IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

[1]           Mr. Snyder is charged with uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm. Both defence and Crown counsel seek to resolve this matter by way of peace bond pursuant to section 810 of the Criminal Code. They have both asked whether a new information alleging a fear in accordance section 810 is required, or if they can rely on section 606(4). I am satisfied they can rely on section 606(4) and these are my reasons why.

[2]           For several years, cases have been resolved with section 810 peace bonds, yet there are no reported decisions addressing the issue whether the parties can rely on section 606(4) of the Criminal Code. After considering various sections of the Code and applying the principles of statutory interpretation, I am satisfied the parties can rely on the section, and swearing of a new information is not required.

[3]           Section 606(4) reads:

[4]           The argument against the use of this section in a section 810 scenario is that section 606(4) speaks to other offences. In the case of a section 810 the defendant is not pleading guilty to any other offence but instead entering into a preventative recognizance. At first blush, the argument is compelling, however, following an examination of the interplay between the various sections of the Code and the case law, it loses support.

[5]           Sections 810(5) and 795 play important roles in extending the reach of section 810 to other sections of the Code. They read:

[6]           Section 606 is contained in Part XX [Procedures in Jury Trials] while sections 810 and 795 are contained in Part XXVII [Summary Convictions].

[7]           In R v Penunsi, 2019 SCC 39, it was argued that because section 515 (bail provisions) specifically apply to “accused charged with offences”, the provisions could not apply to a defendant who was the subject of an 810 information. It was further argued that incorporating the provisions went beyond modifying the bail provisions and changed the law in a substantive way which was the job of Parliament and not the court.

[8]           The Supreme Court of Canada did not agree and relied on section 795 to incorporate the bail provisions to section 810.

[9]           The Court explained that instead of repeating all of the provisions of Part XVI (bail provisions) again in the Part containing section 810, Parliament chose to have the relevant provisions apply to the peace bond scheme via a series of incorporating provisions (namely section 795). The drafting technique of incorporation by reference as the court observed is a legitimate and “an economical one for Parliament to employ”.

[10]        Likewise, in the case at hand, rather than repeating all of the procedures contained in Part XX, Parliament chose to also incorporate them by reference through section 795.

[11]        This does not mean all of the sections found in Part XX apply to peace bonds. Instead, only those that:

[12]        In R v Harris, 2008 BCSC 561, the trial judge dismissed the Crown’s application to amend a section 810 information because section 601 only refers to amendments during a trial of an indictment and not a peace bond hearing. On appeal, Justice Curtis relied on section 795 and concluded that section 601, with the necessary modifications, applied to section 810 hearings.

[13]        In R v Morchauser, 2006 ONCJ 88, the issue for the court was whether a peace bond information could name more than one defendant because section 810 refers to the singular person. Again, the court concluded that because section 795 incorporates through reference section 591(3), the section dealing with joinder and severance, the information could include more than one defendant.

[14]        Finally in R v Nowazek, 2018 YKCA 12, the Court of Appeal addressed the question whether the bail provisions, primarily section 515(4) which allows a judge to impose conditions upon release applied to section 810 informations. Although Mr. Justice Fitch for the court agreed that the bail provisions applied, he found that they did not apply to Mr. Nowazek because he had been summoned to appear and not arrested on the information. For this reason, the presiding judge erred by imposing bail pending conditions pending the section 810 hearing.

[15]        Mr. Justice Fitch said the Crown’s argument to incorporate section 515(4) went beyond the scope of section 795. Section 515(4) was never intended to be used in the situation where a person has been summonsed, instead it was intended only to apply to a release after an arrest. Mr. Justice Fitch also observed that the word “necessary” must be understood as limiting the reach of section 795. To incorporate the provisions in the way suggested by the Crown was unnecessary because the judge, like those charged with criminal offences, could issue a warrant for the accused, engage section 515(4) and impose conditions upon release.

[16]        In the case at hand, section 606(4) provides a procedural mechanism whereby with the consent of the prosecutor an accused charged with a criminal offence can plead not guilty to the offence charged in the information but guilty to any other criminal offence arising out of the same transaction. The objective of the section is timely and effective justice, with minimal impairment to the liberty of the people the court serves.

[17]        More often than not, the resolution of cases that involve a guilty plea to an offence other than the one charged or the entering into of a peace bond occurs on the day of trial with the witnesses present. Prudent counsel usually does not discharge witnesses until the guilty plea or peace bond has been recorded as entered; meaning all wait until the order is pronounced.

[18]        In this scenario, when judges fail to utilize the procedural mechanism in section 606(4) the system becomes less efficient, and unnecessarily more onerous for the people served by the courts. The prosecution must stand the matter down, wait for a break in the proceedings to inform his or her legal support staff to prepare a new information, and have them locate a police liaison officer to swear the information. In some centres, like Penticton, the liaison officers do not work in the courthouse, and have other duties preventing them from attending to the swearing of new information immediately. Once sworn, the court registry must input the information into the system and deliver the information to the courtroom. In some cases, this requires the parties to either return later or even another day.

[19]        In Penunsi, Mr. Justice Rowe reminds us of the well-establish principles of statutory interpretation that favours the interpretation of statutes in a way that “avoid absurd results.” In the case at hand, it would be an absurd result that an accused charged with a criminal offence could plead guilty to another criminal offence, without the necessity of swearing a new information, yet one who wants to enter into and agree to something less, like a section 810 peace bond, cannot. What makes the situation even more absurd, is that the parties could agree and the court could impose a common law peace bond without any reference to the information at all.

[20]        The modifications to section 606(4) that are necessary to accommodate reliance on it are minimal. The modifications do not require a substantive change to the law. Unlike the incorporation of the bail provisions in Penunsi, the section being incorporated is strictly procedural and it even requires the consent of the accused before it can be utilized.

[21]        Utilizing section 606(4) is a legitimate, efficient and a prudent way to deal with these types of matters. Pursuant to the section 606(4) and with the consent of the parites, I order Mr. Snyder to enter into a section 810 peace bond.