This website uses cookies to various ends, as detailed in our Privacy Policy. You may accept all these cookies or choose only those categories of cookies that are acceptable to you.

Loading paragraph markers

R. v. A.H., 2024 BCPC 69 (CanLII)

Date:
2024-04-11
File number:
30900-1
Citation:
R. v. A.H., 2024 BCPC 69 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/k48v2>, retrieved on 2024-05-16

Citation:

R. v. A.H.

 

2024 BCPC 69

Date:

20240411

File No:

30900-1

Registry:

Prince Rupert

 

 

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

 

 

 

 

 

 

REX

 

 

v.

 

 

A.H.

 

 

 

 

 

 

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

OF THE

HONOURABLE JUDGE D. PATTERSON

(Appearing Via Videoconference)

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel for the Crown:

E.C. Rines

Counsel for the Accused:

L.M. Fadden

Place of Hearing:

Prince Rupert, B.C.

Dates of Hearing:

April 17, 18 2023; May 30, 31, 2023; February 1, 2024

Date of Judgment:

April 11, 2024

 


Introduction

[1]         THE COURT:  After a multi-day trial, I found A.H. had sexually assaulted J.S. on September 12, 2020, in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. I have set out the circumstances of the sexual violence offence and my factual findings in R. v. A.H., 2023 BCPC 131. Although it appeared initially that the B.C. Prosecution Service was proceeding by way of summary conviction, on April 20, 2022, the B.C. Prosecution Service clarified before Judge Skilnick that it was proceeding by indictment. On April 17, 2023, A.H. elected to be tried by a Provincial Court judge without a jury. 

[2]         As pointed out by Justice Marchand, as he then was, in R. v. C.C.C., 2021 BCSC 599, a case involving the sexual victimization of a preteen girl by an Indigenous man:

[2]        These are amongst the most painful of reasons for judgment a sentencing judge can be asked to deliver. Two crises that arise from the same historical factors pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, the circumstances call on me to denounce and deter the sexual victimization of an extremely vulnerable Indigenous girl. On the other hand, I do not wish to exacerbate the grotesquely disproportionate rate of incarceration of Indigenous people. There is no easy solution.

[3]         I believe that the same holds true in the case of the sexual victimization of an Indigenous female teenager by an Indigenous man, especially when the Indigenous man was himself repeatedly sexually victimized as a boy.

[4]         Taking into account that A.H. is an Indigenous man and the victim of his sexual violence is an Indigenous woman who was 18 at the time of the offence, the B.C. Prosecution Service seeks a sentence of 12 to 18 months in jail, followed by a two-year probation order. The B.C. Prosecution Service also seeks the following ancillary orders:

a.   a DNA order according to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code;

b.   an order that A.H. not contact the victim while he is in custody, under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code;

c.   a weapons prohibition order under s. 109(2) of the Criminal Code, with a sustenance exception under s. 113 of the Criminal Code, if appropriate;

d.   a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, otherwise known as a SOIRA order.

[5]         Taking into account the Supreme Court of Canada's teachings in R. v. Gladue, [1999 CanLII 679], and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, and arguing that "exceptional circumstances" exist for A.H., Ms. Fadden submits that the principles of sentencing can be met in A.H.'s case by the imposition of a conditional sentence order ("CSO"). The defence seeks a CSO of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation. The defence concedes that DNA and SOIRA orders are appropriate in the circumstances. The defence also concedes that a CSO should not be imposed unless the court is satisfied that the service of the CSO in the community would not endanger the community's safety and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and sentencing principles as set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

[6]         Counsel has provided the Court with several case authorities, including the following prosecution cases:

         R. v. W.F.G., 2022 BCSC [1394];

         R. v. Daychief, 2023 BCPC 62;

         R. v. G.M., 2015 BCCA 165;

         R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10; and

         R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5

[7]         The defence has provided the following cases:

         Gladue;

         Ipeelee;

         R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34;

         R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2020 BCSC 308;

         R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46;

         R. v. Browne, 2021 ONSC 6097;

         R. v. B.L.M., 2022 BCPC 187;

         R. v. Carlson, 2022 BCPC 315;

         R. v. Holland, 2022 ONSC 1540;

         R. v. J.A.P.H., 2023 BCPC 90.

[8]         I have read and considered all of the cases provided by counsel, as well as a number of other cases which I will reference in my decision.

[9]         In light of the sentencing positions presented to the court, the issue for me to decide is this: should the now 47-year-old A.H. serve his sentence behind bars in a correctional centre or in the community by way of a conditional sentence order (CSO)?

[10]      For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that this is one of the rare cases where exceptional circumstances exist. In the unique circumstances of the present case, and applying the principles set out in the relevant sections of the Criminal Code, Gladue, and Ipeelee, the appropriate sentence for A.H. is a CSO of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation and ancillary orders.

Brief Facts

[11]      On September 11, 2020, the defendant drove himself to work and later, after allowing his daughter to take his vehicle, he got a ride home from work shortly after 6:30 p.m.

[12]      On the evening of September 11, 2020, the defendant spent time with his then-partner and her family, before going with his partner to a pub in Prince Rupert. He consumed one or more beers at the pub over a short period of time. Sometime after 9:00 p.m., the defendant left the pub with his partner. They went to her home, where the defendant continued drinking alcohol, consuming not less than four vodka ice teas.

[13]      While A.H. was enjoying his time with his partner, the victim and A.H.'s son, R.H., were at the house of A.H.'s mother, D.G., in Prince Rupert. A.H. and his three children, including R.H., lived with D.G.

[14]      The victim, who [omitted for publication] employed, had just relocated from Haida Gwaii to Prince Rupert. She surprised R.H. by going to his house around 7:00 p.m. After a trip to the liquor store, R.H. and the victim had alcoholic drinks with their mutual friends, A. and J., in R.H.'s bedroom.

[15]      R.H. and the victim were having a good time when the intoxicated defendant arrived home late in the evening. R.H. and the defendant got into a discussion about abortion and the debate turned heated. A. and J. left the house, while the victim and R.H. went for a walk to cool R.H. down.

[16]      After R.H. calmed down, they went back to R.H.'s bedroom, chilled, watched a movie, and fell asleep in R.H.'s bed.

[17]      Sometime in the morning of September 12, 2020, before 7:45 a.m., the defendant, A.H., entered R.H.'s bedroom while R.H. and the victim slept. The victim was sleeping on her side and turned away from R.H. The defendant got into the bed and sexually assaulted the victim. Specifically, the victim, wearing pyjama shorts and a sweater, was awakened by A.H. on top of her and kissing her. At the same time, A.H. held one hand on the right side of her face, pushing it into the bed, while his other hand went up her pyjama bottoms and under the sweater she was wearing.

[18]      As the sexual violence continued, A.H. touched the victim's breasts, buttocks, and vagina before inserting his fingers inside her vagina, resulting in the victim experiencing pain and bleeding. The victim was frozen in place and unable to react.

[19]      During the sexual assault, A.H. told the victim that she was a good girl and that he wished R.H. never broke up with her, so that she could stay around.

[20]      At some point during the sexual violence, R.H. woke up, saw what his father was doing to the victim, and kicked his father out of the bedroom. A.H. said that he was sorry and rushed out of the bedroom.

[21]      At no point did the victim consent to being touched by A.H., never mind agreeing to be touched in the manner that A.H. sexually violated her.

[22]      The victim and R.H. did not discuss the sexual assault again until approximately six weeks later. They did not discuss the sexual violence again until February 15, 2021, after D.G. kicked R.H. and the victim out of her house for failing to do dishes or otherwise assisting with household chores.

[23]      R.H. and the victim broke up in 2021, approximately three months after D.G. kicked them out of her house.

Victim Impact Statement

[24]      Victim impact statements assist the court in assessing the gravity of the harm arising from the offences and give victims of crime a voice in the criminal justice system. They allow victims to explain to the court and the offender, in their own words, how the crime has affected them. If a victim wants to read their victim impact statement aloud at the sentencing hearing, the court must allow it.

[25]      Section 722 of the Criminal Code outlines the rules and expectations for victim impact statements. The first three subsections are particularly applicable:

Victim impact statement

722 (1) When determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender or determining whether the offender should be discharged under section 730 in respect of any offence, the court shall consider any statement of a victim prepared in accordance with this section and filed with the court describing the physical or emotional harm, property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as the result of the commission of the offence and the impact of the offence on the victim.

Inquiry by court

(2) As soon as feasible after a finding of guilt and in any event before imposing sentence, the court shall inquire of the prosecutor if reasonable steps have been taken to provide the victim with an opportunity to prepare a statement referred to in subsection (1).

Adjournment

(3) On application of the prosecutor or a victim or on its own motion, the court may adjourn the proceedings to permit the victim to prepare a statement referred to in subsection (1) or to present evidence in accordance with subsection (9), if the court is satisfied that the adjournment would not interfere with the proper administration of justice.

[26]      In the present case, the B.C. Prosecution Service did not provide the Court with a victim impact statement, despite the victim telling the author of the presentence report that she had prepared a victim impact statement. Nevertheless, I did have the advantage of listening to the victim's testimony at trial. Furthermore, on page 4 of the presentence report, the author of the presentence report sets out what the victim told him about how the sexual violence has affected her:

[J.S.] reports that she did fill out a victim impact statement for sentencing. [J.S.] let this writer know that this offence has affected her life tremendously. She reports that the biggest area it has affected is her sleep and finds that she is unable to get more than 4-5 hours at night. [J.S.] stated that she has "PTSD" (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) and that she relives the event often. [J.S.]'s current job schedule has her working long days and because of her lack of sleep at night, she finds that she spends most of her days off resting or sleeping in an effort to make up for the lack of sleep she is able to get at night.

[27]      J.S. reports that A.H. has not tried to contact her while he has been on his undertaking. However, she does want a no-contact and a no-go condition on any subsequent order.

Circumstances of the Offender

[28]      In coming to know A.H.'s background and current circumstances, the court has had the benefit of extensive submissions from Ms. Fadden and three reports:

a.   a Gladue report prepared by Stuart Cadwallader;

b.   a presentence report (PSR) prepared by Kelly Jackson; and

c.   a presentence psychological assessment (psych assessment) prepared by Dr. Dylan Gatner.

[29]      A.H.'s paternal family is Tsimshian and his maternal family is Nisga'a. The Gladue report indicates that his paternal grandparents were survivors of the residential school system who became alcoholics in response to their trauma, while his mother, D.G., attended Indian day school.

[30]      Raised in Prince Rupert, when A.H. was a child, his father worked the day shift at the local shipyard, while D.G. worked the night shift at the cannery. His parents separated when A.H. was eight years old. Having grown tired of her husband's infidelities and the physical and mental abuse he subjected her to, D.G. abruptly left the family. D.G.'s meaningful parental involvement or contact with her children ended shortly after that.

[31]      A.H.'s father, with the support of A.H.'s paternal grandparents and various extended family members, took over the responsibility of raising A.H. and his siblings.

[32]      As a young child and throughout his childhood, A.H. experienced ongoing physical and sexual abuse from his father and other relatives. He continues to have flashbacks. Some of his earliest memories are of his grandfather beating him and his grandmother. His sisters were also sexually abused by their uncles whenever the children visited or stayed with the paternal grandparents. Sexual abuse of the children, including A.H., also often happened when his father hosted parties. There exists an intergenerational family history of incest – including A.H.'s father and uncle sexually violating their sisters.

[33]      At age 20, and while living in Prince Rupert, A.H. became involved in a nine-year relationship with C.M., which produced three children: M.H. (now age 24), T.H. (now age 22), and R.H. (now age 20). While absent any forms of violence, A.H. and C.M. struggled to cope with the emotional manifestations of their respective childhood traumas, and they both engaged in the misuse of alcohol and drugs. The Ministry of Children and Family Development became involved with the family and placed their children with other family members. C.M. and A.H. separated as a result of their misuse of crack cocaine. Ultimately, to get his children back and get his life under control again, A.H. self-referred to the three-month residential addictions program at the [omitted for publication] Healing Centre in [omitted for publication], British Columbia. C.M. passed away as a result of drug overdose.

[34]      Upon completion of the residential treatment program, A.H. worked with the Ministry of Children and Family Development to regain custody of his children, including his son M.H., who was born with [omitted for publication] (a genetic condition [omitted for publication]) and requires a caregiver. Dr. Michael Ryeburn has opined that M.H.'s intellectual impairment means he is incapable of making important decisions, including medical decisions.

[35]      In October 2019, A.H. commenced a three-year intimate partner relationship with B.I. She is a [omitted for publication] councillor and is involved in the local justice and healthcare fields. They broke up due to the offence I have found A.H. guilty of.

[36]      Not long after his relationship with B.I. dissolved, A.H. entered into an intimate partner relationship with B.G. They reside together on the [omitted for publication] near Terrace, British Columbia, along with A.H.'s son M.H. and B.G.'s two children from a previous relationship: a nine-year-old boy and a six-year-old girl. B.G. knows of the matters before the court and fully supports A.H., noting that their relationship is stable and that A.H. is good with her children. A.H. relocated to Terrace from Prince Rupert because, after his arrest, he faced an onslaught of negative attention from the victim, her family, and other community members who made him feel like a pariah in Prince Rupert. A.H., through Ms. Fadden, has also claimed to have been the subject of vigilante justice, reporting being assaulted by the victim's current boyfriend.

[37]      Throughout his adult life, A.H. has enjoyed continuous employment in various fields, including First Nations fisheries and [omitted for publication] Services as a case support worker. Currently, he works full-time for the construction company [omitted for publication], where he is a lead hand overseeing the work of 10 to 20 other employees. The company ensures site cleanliness at the new hospital under construction in Terrace. His working life suffered from his alcohol use shortly after his arrest, and he acknowledges his alcohol use at that time was causing him to function poorly.

[38]      Concerning his financial circumstances, A.H. has approximately $1,800 in savings and no significant assets. His debts are roughly $7,500.

Principles and Purposes of Sentencing

[39]      The Criminal Code of Canada includes a statement of sentencing purposes and principles to guide courts in determining punishment. The relevant sections in A.H.'s case include the following:

Purpose

718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

. . . 

Objectives — offence against vulnerable person

718.04 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.

Fundamental principle

718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

Other sentencing principles

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:

(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

. . .

(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation,

 shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances;

(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and

(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.

Sentencing Considerations for Indigenous Offenders

[40]      Unfortunately, many Indigenous persons going through this court have a tragic story of familial instability, witnessing and being a victim of domestic violence, experimenting with drugs and alcohol at a young age, being in and out of the child welfare system, unemployment, and being subjected to sexual abuse as a child. Often, a criminal record or interaction with the criminal justice system. Because of life circumstances, bail is also frequently problematic, resulting in guilty pleas to get out of jail sooner.

R. v. Gladue

[41]      Just over 24 years ago, the Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue sought to break the cycle that we are encountering today. In Gladue, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that s. 718.2(e) did not represent mere tinkering with the sentencing framework, but rather was a fundamental shift in the sentencing paradigm. Furthermore, Gladue teaches that for s. 718.2(e), anyone with Indigenous ancestry should be considered an Aboriginal offender, whether or not they had been impacted by systemic discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada also noted in para. 91 that:

Section 718.2(e) applies to all aboriginal offenders wherever they reside, whether on- or off-reserve, in a large city or a rural area.

[42]      We are taught in para. 27 of Gladue that the interpretation of s. 718.2(e) must begin with considering the words in context. Although the appeal in Gladue was ultimately concerned only with the meaning of the phrase "with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders," the Supreme Court of Canada noted that the phrase takes on meaning from the other words of s. 718.2(e), from the purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2, and from the overall scheme of Part XXIII of the Criminal Code.

[43]      At the beginning of para. 33 in Gladue, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that:

In our view, s. 718.2(e) is more than simply a re‑affirmation of existing sentencing principles.  The remedial component of the provision consists not only in the fact that it codifies a principle of sentencing, but, far more importantly, in its direction to sentencing judges to undertake the process of sentencing aboriginal offenders differently, in order to endeavour to achieve a truly fit and proper sentence in the particular case. . . . 

[Emphasis in original] 

[44]      In the latter half of para. 37, the Supreme Court of Canada instructed sentencing judges that they:

. . . should pay particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique, and different from those of non‑aboriginal offenders.  The fact that the reference to aboriginal offenders is contained in s. 718.2(e), in particular, dealing with restraint in the use of imprisonment, suggests that there is something different about aboriginal offenders which may specifically make imprisonment a less appropriate or less useful sanction.

[Emphasis in original]

[45]      Paras. 58–64 of Gladue clarify the purpose of s. 718.2(e) was to reduce the over-incarceration of Indigenous offenders in Canadian jails.

[46]      Midway through para. 71, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that:

. . . In general terms, restorative justice may be described as an approach to remedying crime in which it is understood that all things are interrelated and that crime disrupts the harmony which existed prior to its occurrence, or at least which it is felt should exist.  The appropriateness of a particular sanction is largely determined by the needs of the victims, and the community, as well as the offender.  The focus is on the human beings closely affected by the crime.

[47]      Continuing at the beginning of para. 72 and then at para. 73, the Supreme Court of Canada said:

The existing overemphasis on incarceration in Canada may be partly due to the perception that a restorative approach is a more lenient approach to crime and that imprisonment constitutes the ultimate punishment. Yet in our view a sentence focussed on restorative justice is not necessarily a "lighter" punishment. Some proponents of restorative justice argue that when it is combined with probationary conditions it may in some circumstances impose a greater burden on the offender than a custodial sentence. 

In describing in general terms some of the basic tenets of traditional aboriginal sentencing approaches, we do not wish to imply that all aboriginal offenders, victims, and communities share an identical understanding of appropriate sentences for particular offences and offenders. Aboriginal communities stretch from coast to coast and from the border with the United States to the far north. Their customs and traditions and their concept of sentencing vary widely. What is important to recognize is that, for many if not most aboriginal offenders, the current concepts of sentencing are inappropriate because they have frequently not responded to the needs, experiences, and perspectives of aboriginal people or aboriginal communities.

R. v. Ipeelee

[48]      Thirteen years after Gladue, in Ipeelee, Justice LeBel confirmed that the law requires that a sentencing judge engage in a different process for arriving at a fit sentence where the offender is Indigenous, but not necessarily impose a different sentence. In para. 71, Justice LeBel noted that in Gladue, the Supreme Court of Canada " . . . rejected Ms. Gladue's argument that 718.2(e) was an affirmative action provision or, as the Crown described it, an invitation to engage in 'reverse discrimination'."

[49]      Accordingly, s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code does not require an automatic reduction of a sentence or warranted period of incarceration simply because the offender is Indigenous. Instead, as set out in the middle of para. 60 of Ipeelee:

. . . courts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a different sentence for Aboriginal offenders. Rather, they provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel.

Gladue Factors Applied to A.H.

[50]      In the sentencing context for offenders who are Indigenous and seek the benefit of s. 718.2(e) and the Gladue analysis, a sentencing judge needs to look at several factors, including:

                     i.        the evidence of the offence before the court;

                    ii.        the personal circumstances of the offender, including the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the offender before the courts;

                  iii.        the statutory purpose and principles of sentencing;

                  iv.        the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of their particular heritage or connection to an Indigenous community; and

                    v.        the relevant case law.

The sentencing judge then crafts a sentence specific to the offender before the court.

[51]      I have considered systemic and background factors that may have played a part in bringing A.H. before the court. For greater certainty, these are the same systemic and background factors that I consider when any Indigenous person appears before me. In doing so, I have looked deeper into the realities of A.H.'s life experience. I have conducted an individualized analysis of the available information about A.H. I have specifically looked at and for the following factors as they relate to A.H.:

1)   poverty;

2)   substance abuse;

3)   a lack of employment opportunities;

4)   a lack of access to education;

5)   the legacy of forced attendance at Indian residential schools and the so-called "Sixties Scoop" of Indigenous children being removed from their families and adopted into Caucasian Canadian families;

6)   intergenerational impacts of colonialism and displacement;

7)   racism and bias against Indigenous people;

8)   loss of autonomy via the Indian Act and other attacks on self-determination;

9)   loneliness, abandonment, and dislocation from culture, community and family;

10) legacy of sex discrimination in the Indian Act and related policies;

11) intergenerational trauma;

12) loss of parenting skills and familial composition;

13) emotional, sexual, and physical violence;

14) lack of opportunity or isolation of communities;

15) connection with the Indigenous heritage/culture he or she claims;

16) criminal history;

17) mental health diagnoses;

18) the early death of family or friends because of substance abuse, violence or suicide;

19) family breakdown;

20) dysfunctional behaviour;

21) committing violence, being the victim of violence, or witnessing violence, and

22) Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) and other related ailments.

Relevant Case Law

[52]      In Parranto, Justices Brown and Martin for the majority clarified the basics of sentencing in Canada at paras. 9–12. The goal in every case is a fair, fit, and principled sentence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada at para. 36 emphasized that sentencing is an individualized process and that:

. . . Sentencing judges retain discretion to individualize their approach to sentencing "[f]or this offence, committed by this offender, harming this victim, in this community" (R. v. Gladue1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 80 (emphasis in original)). There is no longer space to interpret starting points (or ranges) as binding in any sense.

[Emphasis in original]

[53]      Our Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. L.S.N., 2020 BCCA 109, provides a good reminder that all sentences must be proportionate to the offence's gravity and the offender's degree of responsibility. L.S.N. also assists sentencing judges in understanding the application of exceptional circumstances to the assessment of an offender's moral culpability. In para. 72, Justice Fitch confirmed that:

. . . A judge can impose a sentence outside the usually applicable range, including in response to exceptional circumstances, so long as the sentence gives effect to the proportionality principle and is in accordance with the other principles and objectives of sentencing applicable to the case: Nasogaluak at para. 44.

[54]      The recent decision of Justice Edelmann in R. v. Maslehati, 2024 BCSC 121 – although not involving the complicating issue of an Indigenous man committing sexual violence against a teenage Indigenous woman – provides interesting commentary as to the use of CSOs in cases of sexual violence where there was no sexual intercourse. I note that Mr. Rines for the B.C. Prosecution Service essentially made the duplicate submissions as the prosecutor in Maslehati; that the level of physical interference was such that a custodial sentence in a correctional centre is required. In Maslehati, beginning midway through para. 29, it was noted that:

[29]      . . . Between 1996 and 2012, a CSO was available for sexual assaults, whether prosecuted summarily or by way of indictment. Legislative changes to s. 742.1 in 2012 removed the availability of CSOs for sexual assaults prosecuted by way of indictment.

[30]      In November 2022, Parliament made CSOs available in relation to a number of offences where they were previously unavailable, among which were sexual assaults prosecuted by way of indictment.

[31]      The Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. K.B., 2023 ONCJ 286 recently commented on the changes of Parliament in the following terms at para. 7:

Parliament’s repeated directives to the courts to use restraint in the imposition of real jail are further emphasized in the most recent amendments to the Criminal Code, which significantly widen the availability of conditional sentences by almost completely eliminating automatic exclusions from the conditional sentence regime other than sentences that are two years or longer . . . This is not a trivial change in the sentencing landscape; it is a dramatic change from the much more restrictive conditional sentence framework established by Parliaments between the inception of conditional sentences and now.

[32]      At the time when conditional sentences were initially considered or initially integrated into the sentencing regime, the Supreme Court discussed the impact of a conditional sentence order in R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 and the role that a conditional sentence can play in sentencing. At para. 105:

105     The stigma of a conditional sentence with house arrest should not be underestimated.  Living in the community under strict conditions where fellow residents are well aware of the offender's criminal misconduct can provide ample denunciation in many cases. In certain circumstances, the shame of encountering members of the community may make it even more difficult for the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community than in prison.

106     The amount of denunciation provided by a conditional sentence will be heavily dependent on the circumstances of the offender, the nature of the conditions imposed, and the community in which the sentence is to be served.  . . .

[33]      As pointed out by defence, the stigma of an investigation and prosecution for sexual offence can also be seen to constitute punishment, as noted by our Court of Appeal in R. v. D.E.S.M., 1992 CanLII 6009 (BC CA), [1993] B.C.J. No. 702 at para. 20:

[20]      There is no suggestion that the accused is a danger to anyone so he need not be isolated in order to protect the public. By convicting him, society has already stigmatized him as a person who has committed a serious offence, and has denounced his offence. Quite recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has expressed itself quite strongly on the importance of stigma as a consequence of criminal proceedings. The court has been saying what most lawyers and criminologists have known all along, that a public charge, trial and conviction for a serious offence brands a person for life, constitutes serious punishment, and is an important part of the way society brings offenders to account for their misconduct.

[55]      In R. v. K.B., 2023 ONCJ 286, a decision from the Ontario Court of Justice, K.B., a 27-year-old man, sexually assaulted two female victims while they slept. K.B. sexually fondled both victims on their breasts and digitally penetrated one of the victims. K.B. had no criminal record. The court found K.B.'s conduct was a severe violation of the sexual integrity of the two sleeping victims, affecting their dignity and emotional well-being, as well as their sense of safety and security. Nonetheless, the court concluded that a 12-month CSO would satisfy the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

[56]      Finally, in R. v. T.H., 2024 BCCA 123, our Court of Appeal considered the Crown appeal of a CSO in a case involving sexual violence by vaginal penetration. In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the cumulative effect of the terms and length of the sentence was sufficiently harsh to reflect the gravity of the offence and the moral culpability of the respondent.

Restorative Justice

[57]      Restorative justice processes take various forms. In the sentencing context, restorative justice is often understood to be a non-adversarial and non-retributive approach to justice that focuses on addressing the harm caused by crime, while holding the offender responsible for their actions. In theory, restorative justice provides an opportunity for the parties directly impacted by the crime – victims, offenders, and communities – to identify and address their needs in the aftermath of a crime.

[58]      Restorative justice is based on the understanding that crime is a violation of people and relationships. The principles of restorative justice are based on respect, compassion, and inclusivity. Restorative justice encourages meaningful engagement and accountability, and provides an opportunity for healing, reparation, and reintegration.

[59]      With respect to Indigenous communities, restorative justice means ensuring that the offender's sentencing reflects an understanding of the specific First Nations' cultures, traditions, and hopes for the future. It also means addressing local issues by engaging with the local community.

[60]      While I am not sitting in an Indigenous Court for purposes of A.H.'s sentencing, I have nevertheless kept in mind and applied, albeit in a modified form, the principles of restorative justice in rendering my judgment. Specifically, I have addressed the harm caused by A.H.'s offence and I hold him responsible for his crime.

[61]      I have kept in mind that in sentencing A.H., I am required to consider the lasting consequences of colonialism, residential schools, and the resulting disproportionate incidences of addictions, crimes involving sexual violence, poverty, and children being separated from their parents and home communities in First Nation communities. I cannot ignore the reality of how the European Eurocentric worldview favours it over non-Western civilizations, has affected British Columbia's First Nation communities and left generations of First Nations peoples struggling to find their place in the world.

[62]      I must also consider the same lasting consequences of colonialism, residential schools, and the resulting disproportionate incidences of addictions, crimes involving sexual violence, poverty, and children being separated from their parents and home communities in First Nation communities as they relate to the young female victim in this case. It is unfortunate that the B.C. Prosecution Service did not submit a detailed victim impact statement from the victim, as doing so would have enlightened the court to a greater degree on the lasting harm of A.H.'s crime, both in relation to his victim specifically and Indigenous women generally.

[63]      At pages 39–40 of their scholarly article Sexual Abuse in Canadian Aboriginal Communities: A Broad Review of Conflicting Evidence, the authors noted the following about Child Sexual Abuse (what they call "CSA") among Canada's Indigenous peoples:

Traditionally, in Aboriginal cultures, sexual abuse was viewed as an illness requiring community participation and healing of both abuser and victim to restore community balance and harmony (Bopp and Bopp, 1997). The dominant culture's way of dealing with CSA is through the legal justice system, which separates the abuser from the victim and isolates the abuser in prison for a period of time. Suspicion about the justice system may discourage Aboriginal people from seeing it as an option (Green, 1996). The legal system of the dominant society may be perceived as not addressing the root causes of the imbalances that allowed CSA to occur in the first place. Aboriginal communities may not have yet developed effective policies, models, and procedures for dealing with abuse in their communities. As well, community-based programs in Aboriginal communities may not have adequate resources to deal with the magnitude of the problem. As a result, many victims, abusers, family members, and other individuals who are affected by the problem do not get the help they need. External factors affecting Aboriginal communities with a direct impact on the way sexual abuse is handled include a lack of culturally appropriate programs and service. In some instances, sexual abusers may be important and respected members of the community such as Elders, medicine people (healers), community leaders, service providers, religious authorities, teachers, or law enforcement officers (Green, 1996). Living on a reserve may place victims in situations of powerlessness and fearfulness, producing a strong fear of speaking up. They may be afraid of the consequences for themselves and their families (e.g., limited access to services and programs).

Delphine Collin-Vézina, Jacinthe Dion, & Nico Trocmé, “Sexual Abuse in Canadian Aboriginal Communities: A Broad Review of Conflicting Evidence.” (2009) Pimatisiwin: A Journal of Aboriginal and Indigenous Community Health, 7, 27-47.

[64]      Nine years ago, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada concluded its momentous work. In order to redress the legacy of residential schools and advance the process of Canadian reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission made 94 Calls to Action in Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada: Calls to Actions, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2015, Winnipeg. Call to Action Number 36 specifically recognized and called out the prevalence of offenders having been sexually abused themselves:

We call upon the federal, provincial, and territorial governments to work with Aboriginal communities to provide culturally relevant services to inmates on issues such as substance abuse, family and domestic violence, and overcoming the experience of having been sexually abused.

[65]      I would be remiss not to reference that "there has to be awareness of the past, acknowledgement of the harm that has been inflicted, atonement for the causes, and action to change behaviour'' as set out at pages 6 and 7 in Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future - Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015, Winnipeg.

[66]      In R. v. Testawitch, 2022 BCPC 39, in addressing the directive of the Supreme Court of Canada to reduce the over‑incarceration of Indigenous offenders in Canadian jails and thus fulfil the purposes of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, I noted the following:

[33]      One might ask: Why is the judge giving all this information out during the course of Mr. Testawitch's sentencing?  The reason is simple.  As a judge who sits in Northern British Columbia, I view the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in our prisons as outrageous.  On page 61 of the 2017-2018 Annual Report of the Office of Correctional Investigator published by the Government of Canada Research and Statistical Division, it states that:

In the ten-year period between March 2009 and March 2018, the Indigenous inmate population increased by 42.8% compared to a less than 1% overall growth during the same period. As of March 31, 2018, Indigenous inmates represented 28% of the total federal in-custody population while comprising just 4.3% of the Canadian population. The situation continues to worsen for Indigenous women. Over the last ten years, the number of Indigenous federally sentenced women increased by 60%, growing from 168 in March 2009 to 270 in March 2018. At the end of the reporting period, 40% of incarcerated women in Canada were of Indigenous ancestry. These numbers are distressing.

[34]     Since June 29, 2018, as published by the Government of Canada, Department of Justice, the incarceration rates for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous men have changed.  For non-Indigenous offenders, it has gone down.  For Indigenous male offenders, it has increased.  To adopt the terminology of Ivan Zinger, J.D., Ph.D., Correctional Investigator, in the 2017-2018 Annual Report of the Office of Correctional Investigator, it is very distressing.

[35]     The Adult and youth correctional statistics in Canada, 2018/2019 report authored by Jamil Malakieh and published by Statistics Canada on December 20, 2020, page 5, also confirms that 31 percent of admissions to provincial or territorial custodial institutions are Indigenous persons, either First Nations, Métis, or Inuit:

In 2018/2019, Indigenous adults accounted for 31% of admissions to provincial/territorial custody and 29% of admissions to federal custody, while representing approximately 4.5% of the Canadian adult population. These proportions were virtually unchanged from the previous year.

Unsettling when one considers that it has been over 22 years since the Supreme Court of Canada's teachings in Gladue that we need to specifically address the problem.

Discussion and Analysis

[67]      As stated by Justice Punnett at paras. 89, 90 in R. v. D.R.P., [[2021] B.C.J. No. 1954]:

[89]      Moral blameworthiness, the foundational principle upon which a fit sentence is based, cannot be determined without considering the offender's family, his background, and his community. Understanding is not about excusing. It is however about fairly sentencing in this case an aboriginal offender.

[90]      The British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. R.R.M., 2009 BCCA 578 provides guidance for applying the Gladue principles in sentencing aboriginal offenders for sexual offences:

[24]      The sentencing of Aboriginal offenders for serious sexual assaults, where there is evidence that they have suffered from historical and systemic abuses, is not an easy task. This Court has observed that in sentencing Aboriginal offenders, while judges must be “sensitive to the conditions, needs and understandings of Aboriginal offenders and communities, this does not mean that sentences for such offenders will necessarily focus solely on restorative objectives or give less weight to conventional sentencing objectives such as deterrence and denunciation.” . . . Chief Justice Finch further noted at para. 53 that Gladue made clear that it was not the principles of sentence that varied in sentencing Aboriginal offenders but the application of those principles to a particular case. ... In Gladue (at para. 80), the Court further stated that:

As with all sentencing decisions, the sentencing of aboriginal offenders must proceed on an individual (or case-by-case) basis: for this offence, committed by this offender, harming this victim, in this community, what is the appropriate sanction under the Criminal Code?

[Emphasis in original]

[68]      Dr. Gatner, Clinical Psychologist, carried out the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol-2nd Version and identified A.H.'s perpetrator risk factors "were predominantly coded as occurring in the past", namely serious past problems with substance use, high‑conflict relationships, unhealthy non-intimate relationships (gang associated friends in his youth), mental disorder (depression and possible psychosis in 2021), stress, and coping.

[69]      Dr. Gatner's assessment is complemented by a Structured Assessment of Protective Factors, these being the elements of A.H.'s life that mitigate against further offending. Dr. Gatner noted A.H.'s full-time employment, good financial management, respect for authority, treatment motivation, and the support of his live‑in partner as bring protective qualities against future violence.

[70]      Based on his risk and protective factors, Dr. Gatner concludes that A.H. is of a low-to-moderate risk for sexual violence, and low risk for serious or life‑threatening violence. Dr. Gatner further noted that the largest risk factors, namely prior sexual offences and sexual deviance, are absent in his clinical assessment:

. . . the clinical data does not indicate that [A.H.] has a persistent criminal history (including no past sexual offences) or problems with sexual deviance, two of the largest risk factors of sexual recidivism.

[71]      Defence counsel submitted, and Crown Counsel did not disagree, that A.H.'s low-to-moderate risk level means that he may not be accepted into a sex offender program because he is not of a moderate-to-high risk. What this means in real world terms is that A.H. is a lower priority candidate, so he may have more therapeutic options in a community setting as opposed to a penal setting.

[72]      I accept that A.H. is a low risk of committing another sexual violence offence, especially if he is not consuming alcohol. The laying of charges and the criminal process itself have had a significant impact on him. He has been on bail for some time, and the trial process has been particularly difficult for him. He is now a convicted sex offender, the social impact of which is substantial. He has been the recipient of vigilante retribution.

[73]      Because both the victim and A.H. are Indigenous, I must consider and apply the issues identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gladue and lpeelee. I also must consider that while the victim in the present case is not considered a child by the Government of Canada, she was a child as far as the Government of British Columbia is concerned, as the legal age in British Columbia is 19. As noted in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9:

[92]      Likewise, where the person before the court is Indigenous, courts must apply the principles from R. v. Gladue, 1999 CanLII 679 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and Ipeelee. The sentencing judge must apply these principles even in extremely grave cases of sexual violence against children (see Ipeelee, at paras. 84‑86). The systemic and background factors that have played a role in bringing the Indigenous person before the court may have a mitigating effect on moral blameworthiness (para. 73). Similarly, a different or alternative sanction might be more effective in achieving sentencing objectives in a particular Indigenous community (para. 74).

[74]      The teachings of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Sharma, 2020 ONCA 478, reversed on other grounds at R. v. Sharma, 2022 SCC 39, are beneficial and applicable to the present case. Justice Feldman, for the Majority in Sharma, stated:

[70]    Aboriginal offenders start from a place of substantive inequality in the criminal justice system. The overincarceration of Aboriginal people is one of the manifestations of that substantive inequality, which prompted Parliament to create the community-based conditional sentence and direct sentencing judges to consider that sanction, along with all others that do not involve imprisonment, when determining an appropriate punishment for Aboriginal offenders. The conditional sentence is one means of redressing the substantive inequality of Aboriginal people in sentencing. It is certainly the case that conditional sentences are available to all offenders, not just Aboriginal offenders. However, the legislative history and jurisprudence demonstrate that conditional sentences take on a unique significance in the context of Aboriginal offenders by conferring the added benefit of remedying systemic overincarceration. By removing that remedial sentencing option, the impact of the impugned provisions is to create a distinction between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders based on race.

[75]      I wholeheartedly agree with the Supreme Court of Canada in para. 118 of Friesen that our understanding of the profound physical and psychological harm that all victims of sexual violence experience has deepened. I also unreservedly agree with the prosecutor that A.H.'s offence was a severe violation of the victim's bodily autonomy, sexual integrity, and dignity that caused her physical and psychological harm.

Aggravating and Mitigating Facts

[76]      The aggravating circumstances in this matter include the following:

a.   The victim, an 18-year-old young Indigenous woman, was asleep at the time of the assault.

b.   The victim's youth presented vulnerability. She was 18 at the time of the offence, and she had newly left her mother's home in Masset, in Haida Gwaii, to join her boyfriend in Prince Rupert, where he lived with his family, including A.H.

c.   The victim's primary supports and her family lived in Masset at the time of the sexual violence, so she was at least somewhat isolated, though her boyfriend, some friends, and employment were in Prince Rupert.

d.   The sexual violence included vaginal penetration, bodily injury to the victim, and has resulted in psychological and emotional injury to the victim, including ongoing post traumatic stress disorder. Simply put, the victim's life has forever been changed from the negative actions of A.H.'s crime.

[77]      The mitigating circumstances include the following:

a.   A.H. is an Indigenous man, who himself was the victim of repeated sexual abuse as a child.

b.   A.H. lives a prosocial life, working full-time, financially supporting his grown children, and helping to raise his partner's young children.

c.   A.H. has been compliant on his bail conditions from the time of his arrest to the present day, and advised his probation officer that he is willing to abide by any conditions that the court would impose.

d.   While A.H. has no recollection of the offence, he nevertheless remarked to Dr. Gatner that J.S. would have been emotionally impacted by it and that she would have had much to process in its aftermath. This is an acknowledgment of harm.

e.   A.H. has a limited criminal record, which includes a 2016 conviction for impaired driving and driving while prohibited, but no history of related sexual offences or other violence.

f.     A.H. has endured collateral consequences in the aftermath of the offence. The victim has posted publicly about the proceedings online and has brought considerable stigma to A.H.

[78]      A.H. has been the subject of vigilante justice, having been assaulted by somebody known to the victim. While vigilante justice is a collateral consequence and not mitigating in relation to the offence itself, as set out in Suter at paras. 45–59, vigilante justice is a factor for the sentencing judge to take into account when considering the circumstances of the offender, albeit to a limited extent.

[79]      The defence acknowledges that there is no benefit of an early guilty plea but submits, correctly in my opinion, that the failure to plead guilty and conviction after trial are not aggravating factors.

Moral Blameworthiness

[80]      I believe A.H.'s moral blameworthiness is on the higher end of the spectrum. His voluntary consumption of alcohol and the accompanying mental health issues directly impacted A.H.'s decision-making process. They contributed to his drunken decision to sexually violate the victim in his son's bedroom with his son present. A.H. was aware of his alcohol addiction at the time of the offence. Nonetheless, he simply refused to deal with it seriously until after he was charged with the sexual assault.

A.H.'s Expression of Remorse and Apology

[81]      At the conclusion of submissions by legal counsel, A.H. addressed the court. I am of the belief that his actions since his crime show true remorse; that is, he is truly sorry for his crimes and that he has now faced the demon of his alcohol addiction disorder head-on, with an earnest desire to live a lawful and productive life moving forward, as he stated in court:

THE ACCUSED:  I'm not much of a speaker.  I kind of get emotional.  But I do ‑- like when ‑- like, when the Crown mentioned that yes ‑- yesterday that he didn't believe that I've taken the steps to break the inter-generational cycle with my kids and ‑- sorry.  But I mean, every day I wake up and I don't wake up to hurt anybody.  I try to teach my kids to do well, speak about their problems, don't hold it in like myself.  And I'm sorry that we're here [now].  I'm sorry that we had ‑- don't have this [it in ‑‑ like myself, don't have this] situation.  I was depressed and I was drinking a lot that ‑- that time.  And I'm sorry for any harm that [J.S.] has gone through [and has] to go through.

One thing that I do want to say is that this whole process, you know, I never tried to like dissuade my son, [R.H.], to change his statement or to back down from ‑- from what he thought was right.  And that's just made ‑- made me like really proud of him because his dad is a real pain in the ass.  And like really regrettable of this whole situation.  Just like, that we're here and having to do this, right.  I know that alcohol is what blamed the things that have ‑- problems that have come up in my life.  But I don't blame the alcohol, I blame myself because I am [the] one that chooses to pick it up. And I'm the one that chooses to have those drinks. I do have a lot of support in like a network right now, I'm hopefully talking with my partner's mom who is a social worker.  And I talk to my friends and talk to my kids and encouraging them that, you know, despite what I'm going through that I don't want this to affect ‑- I don't ‑- I want them to have their head up.  And I'm just very sorry.

Conclusion

[82]      As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx, a CSO is a term of imprisonment that, although served in the community, is punitive and denunciatory. In particular, given A.H.'s circumstances, including the needs of his eldest son and the changes he has made to his life since his arrest – including sobriety – I do not find incarceration in a correctional centre necessary to achieve the sentencing objectives. Considering the overall circumstances, exceptional circumstances exist. I, therefore, find that a CSO with appropriate punitive conditions, combined with three years of probation, can meet the principles of denunciation and deterrence in the case before me.

Terms of the CSO

[83]      One moment.

[84]      3000-1: You must comply with a conditional sentence order for a term of two years less one day. The conditions are:

[85]      3001: You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court. You must notify the court or your conditional sentence supervisor before any change of name or address and promptly inform the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation. You must remain in British Columbia unless you have prior written permission from the court or your conditional sentence supervisor to leave the province.

[86]      3101: You must report in person to a conditional sentence supervisor at the Prince Rupert Community Corrections Office by 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, April 12, 2024. After that, you must report as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor.

[87]      3201: When first reporting to a conditional sentence supervisor, you must provide them with the address or location where you live and regularly sleep and your telephone number, if you have one. You must not change your address or location where you live and regularly sleep, or your telephone number, without prior written permission from your conditional sentence supervisor.

[88]      3002: You must have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with J.S.

[89]      3003: You must not distribute, publish, post, or make publicly available in any way information, including comments and images, which refer to or depict J.S.

[90]      3005-1: You must not go to or be within 100 metres of any place where J.S. lives, works, attends school, worships, or happens to be. You must leave her presence immediately without words or gestures if you see her.

[91]      3209-1: Beginning at 7:00 p.m. on April 12, 2024, for the first 18 months of the conditional sentence order, you must obey house arrest by being inside your residence where you live and regularly sleep 24 hours a day, seven days a week. For the remainder of your conditional sentence order, you must obey house arrest by being inside the residence where you live and regularly sleep between 3:00 p.m. and noon. The exceptions are as follows:

a.   You have the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor. Such permission is to be given only for employment, attending your conditional sentence supervisor's office, medical appointments for yourself or your son M.H., or other reasonable purposes.

b.   You are going directly to, or returning directly from, a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency involving yourself or your son M.H. You must provide proof of your attendance at the healthcare facility if requested by your conditional sentence supervisor or a peace officer.

c.   You are on the lot of your residence but within 10 metres of the front door, where you can be immediately located.

d.   For completing any community work service required by this conditional sentence order and under the direction of your conditional sentence supervisor.

[92]      3209-2: You must present yourself immediately at the door of your residence where you are living or answer the telephone when any peace officer or conditional sentence supervisor attends or calls to check on you during the house arrest.

[93]      I am just going to stop right here, A.H. Do you understand all these conditions so far?

[94]      THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do, thank you.

[95]      THE COURT:  All right, thank you.

[96]      3209-3: If your conditional sentence supervisor permits you to be outside your residence during your house arrest, you must carry the permission with you in paper or electronic form and show it to any peace officer finding you outside your residence during your house arrest hours.

[97]      3219: You must provide your conditional sentence supervisor with details of your employment and intimate relationship status. You must inform your supervisor within two business days of any employment or intimate relationship status change.

[98]      3400: You must not possess or consume alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances, except with a medical prescription given to you by a medical doctor who is a member in good standing of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia.

[99]      Do you understand all of those conditions, A.H.?

[100]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do, thank you.

[101]   THE COURT:  3403: You must not enter into any liquor store, beer and wine store, bar, pub, lounge, nightclub, beer garden, or any other business from which minors are prohibited at any time by the terms of a liquor licence.

[102]   3501: You must attend, participate in, and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor.

[103]   3509: You must complete 60 hours of community work service under the direction of your conditional sentence supervisor. Your community work service must be completed by October 31, 2025.

[104]   Do you understand all of those conditions, sir?

[105]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do.

[106]   THE COURT:  3610: You must not possess, directly or indirectly, any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code, including but not limited to:

a.   Firearms and ammunition.

b.   Crossbows, prohibited or restricted weapons or devices, or explosive substances.

c.   Anything used, designed to be used, or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person, or to threaten or intimidate any person.

d.   Any imitation firearms or weapons, including any compressed air guns, BB or pellet guns.

e.   You must not apply for any related authorizations, licences, or registration certificates.

[107]   3616: You must not possess knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to be used to cut things. The exceptions are: 

a.   You can possess a knife when preparing and eating food.

b.   You can possess knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to cut things for lawful employment, while at or going directly to and from your lawful employment. If asked, you must provide your conditional sentence supervisor with the details of your location and hours of employment.

c.   You can possess knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to cut things with the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor. If you are given permission, you must carry it with you in paper or electronic format when you possess any of these items outside the place where you live.

[108]   3616-D: If a peace officer finds you in possession of one or more knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to cut things and requests to see the written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor allowing you to possess the item, you must show it to the officer.

[109]   Do you understand all those conditions, sir?

[110]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do.

[111]   THE COURT:  All right.

Terms of the Probation Order

[112]   2000-1: You must comply with the probation order for a term of three years. The conditions are:

[113]   2001: You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court. You must notify the court or your probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the officer of any change in employment or occupation.

[114]   2104: You must report in person to a probation officer at the Prince Rupert Community Corrections Office within two business days after completion of your conditional sentence unless you have obtained written permission from a probation officer to report elsewhere or within a different timeframe. After that, you must report as directed by your probation officer.

[115]   When first reporting to a probation officer, you must provide them with the address or location where you live and regularly sleep, and your telephone number if you have one. You must not change your address or location where you live and regularly sleep, or your telephone number, without prior written permission from your probation officer.

[116]   Do you understand all those conditions, sir?

[117]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do.

[118]   THE COURT:  2209-1: You must obey a curfew for the first year of your probation by being inside your residence or within 10 metres of the front door of your residence between 10:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. daily. The exceptions are as follows:

a.   You have the prior written permission of your probation officer. Such permission is to be given only for employment, attending your probation officer's office, medical appointments for yourself or your son M.H., or other reasonable purposes.

b.   You are going directly to, or returning directly from, a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency involving yourself or your son M.H. You must obtain proof of your attendance at the healthcare facility and provide it to your probation officer or a peace officer upon demand.

[119]   2002: You must have no contact or communication, directly or indirectly, with J.S.

[120]   2003: You must not distribute, publish, post, or make publicly available in any way information, including comments and images, which refer to or depict J.S.

[121]   2005-1: You must not go to or be within 100 metres of any place where J.S. lives, works, attends school, worships, or happens to be. You must leave her presence immediately without words or gestures if you see her.

[122]   Do you have any questions about those conditions, sir?

[123]   THE ACCUSED:  None, sir. thank you.

[124]   THE COURT:  You understand ‑- you understand them all?

[125]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do.

[126]   THE COURT:  Okay. 2212: You must provide your probation officer with details of your employment and intimate relationship status. You must inform your probation officer within two business days of any employment or intimate relationship status change.

[127]   3400: You must not possess or consume alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances, except with a medical prescription given to you by a medical doctor who is a member in good standing of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia.

[128]   3403: You must not enter any liquor store, beer and wine store, bar, pub, lounge, nightclub, beer garden, or any other business from which minors are prohibited at any time by the terms of a liquor licence.

[129]   Any questions about those terms, sir?

[130]   THE ACCUSED:  No.

[131]   THE COURT:  You understand them all?

[132]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do.

[133]   THE COURT:  All right. 2501: You must attend, participate in, and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your probation officer.

[134]   2610: You must not possess, directly or indirectly, any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code, including but not limited to: firearms and ammunition; crossbows, prohibited or restricted weapons or devices, or explosive substances; anything used, designed to be used, or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person, or to threaten or intimidate any person; any imitation firearms or weapons, including any compressed air guns, BB or pellet guns. You must not apply for any related authorizations, licences, or registration certificates.

[135]   You must not possess knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to be used to cut things. The exceptions are: 

a.   You can possess a knife when preparing and eating food.

b.   You can possess knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to cut things for lawful employment, while at or going directly to and from your lawful employment. If asked, you must provide your probation officer with the details of your location and hours of employment.

c.   You can possess knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to cut things with the prior written permission of your probation officer. If you are given permission, you must carry it with you in paper or electronic format when you possess any of these items outside the place where you live.

[136]   3616-D: If a peace officer finds you in possession of one or more knives, axes, or other sharp-bladed instruments designed to be used or intended to cut things and requests to see the written permission of your probation officer allowing you to possess the item, you must show it to the officer.

[137]   Do you understand all those conditions, sir?

[138]   THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do.

[139]   THE COURT:  Any questions about any of the conditions at all?

[140]   THE ACCUSED:  Just that my probation, is it in Terrace that I'll be reporting to? Terrace office?

[141]   THE COURT:  That will be ‑- you are going to ‑- yes, so you are going to report to Prince Rupert either today before you leave town or tomorrow before three o'clock. They will transfer the probation to the Terrace office, I am assuming, but because this is a Prince Rupert file, I am having ‑- I appreciate you probably have an officer you are attending to in Terrace right now, but I am having you just drop in at Prince Rupert, and they may very well turn around and just say, "Hey, go to the Terrace office."

[142]   THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

[143]   THE COURT: 

Ancillary Orders

DNA Order per s. 487.051(1) Criminal Code

[144]   Count 1 on Information 30900-1 is a primary designated offence. Under s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I authorize taking samples of bodily substances from you. You must attend to the Terrace Royal Canadian Mounted Police Detachment in Terrace, British Columbia, by no later than May 30, 2024, and submit to the taking of the DNA samples. This order is valid until executed.

Section 109(2) Weapons Prohibition

[145]   As required by s. 109 of the Criminal Code, you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, and explosive substance for a period of 10 years from today. You are also prohibited from possessing any prohibited or restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life.

SOIRA

[146]   On October 26, 2023, Bill S-12 changed the Criminal Code sections about imposing a reporting obligation under the SOIRA. The provisions of s. 490.012, which are currently in force and apply to A.H., read as follows:

Order – other circumstances

(3) Subject to subsection (5), when a court imposes a sentence on a person for a designated offence in circumstances in which neither subsection (1) nor (2) applies, or when the court renders a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for a designated offence, it shall make an order in Form 52 requiring the person to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act unless the court is satisfied the person has established that

(a) there would be no connection between making the order and the purpose of helping police services prevent or investigate crimes of a sexual nature by requiring the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act; or

(b) the impact of the order on the person, including on their privacy or liberty, would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society through the effective prevention or investigation of crimes of a sexual nature, to be achieved by the registration of information relating to sex offenders under that Act.

Factors

(4) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (3) in respect of a person, the court shall consider

(a) the nature and seriousness of the designated offence;

(b) the victim's age and other personal characteristics;

(c) the nature and circumstances of the relationship between the person and the victim;

(d) the personal characteristics and circumstances of the person;

(e) the person's criminal history, including the age at which they previously committed any offence and the length of time for which they have been at liberty without committing an offence;

(f) the opinions of experts who have examined the person; and

(g) any other factors that the court considers relevant.

[147]   "Designated offence" is defined in s. 490.011 of the Criminal Code and includes s. 271.

[148]   The duration of any imposed SOIRA order is governed by s. 490.013. As the prosecution proceeded by way of indictment, the following sections of the Criminal Code are relevant:

Date order begins

490.013(1) An order made under section 490.012 begins on the day on which it is made.

Duration of order — s. 490.012(1) or (3)

(2) An order made under subsection 490.012(1) or (3)

(a) subject to subsections (3) and (5), ends 10 years after it was made if the offence in connection with which it was made was prosecuted summarily or if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is two or five years;

(b) subject to subsections (3) and (5), ends 20 years after it was made if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is 10 or 14 years; and

(c) applies for life if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence is life.

[149]   Having considered the factors set out above related to whether the court should impose a SOIRA order, I am of the belief that a SOIRA order is appropriate in A.H.'s case, and accordingly I make an order in Form 52 requiring A.H. to comply with the SOIRA for a period of 20 years.

[150]   That is my decision.

[151]   A.H., any questions?

[152]   THE ACCUSED:  I don't have any questions, thank you.

[153]   THE COURT:  All right. I am not waiving the requirement that a justice of the peace read the conditional sentence order, the probation order, and the other ancillary orders to you, and I am not waiving the requirement that you sign the respective orders.

[154]   Mr. Rines, anything from your perspective?

[155]   CNSL E. RINES:  I don't believe so. Nothing ‑- nothing jumped out that I missed, Your Honour. Your Honour, I would just note, I didn't make a note with regards to the duration of the probation, so I'd just ask with regards to that for my own personal notes.

[156]   THE COURT:  Three years.

[157]   CNSL E. RINES:  Thank you, Your Honour.

[158]   THE COURT:  So it is a total of five years minus one day.

[159]   CNSL E. RINES:  Nothing further from the Crown, Your Honour, no questions.

[160]   THE COURT:  Thank you. Ms. Fadden, anything from your perspective?

[161]   CNSL L. FADDEN:  No, Your Honour, thank you very much.

[162]   THE COURT:  Thank you, everyone. I want to say thank you to both lawyers involved in this case, and I apologize to J.S. that it took so long to get to here today.

[163]   And A.H., moving forward, you need to know that you need to not violate any of the terms of the conditional sentence order or the probation, because if you do so, you will be charged with a separate criminal offence. You could be arrested. You could be incarcerated pending your trial. And I mean this when I say this, good luck moving forward.

[164]   Thank you to everybody.

 (REASONS CONCLUDED)