IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

[1]           On August 5, 2014, the members of the Prince George RCMP Crime Reduction Unit executed a search warrant on a residence on 2369 Redwood Street, Prince George, B.C. for controlled substances and paraphernalia, such as packing materials, score sheets, scales, etc.  The police located and seized a number of items, which they documented and photographed.

[2]           Following the execution of the search warrant, Joseph William Hammer was charged under Information 39585-2-C with unlawfully possessing a controlled substance, namely, heroin, for the purposes of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (CDSA).  The trial commenced on January 25, 2016, and has proceeded intermittently since and is still ongoing.

[3]           As part of its case, Crown counsel sought to introduce Certificates of Analyst concerning the drugs the Crown says the RCMP seized during their execution of the August 5, 2014 search warrant.  During the trial the following Certificates of Analyst were marked as exhibits for identification only:

[4]           On April 6, 2017, at the close of its case, the Crown moved to have the Certificates admitted into evidence.  Defence Counsel objected to the introduction of the Certificates into evidence on the basis the Crown had not complied with the notice requirements set out in s. 51(3) of CDSA.  The accused admits having received the Notice of Intention to Produce the Certificates (the “Notice”) together with a copy of the Certificates within the time-lines required by statute.  It is the Notice’s delivery process to which he objects.

[5]           I do not understand there to be any challenge to the accuracy and reliability of the Certificates and the accused has not sought leave to cross-examine the analyst under s. 51(2) of the CDSA.

[6]           The issues before the court in this motion are as follows:

[7]           The Crown and Defence seek a determination of these threshold issues prior to the Defence making an election to call evidence.  In support of their respective positions, they have filed a statement of admissions, made oral submissions and provided case law.  This is my decision as to the reasonableness of the Crown’s notice of its intention to produce the Certificates at trial.

[8]           Information 39585-2-C sworn August 12, 2014, alleges an offence date of August 5, 2014.  The trial commenced on January 25, 2016, and continued on January 26, May 2, July 7 and 8, September 15, 2016 and January 6, April 6, and May 16, 2017.

[9]           On April 6, 2017, the Crown and Defence tendered and marked as Exhibit 22 in the trial a document entitled “Admissions of Facts pursuant to Section 655 Criminal Code of Canada” (“Admissions”) in which the accused by way of his legal counsel admitted certain facts.  The Admissions annexed two documents: (1) the Crown’s disclosure memorandum (“Disclosure Memorandum”) dated September 3, 2015; and (2) the Crown’s Notice dated July 30, 2015, attaching a copy of the referenced Certificates.

[10]        On September 3, 2015, agent for the Director of Public Prosecutions hand delivered the Crown’s disclosure materials to the Defence Counsel.  This was effected by their respective legal secretaries.  The Crown’s disclosure materials were identified and itemized on its Disclosure Memorandum.

[11]        One of the many documents included in the Crown disclosure package was the Notice attaching copies of the referenced Certificates.  The Notice is addressed to Joseph William Hammer and his co-accused, Joann Bunny Faith Potskin.  It states:

[12]        The Notice is dated July 30, 2015, and signed by Emily K. Yao, Federal Crown Counsel.  Below her signature is the following provision for the accused or counsel for the accused to acknowledge receipt of the Notice and Certificates.

[13]        As there were two named accused the Notice included two acknowledgement provisions.

[14]        The inclusion of the Notice and Certificates as part of the Crown’s disclosure materials was indicated on the Disclosure Memorandum as “NOI - Certificate dated July 30 - 8 pgs.”

[15]        The Disclosure Memorandum includes the following endorsement:

[16]        Sharon Toombs, Mr. LeBlond’s legal secretary, signed the Disclosure Memorandum acknowledging receipt of the Crown’s disclosure materials on September 3, 2015.  There is no suggestion Sharon Toombs was not authorized to accept the Crown’s disclosure materials on behalf of the accused and Mr. LeBlond and sign the Disclosure Memorandum acknowledging receipt of those materials.

[17]        Mr. LeBlond was Mr. Hammer’s legal counsel at the time he received the Notice and Certificates and he was Mr. Hammer’s legal counsel at trial.

[18]        At trial, on September 15, 2016, Ms. Yao explained that Mr. LeBlond was legal counsel for Mr. Hammer from the outset of these proceedings.  At some point prior to the commencement of the trial, Mr. LeBlond sought to be removed as counsel of record and Mr. Hammer became self-represented.  Mr. LeBlond was again retained as Mr. Hammer’s legal counsel on or before September 3, 2015.  During this hiatus, the Crown couriered its disclosure materials directly to Mr. Hammer.  These disclosure materials included the Notice and attached Certificates.  As Mr. Hammer did not sign for the materials, the courier returned them to the Crown.  The Crown then engaged the assistance of the RCMP to deliver the disclosure materials to Mr. Hammer personally.  Unfortunately, the RCMP provided the Crown with an Acknowledgement of Service only with respect to the expert report included in the disclosure materials.

[19]        When Mr. LeBlond was again retained as legal counsel for Mr. Hammer, the Crown hand delivered to his office a duplicate set of its disclosure materials as evidenced by the Disclosure Memorandum signed by Sharon Toombs on September 3, 2015.

[20]        Mr. LeBlond’s usual practice when receiving a notice of intention and certificates from the Crown is to seek instructions from his client whether to accept service of these documents.  If those instructions are given, Mr. LeBlond signs the acknowledgement and takes no issue with the notice.  In this case, Mr. LeBlond did not sign the Notice.

[21]        When the issue of whether the Crown had properly served the Notice arose in Court on September 15, 2016, the Crown provided the Court and Mr. LeBlond with the affidavit of Ms. Virginia Kaun, who is the legal assistant for the agent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  Ms. Kaun’s affidavit exhibited the Crown’s Disclosure Memorandum and an internal record of proceedings from the file where she referred to having delivered the disclosure documents.

[22]        On September 15, 2016, Mr. LeBlond acknowledged in Court he had a copy of the Notice and Certificates.

[23]        It is not clear how many actual pages comprised the Crown’s disclosure delivered to Mr. LeBlond’s secretary on September 3, 2015; however, the Disclosure Memorandum suggests it may be in excess of 200 pages.  There is no suggestion the disclosure consisted of thousands of pages or boxes of documents.

[24]        Crown Counsel acknowledges that it typically serves defence counsel with the notice of intention and certificates of analyst independent of its general disclosure package.

[25]        The provisions of the CDSA which are relevant to this issue are as follows:

[26]        The Crown submits Mr. Hammer did receive reasonable notice of its intention to produce the Certificates, both on September 3, 2015 and again in Court on September 15, 2016.  As the Crown did not seek to tender the Certificates in evidence until April 6, 2017, the Defence had ample notice of its intention to do so.  Moreover, even if the Crown failed to give reasonable notice, the court ought to “otherwise order” the Certificates be admitted into evidence under s. 51(3) of the CDSA.  In support of its position, the Crown relies on the cases of R. v. Leroux, 2003 BCPC 241 (CanLII) and R. v. Lewis 2008 BCCA 266.

[27]        The Defence submits the Crown has failed to prove it provided reasonable notice beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although the Crown provided timely notice, it was not reasonable because the Notice was buried in the Crown’s voluminous general disclosure materials.  Mr. LeBlond did not provide the Crown with written acknowledgement of having received the Notice.  The defence relies on the cases of R. v. Santos, 2014 SKQB 5 (CanLII), [2014] S.J. No. 24 (QL), R. v. Aldaba, [2-14] A.J. No. 1009 and R. v. Phung, 2011 ABQB 427 (CanLII).

[28]        At the close of the Crown’s case on April 6, 2017, Mr. LeBlond says his argument on the reasonableness of the Notice was essentially that made on September 15, 2016.

[29]        Mr. LeBlond is an experienced defence counsel.  Over the years, he has come to rely on the Crown’s practice of serving notice of its intention to produce the certificates of analyst in a prescribed manner.  The Crown typically delivers the notice independent of its general disclosure package.  In this way, the notice is brought to his attention.  He first seeks his client’s instructions on whether to accept service of the notice, then signs the acknowledgement provisions contained in the notice as counsel for the accused and returns the signed document to the Crown.  In this case, the Crown failed to follow this established practice.  Instead, the Crown’s legal secretary delivered the Notice as part of the Crown’s general disclosure materials to Mr. LeBlond’s law office.  It was not Mr. LeBlond, but his legal secretary who acknowledged delivery of these materials.

[30]        Mr. LeBlond says the reason for the set procedure with respect to the delivery and acknowledgement of the Crown’s notice of intention is to clearly establish it made its way into his hands and that he had personally reviewed it.  He submits it is dangerous to amass such an important document in the Crown’s general disclosure materials.  Section 51 contemplates that unless the Crown can prove clear acknowledgement of the Notice by the accused or counsel for the accused, then the Certificates are inadmissible.  The parliamentary intent of s. 51, as interpreted by the courts, is to ensure the accused or the accused’s counsel knows the certificates of analyst are going to be produced and relied upon at trial.  Armed with this knowledge, the defence can then take steps to have other aspects of the analysis brought before the court.  Section 51(3) as interpreted by Santos, does not sanction a watered down process for providing notice.  It is not enough for the Crown to simple throw the notice in the mailbox along with its general disclosure.  In this case, the Crown cannot rely on the acknowledgement of his secretary on the Disclosure Memorandum to prove “reasonable notice”.

[31]        Section 51(1) of the CDSA enables the Crown to prove an element of the offence of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking by way of a certificate of analyst.  In this case, the Crown seeks to tender into evidence the Certificates to prove the substance Mr. Hammer is said to have possessed was diacetylmorphine, more commonly called heroin.

[32]        Section 51(3) of the CDSA requires the Crown to give an accused reasonable notice it will be relying on a certificate at trial rather than the oral testimony of the analyst.  In this way, the accused has an opportunity to assess whether to seek to cross examine the analyst or challenge the certificate.

[33]        Relying on Leroux, the Crown says it is only required to prove it provided the accused with “reasonable notice” on a balance of probabilities.  In Leroux, Judge Challenger states at para. 10, in part:

[34]        Judge Challenger does not undertake an in-depth analysis as to why she concluded the Crown’s standard of proof under s. 51(3) is the civil rather than criminal standard.

[35]        The cases cited by the Defence makes it clear that the Crown’s obligation to provide reasonable notice to produce certificate evidence is no mere formality.  It is a condition precedent to the admissibility of a certificate.  In Santos, Justice Gunn states at paras. 110-111:

[36]        In Phung, Justice Nation of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, stated at para. 23:

[37]        Still, none of Santos, Aldaba, or Phung, specifically addresses the standard of proof applicable to the Crown’s obligations under s. 51(3) to provide reasonable notice.  I was not provided with any appellate decision from this province on the appropriate standard of proof with respect to service of a notice of intention to produce a certificate.

[38]        The issue as to the appropriate standard of proof of notice to the accused of the Crown’s intention to produce certificate evidence at trial has most often being addressed in relation to certificate of a qualified technician in impaired driving cases.

[39]        Section 258(7) of the Criminal Code states:

[40]        The significant difference between s. 51(3) of the CDSA and s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code is the inclusion of the limiting words in the former: “unless the court otherwise orders.”  In R. v. Demers, 2007 SKQB 348 (CanLII), Justice Mills of the Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan comments (at para. 14) that s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code and s. 51(3) of the CDSA, although worded slightly different, have the same import.  In R. v. Van Boeyen, 1996 CanLII 8372 (BCCA), the appellant court considered the procedural requirements for notice under s.754(1)(b) of the dangerous offender provisions then in force.  Justice Hinds reviewed jurisprudence on  s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code and 9(3) of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1 (the predecessor to s. 51(3) of the CDSA), along with other statutory provisions requiring the Crown to give notice to an accused person.  Justice Hinds found these notice provisions “not dissimilar”.

[41]        The issue of whether the civil or criminal standard applied with respect to the Crown’s obligation to provide reasonable notice was considered, but not decided, in R. v. Graham, 2012 BCSC 1455 (CanLII).  Graham was a Crown appeal from the trial judge’s decision to exclude a certificate of a qualified technician from evidence in an impaired driving case.  The trial judge found the Crown failed to prove service of its notice of intention to rely on the certificate pursuant to s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code.

[42]        In considering the Crown’s requisite standard of proof under s. 258(7), the appeal judge in Graham referenced R. v. Egger, 1993 CanLII 98 wherein Sopinka J., for the Supreme Court of Canada held:

[43]        Justice Bretton also cites the following passage from R. v. MacKinnon, 2003 CanLII 48350 (ON CA):

[44]        Justice Bretton goes on to state at para. 20:

[45]        In R. v. Heppner, 2010 BCSC 1989 (CanLII), Mr. Justice Crawford acknowledged the divergent authorities in B.C. on the standard of proof of service of notice.  Heppner was also a Crown appeal against an acquittal in an impaired driving case.  The Crown argued the trial judge failed to distinguish between proof of service of notice documents tendered in evidence at trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the offence.  Justice Crawford referred to MacKinnon and a number of other cases and stated at para.10:

[46]        On October 22, 2014, the Alberta Court of Appeal handed down its decision in R. v. Redford, 2014 ABCA 336, wherein it considered the applicable standard of proof with respect to the notice requirements of the Crown’s intention to rely on certificate evidence in an impaired driving case.  Madam Justice Paperny comments on the standard of proof for notice under s. 51 (3) of the CDSA at para. 6:

[47]        In Redford, the appellate court distinguished between the findings of fact that are elements of the offence and auxiliary findings.  Citing R. v. Morin, 1988 CanLII 8 (SCC), Justice Paperny noted (at paras. 14-15) that at the fact-finding stage, individual items of evidence must be established on a balance of probabilities:

[48]        Justice Paperny points out (at para. 17) there are only a few recognized exceptions to this general principle, namely: (a) the voluntariness of confessions to a person in authority; (b) the admissibility of statements made by a young person; and (c) the availability of the presumption in s 258(1)(d) of the Criminal Code where samples of the accused’s blood have been taken and analysed to establish blood/alcohol content.

[49]        Redford has been referenced by courts in multiple jurisdictions.  I understand the courts in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario now require the Crown to prove reasonable notice of its intention to rely on certificate evidence on a balance of probabilities: Redford, R. v. Dean, 2017 ABPC 37 (CanLII) , R. v. Vader, 2017 ABQB 48 (CanLII); R. v. Wheaton, 2015 SKPC 102 (CanLII) and R. v. Daoust, 2015 SKPC 144 (CanLII), citing R. v. Bear, MBQB No 42 of 2014; R. v. Fryza, 2016 MBQB 55 (CanLII); R. v. MacKinnon 2003 CanLII 48350 (ONCA).

[50]        In considering the authorities referred to above, I find the Crown must prove that it gave reasonable notice of its intention to produce the Certificates on a balance of probabilities and not the more stringent standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

[51]        As set out above, the Crown bears the onus of establishing the requirements of s. 51(3) have been met on a balance of probabilities.  The accused is not required to establish the Crown failed to comply with s. 51(3): R. v. Burnett, 2008 BCPC 183 (CanLII), para. 9.

[52]        No particular form of notice is required: Phung, para. 23 and Santos, at para. 119.  There is no statutory requirement in s. 51(3) that a notice with respect to the use of certificate evidence be given in any prescribed manner: Phung, at para. 36, citing R. v. Gazica 2002 ABCA 217 (CanLII).  It is, however, essential the notice be reasonable in time and substance and must not be misleading, confusing or otherwise prejudicial: Leroux, at paras. 14 and 16; Santos at para. 109; Burnett at para. 16.

[53]        In Leroux, at para. 16, Judge Challenger references the following oft-cited passage from R. v. Good, 1983 ABCA 141 (CanLII), in which Mr. Justice McClung states:

[54]        In Santos, Justice Gunn referenced R. v. Dillon, [2005] O.J. No. 2516, a decision of Justice Casey Hill of the Ontario Superior Court involving the admissibility of the certificate of a designated counterfeit examiner under the Criminal Code.  In Dillon, Justice Hill held that reasonableness of notice respecting the Crown’s intention to rely on certificate evidence must be assessed in light of the purposes of that notice.  He cites the following considerations:

[55]        In Leroux at para. 23, Judge Challenger references R. v. Sharma [1999] B.C.J. No. 2621,  in which Justice Holmes states:

[56]        There is no evidence the Notice was misleading or confusing.  Mr. Hammer was charged with one offence under one Information.  The Notice enumerates the Certificates the Crown intends to produce at the trial of that offence.  Each Certificate relates to a police exhibit bearing a unique identification number, which appears on the Major Exhibit Flowchart.  The Major Exhibit Flowchart has been referred to at various times throughout the trial and marked as Exhibit 24.  The Defence Counsel had a copy of Major Exhibit Flowchart at the outset of this trial and it is listed as one of the documents included in the Crown’s disclosure package delivered on September 3, 2015: see Exhibit 22, Appendix “A”, reference to “Major Exhibit Flowchart (1)(5)(9)”.

[57]        There is no comparison in this case to the situation in Aldaba, where the trial judge refused to admit the Certificates of Analyst at trial on the basis the Crown’s notice of intention to do so was inadequate as to both time and substance.  The charges on the notice in Aldaba were referenced only by section numbers of the Criminal Code.  Justice Burrows concluded that an accused should not have to refer to anything other than notice served on him to know exactly what offences in what proceeding the prosecution intends to offer the certificates.

[58]        Similarly, there is no misstatements in the Notice, such as in Santos where the Crown’s notice stated the certificates would be tendered pursuant to s. 28 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-5, rather than the CDSA, or in Phung, where the notice used the singular when it ought to have used the plural and failed to use the word “copies” in relation to faxed documents.  Justice Nation rejected these technical arguments as semantics and found the wording of the notice was not so deficient as to vitiate reasonable notice.

[59]        In this case Crown hand delivered the Notice to Mr. LeBlond’s legal secretary as part of the Crown’s general disclosure package on September 3, 2015.  Almost a year later, on September 15, 2016, Defence Counsel, acknowledged in court, in the accused’s presence that he was in receipt of the Notice and the Certificates.

[60]        There are a number of binding authorities holding that service on the accused of the reasonable notice referred to in s.9(3) of the Narcotic Control Act, was not required: See R. v. Van Boeyen, 1996 CanLII 8372 (BCCA) leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 114 C.C.C. (3d) vi).  In R. v. Finlay, 1991 CanLII 1048 (BC CA), Toy J.A., concluded that service via fax on the accused's counsel satisfied the requirements of s. 9(3) of the Narcotic Control Act then in force.  Toy J.A. states:

[61]        Parenthetically, s. 9(3) of Narcotic Control Act required notice of certificate evidence “before the trial” and s. 51(3) of the CDSA requires notice of the certificate evidence “before its production at trial”.  This change has been held to contemplate notice at or after the start of a trial in certain cases.  See: R. v. E.L., 2011 ABPC 45 (CanLII), at para. 17 citing from Bruce MacFarlane, Robert Frater, and Chantal Proulx, Drug Offences in Canada (3^rd ed.) Vol.2 (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1996‑), chap 13 at 13-14.

[62]        I do not understand the Defence to be arguing that the Crown must prove personal service of the certificates on the accused or that it ought not to have hand delivered the Notice and Certificates to his office.  A lawyer experienced in defending accused persons charged under s. 5(2) of the CDSA will likely expect the Crown’s pre-trial disclosure to include certificates of analysis and a notice of intention to produce those certificates.  On the other hand, where the Crown fails to follow an established practice of delivering the notice and certificates independent of its general disclosure, the defence counsel may wrongly conclude the Crown was not intending to produce the certificates.

[63]        In Burnett, Judge Skilnick considered the issue of prejudice arising from the Crown’s delay in providing notice of its intention to rely on the certificate evidence.  In that case, the defence argued prejudice relating to cross-examining some of the Crown’s witnesses.  Judge Skilnick was unable to discern on the facts of the case before him how witnesses could have been cross-examined any differently if notice under s. 51 had been given a month earlier.  Still, he counsels caution in presuming an absence of prejudice and states at para. 21, in part:

[64]        In this case, the defence has not argued any general or specific prejudice arising from the Crown providing the Notice and Certificate as part of and not independent from its general disclosure package.

[65]        The Defence has not identified how the Crown’s departure from its typical practice of serving the Notice and Certificate independent of its general disclosure package rendered it unable to marshal a defence.

[66]        The cases upon which the Defence rely are all distinguishable from the instant case:

[67]        In Burnett, Judge Skilnick also addressed inability of an accused to marshal a defence as a result of the inadequate notice.  He states at para. 22:

[68]        In this case, the Defence Counsel had the Notice since September 3, 2015, which was over four months before the trial commenced.  I have no evidence if or when the Notice came to Mr. LeBlond’s attention before the September 15, 2016, court date.  As of September 15, 2016, the Crown’s investigating officer in this matter, Constable Charron, the exhibit custodian, was under direct examination.  Mr. LeBlond did not commence his cross-examination until January 6, 2017.  The Crown’s expert witness, Corporal Jeff Ringelberg did not testify until January 6, 2017; he was cross-examined on his evidence on April 6, 2017, after which the Crown closed its case.  The Defence has yet to elect whether to call evidence.  If there were any impediments to Mr. Hammer evaluating, considering, organizing and constructing a defence as a result of the Crown’s departure from its established manner of delivering the Notice and Certificates to Defence Counsel, they are not readily apparent.

[69]        Section 51(3) appears to empower the trial judge to waive the requirement for reasonable notice.  The Crown submits that if this Court were to find the manner in which the Notice was delivered made it unreasonable, the Court ought to admit the Certificates in any event.  The Crown relies on Leroux, at para. 29, where Judge Challenger writes:

[70]        The Crown further relies on Lewis, at para. 7, a drug trafficking case where the Crown gave the defence counsel the certificates of analysis on the first day of trial.  The defence counsel argued the accused had not received reasonable notice under s. 51(3) of the CDSA.  The issue of reasonable notice was adjourned for approximately two months, at which time the trial judge ruled the certificates admissible.  She held that even if the notice had not been unreasonable, she would have admitted the certificates in any event because the defence counsel had two months in which to examine them and take any steps arising from his assessment of them.  The trial judge is quoted in para. 7 of Lewis to have stated, in part:

[71]        As the accused Lewis died before the appeal was heard, the appellate court ordered the proceedings abated and declined to hear the appeal.

[72]        In Burnett Judge Skilnick considered when the “unless the court orders otherwise” provision set out in s. 51(3) might be invoked even though the Crown failed to comply with the statutory notice provisions.  Judge Skilnick states at para. 24:

[73]        Judge Skilnick went on to consider Judge Challenger’s findings in Leroux that the Crown’s failure to give reasonable notice could be remedied by an adjournment.  Judge Skilnick was unable to find authorities to support this proposition: see paras. 27-28.  He states at para. 29:

[74]        Judge Skilnick declined to grant the Crown’s application for an adjournment to remedy the defective notice for a number of reasons, including:

[75]        I do not have to consider whether to exercise my judicial discretion to admit the Certificates unless I find the Crown failed to comply with the notice provisions set out in s. 51(3).

[76]        In R. v. Derion, 2012 BCPC 509, paras. 20 - 24, Judge Giardini considered what constituted reasonable notice pursuant to s. 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.  She found helpful Duncan J.’s decision in R. v. Oslowski, 2005 ONCJ 488 (CanLII), which is also cited in McWilliams Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4^th edition, para: 21:40:40.  In Oslowski, Justice Duncan canvasses the authorities on reasonable notice of certificate evidence with respect to a number of offences, including s. 258(7) of the Criminal Code and s. 51(3) of the CDSA:

[77]        Having considered the authorities cited above in the circumstances of the case before me, I am satisfied on both the civil and the criminal standard the accused and his counsel were given reasonable notice of the Crown’s intention to produce the Certificates at trial.  There is no evidence or suggestion the Crown tried to hide the Notice and Certificates like a needle in a haystack in voluminous disclosure.  The accused has had ample time to raise any objection so the analyst could be called for cross-examination or prepare for any issues raised by the Certificates.

[78]        In my view, to exclude the Certificates on the basis of non-compliance with s. 51(3) of the CDSA would bring the administration of justice into disrepute if this section were interpreted so broadly as to impose upon the Crown the additional burden of ensuring the defence counsel actually scrutinized the disclosure documents it had properly delivered in a timely manner.  In conclusion, I find the Crown has satisfied the requirements of s. 51(3) of the CDSA.

[79]        Subject to hearing any further objections to their admissibility, the Certificates will be admitted into evidence and marked as an exhibit at trial.