of the children. B.L. went on to say that in 2018, she hired her cousin L.C.G. to care for the children, but that E.D. remained in the home and continued to see the children.
[33] B.L. states at paragraph 82 of her affidavit filed May 5, 2020 that on December 31, 2018, E.D. asked to adopt the children.
[34] B.L. went on to describe further communications from E.D. asking about the whereabouts of B.L. and the children. B.L. alleges that E.D. filed a complaint with the police suggesting that the father, Mr. S., may have molested Child A. E.D. says in her affidavit filed May 14, 2020 that she reported that Mr. S. exposed his genitals to Child A and denies reporting a molestation.
[35] B.L. goes on to say in her affidavit filed May 5, 2020 as follows:
144. To this date, I am still living in fear. I need to protect myself, Child A and Child B from the Applicant and from her harassment and stalking.
145. I really cannot predict what the Applicant might do to me, Child A and Child B in future.
146. I believe that if I permit her to be back in our lives that she will continue to issue threats and make attempts to restrict me financially. I do not want to expose my children to this type of behaviour and violence.
147. Due to the Applicant’s past behavior I do not foresee it achievable to work with her to cooperate on issues affecting Child A and Child B as I continue to fear the Applicant.
148. I fear that granting the Applicant time with the children would put the safety of the children and myself at risk. My children are very emotionally stable and I so not want any conflict to pose a threat to their well-being.
[36] I have reviewed the affidavit of the father, S.W.C.J., filed May 5, 2020 and his affidavit filed August 8, 2018. Mr. S. resides in Hong Kong and is married to W.M.S.W. B.L. was initially hired by Mr. S. and his wife as a live-in caregiver. Despite the fact he was married, Mr. S. and B.L. developed a relationship. He refers to having a continuing intimate relationship with B.L.
[37] Mr. S. never lived with the children. There is no basis to presume that he is a guardian of the children.
[38] In my view, Mr. S.’s evidence is irrelevant to the issue of whether E.D. should have contact with the children.
ANALYSIS
[39] E.D. is not a guardian and she applies to become one. Until that occurs, her application is for contact with the children pursuant to Family Law Act s. 59. A person seeking contact with children must show that this would be in the child’s best interests: Kalafchi v. Yao, 2015 BCCA 524
The nature of interim orders during the COVID-19 Pandemic
[40] In the decision J.W. v. C.H., 2020 BCPC 52 (CanLII), I referred to the nature of orders being made during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.
[17] Any resulting orders made under these circumstances are likely to be interim and made on a without prejudice basis. Indeed, in Ontario, the courts have been describing such orders as “temporary, temporary, without prejudice orders”: see for example Phipps v. Petts, 2020 ONSC 1999. The nature of such orders is that they would be subject to review or variation when there is an opportunity for a full hearing and that a party would not be prejudiced by the terms of any interim orders made while the COVID-19 protocols are in place. Furthermore, a material change of circumstances may not be required to justify a change in such orders.
[18] The overriding principle of the child’s best interests remains and that includes any health concerns for the child: Smith v. Sieger, 2020 ONSC 1681 at para. 8.
[41] The Kalafchi v. Yao decision that I referred to earlier commented at paragraph 14 on the nature of interim orders, stating that:
…such orders are inherently interim, temporary, and intended to preserve the status quo pending the final resolution of the issues between the parties.
[42] A useful discussion about what is meant by the “status quo” is found in the Alberta decision PDB v AJB, 2020 ABQB 298, where at paragraph 18, the court set out a summary of “status quo” principles:
[18] I draw the following from these cases:
1. the overarching factor is the best interests of the child or children involved;
2. the status quo parenting is a factor in gauging the “best interests” interim parenting arrangement;
3. that includes both the pre- and post-separation status quo;
4. as between those two, the pre-separation status quo will usually be more significant (typically representing a longer period of parenting and the “baseline” for the family);
5. a parent’s agreement, after separation, to a particular interim arrangement, should not be treated as a waiver of the right to seek a different (longer-term) arrangement;
6. the significance of the post-separation status quo may be particularly be diminished where:
a. it is short-lived;
b. it resulted from one parent’s (i.e. unilateral) decision (e.g. moving with the child or children); or
c. it was affected by one parent’s inability, or reduced ability, to parent in the aftermath of the separation (e.g. arranging suitable accommodation and adChild Bg work schedules);
7. on the other hand, the longer the post-separation status quo, and particularly where it extends beyond the “immediate adjustments” stage, the more significance that status quo may acquire. (For example, in Sorensen v Cooney (cited above), the chambers judge and the Court of Appeal both focused exclusively on the post-separation period, which had run for three years);
8. on that aspect, a party may provide an explanation for apparent delay in applying for a parenting order i.e. other than simply agreement, or acquiescence, to a new status quo; and
9. the status quo parenting (in either period) may be difficult, if not impossible, to determine in a chambers setting e.g. because of conflicting evidence. In such case, it minimizes or even disappears as a factor.
[43] The Ontario decision of L.M.B. v. F.J.D., [2020] O.J. No. 2029 discussed the nature of interim orders and the significance of the status quo:
The Significance of the status quo
29 On a temporary motion, courts should be cautious against ordering a disruption to a defacto situation or a "status quo" arrangement that has existed. In Batsinda v. Batsinda, 2013 ONSC 7899 (CanLII), [2013] O.J. No 6120, Justice Chappell wrote:
In a number of cases, this court has held that as a general rule, changes to existing custody, residence and access arrangements that have evolved either as a result of temporary orders or otherwise should not be made pending trial unless there are compelling circumstances which render a change absolutely necessary in order to satisfy the child's best interests. (Doell v. Cassar, 2009 CarswellOnt 7217 (S.C.J.); Osama v. Sayegh 2004 CarswellOnt 3732 (S.C.J.); David v. McCain, 2005 CarswellOnt 7183 (S.C.J.); Kimpton v. Kimpton, [2002] O.J. No. 5367 (S.C.J.))
However, I rely on the principles which the Ontario Court of Appeal set out in Papp v. Papp 1969 CanLII 219 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.) respecting the weight to be accorded to de facto custodial and access arrangements in the context of motions for temporary custody and access. In that case, the court recognized that the existing arrangements, and how well they are working for the child, are relevant factors in deciding such motions. It stated that as a working rule, a disturbance of the status quo at the interim stage requires more cogent evidence than may be required to disrupt the status quo after trial.
30 However, that is not to say there is a strict presumption in favour of the status quo. The applicable test remains the best interests of the child. In applying that test, there is an obligation on the part of the court to carefully scrutinize and weigh the quality, magnitude, and strength of the evidence adduced in support of a change to the status quo arrangements, and to ensure that the evidence is sufficiently compelling before acting upon that evidence to vary the existing arrangements. (See Batsinda v. Batsinda, 2013 ONSC 7899 (CanLII), [2013] O.J. No 6120, paragraphs 26-27).
31 In determining what was the "status quo", situations unreasonably or unilaterally created by one party to the detriment of the other, to create a tactical advantage, should not be considered the "status quo". The status quo that is relevant on temporary custody and access motions is that which existed prior to the separation between the parties, except in circumstances where there is clear and unequivocal evidence that the parties agreed to a different decision-making and residence arrangement following the separation. The legal status quo is not a status quo created by one party unilaterally taking matters into their own hands, without any consent from the other party. (See Batsinda v. Batsinda, 2013 ONSC 7899 (CanLII), [2013] O.J. No 6120, paragraph 28 and Kimpton v. Kimpton, [2002] O.J. No. 5367 (SCJ), paragraph 1).
The best interests of the children
[44] When deciding whether to make an order for contact with children, s. 37 of the Family Law Act states that the court must consider the best interests of the children. In doing so, I must review all the needs and circumstances of the children including the factors set out at s. 37. I will proceed with reviewing those factors.
The children's health and emotional well-being
[45] There is no specific evidence about the children’s health or emotional well-being.
The children's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them
[46] The children have not expressed their views and they are too young to do so.
The nature and strength of the relationships between the children and significant persons in the child's life
[47] Aside from their mother, the evidence shows that during the course of the children’s lives the one person with the most significant relationship to the children is E.D.
The history of the children's care
[48] E.D. has been involved in the care of the children since their birth. This ended in May 2019 when E.D. moved out of the home.
The children’s need for stability, given the children's ages and stage of development
[49] Over the course of the children’s lives, the two people most involved in the raising of the children were E.D. and B.L. The need for stability favours E.D. having time with the children.
The ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the children, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities
[50] I am dealing just with an application for contact and not for guardianship or parental responsibilities. This factor is not applicable.
The impact of any family violence on the children's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the children or another family member
[51] B.L. has suggested in her materials that E.D. has made threats justifying a protection order. Although I am not dealing with a protection order application, the impact of family violence is a factor I must consider when assessing the best interests of the children.
[52] The evidence presented to me does not appear to justify a protection order. The actions attributed to E.D. are more consistent with a person seeking a share of family property or dealing with issues typical in a Family Law Act dispute.
[53] B.L. suggests that due to threats of violence she had taken a stress leave from work. The evidence of this is lacking though. A doctor’s note attached as Exhibit C to B.L.’s affidavit filed May 5, 2020 only says that B.L. missed work due to medical reasons, and makes no mention of threats.
[54] The question of whether family violence existed is a contested issue that can only be resolved by way of a trial. This issue cannot be determined by affidavit evidence but what evidence there is does not suggest there is any risk to the children. B.L. agrees at paragraph 40 of her submissions that no family violence was directed at the children.
Whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for the children and meet the children's needs
[55] There is no evidence of any family violence directed at the children.
The appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the children's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the children, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the children or other family members
[56] As guardianship is not an issue before me, this factor is not relevant.
Any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the children's safety, security or well-being.
[57] There are no relevant civil or criminal proceedings.
Discussion
[58] Whether or not the parties were in a common law relationship at the time the children were born, E.D. was clearly living in the same home as the children and caring for them since their birth until May 2019. This involvement only ended in May 2019 when E.D. left the L. home. The present court proceedings started shortly afterwards in July 2019. In my view, the status quo of the relationship between E.D. and the children was established in the period prior to May 2019.
[59] This is not a trial to determine a final order regarding contact with the children, as was the case in my decision in C.C. v. D.A., 2019 BCPC 126 and Judge Koturbash’s decision in D.D. v. A.C., 2017 BCPC 5. These cases are distinguishable because they came about after a full hearing. The issue here is to determine an appropriate interim order until the court can make a final decision after a full hearing.
[60] Given the history of the care of the children, I find that it is in the best interests of the children to re-establish, at least to some degree, their relationship with E.D. Her relationship with the children existed for most of the children’s lives. The resumption of contact will also promote stability for the children. Furthermore, this will ensure that E.D.’s application is not prejudiced due to the passing of time until in-person trials can resume.
[61] Based on the evidence, I also see no reason for E.D.’s contact with the children to be supervised.
[62] As E.D. has not seen the children since May 2019, the first contact between E.D. and the children should be gradual and will not be in person. During the first two weeks of the re-established contact, communication will be by videoconference call only. The videoconference call will be for a minimum of 15 minutes, but E.D. will have the option of terminating the contact sooner. I have kept the call duration relatively short given the ages of the children and their likely limited attention span.
[63] After the first two weeks, there will be each week one in-person contact time visit with the children for a period of 90 minutes and one contact by videoconference.
[64] Given some of B.L.’s comments in her affidavits, I am concerned about possible interference with the relationship between E.D. and the children. To safeguard against this, I will make an order applicable to both parties regarding conduct and communication. Neither party is to speak disparagingly about the other in front of the children. Neither party is to discuss these court proceedings with the children.
[65] In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, both parties must comply with all necessary COVID-19 precautions in order to protect the children.
[66] This order relates to contact only. I make this order on an interim basis only and without prejudice to a new order that may affect the amount of time with the children that E.D. may be entitled to upon a further court order. My order does not prevent a subsequent judge from determining that in the best interests of the children, E.D. should not have any time with the children. As I stated earlier, the purpose of this order is to maintain some semblance of the status quo pending a final hearing.
[67] The specific terms of my order are as follows:
1. Commencing Wednesday June 10, 2020, and continuing each Wednesday thereafter up to and including June 24, 2020, E.D. will have contact with the children by way of a video conference call.
2. The video conference call will commence at 7:00 pm and will be for a minimum of 15 minutes, unless E.D. elects to complete the call sooner.
3. B.L. will forthwith provide E.D. with contact information for the video conference call.
4. At the scheduled contact time, E.D. will initiate the video conference call and B.L. will ensure that the children are available to receive the video conference call.
5. Commencing Wednesday July 1, 2020 and continuing each Wednesday thereafter until further order of the court or the agreement of the parties, E.D. will have in-person contact time with the children for a duration of 90 minutes until further order of the court or the agreement of the parties.
6. To facilitate the in-person contact with the children, B.L. will bring the children to the [omitted for publication] located [omitted for publication] or such other location as the parties may agree, for pick up by E.D.
7. Upon completion of the in-person contact with the children, E.D. will return the children to B.L. by bringing the children to the [omitted for publication] located [omitted for publication] or such other location as the parties may agree.
8. Commencing Sunday July 5, 2020 and continuing each Sunday thereafter until further order of the court or the agreement of the parties, E.D. will have contact with the children by way of a video conference call commencing at 7:00 pm for a minimum of 15 minutes, unless E.D. elects to complete the call sooner.
9. If there are any difficulties in arranging a video conference call as provided for in this order, the parties are to discuss such prior to the scheduled time for the call and if necessary make alternative arrangements for the call.
10. Pursuant to s. 227 of the Family Law Act, each party must comply with all orders and directions issued in relation to the COVID-19 virus by the Federal and Provincial Government, the Public Health Officers of Canada and British Columbia and any health-care practitioner caring for the children or the parties, including any requirements and recommendations for social or physical distancing, restrictions on travel and movement from the home, self-isolation and hand-washing.
11. The parties will:
a) put the best interests of the children before their own interests;
b) encourage the children to have a good relationship with the other party and speak to the children about the other party and that party’s partner, if any, in a positive and respectful manner; and
c) make a real effort to maintain polite, respectful communications with each other, refraining from any negative or hostile criticism, communication or argument in front of the children.
12. The parties will not:
a) question the children about the other party or time spent with the other party beyond simple conversational questions;
b) discuss with the children any inappropriate adult, court or legal matters; or blame, criticize or disparage the other party to the children.
13. This order is interim and is made without prejudice to any further order of this court that may vary or cancel the entitlement of E.D. to time with the children.
14. This matter is adjourned to September 29, 2020 at 9:30am, or such other date and time as may be set by the Judicial Case Manager, for the purposes of fixing a date for hearing for the Application to Obtain an Order filed by E.D. on July 10, 2019 and the Reply and Counterclaim filed by B.L. on August 8, 2019.
15. Pursuant to Provincial Court (Family) Rule 18(4), the requirement for counsel to approve the form of this order is dispensed with.
[68] Mr. Arbabi will draft this order.
[69] In light of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the interest of reducing the level of contact between counsel, I have dispensed with the requirement for counsel to sign the order. Mr. Arbabi will prepare the draft order and provide it to Mr. Pryer for review. If the draft order is acceptable, Mr. Pryer will confirm this with Mr. Arbabi in writing, which may occur by fax or email to Mr. Arbabi. In turn, Mr. Arbabi will submit the draft order and a copy of Mr. Pryer’s written approval of the form of the order to the Court Registry for filing. The filing may occur by fax or email.
[70] I am not seized of any further applications in this matter.
_____________________________
The Honourable Judge Lee
Provincial Court of British Columbia