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B.R.S. v. B.L.R., 2016 BCPC 312 (CanLII)

Date:
2016-09-23
File number:
F04542
Citation:
B.R.S. v. B.L.R., 2016 BCPC 312 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/gv3lm>, retrieved on 2024-03-28

Citation:      B.R.S. v. B.L.R.                                                                     Date: 20160923

2016 BCPC 0312                                                                          File No:                  F04542

                                                                                                        Registry:      Prince George

 

 

 

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

 

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF

THE FAMILY LAW ACT, S.B.C. 2011 c. 25

 

 

 

 

BETWEEN:

B. R. S.

APPLICANT

 

AND:

B. L. R.

RESPONDENT

 

 

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OF THE

HONOURABLE JUDGE J. T. DOULIS

 

 

 

 

Appearing on their own behalf:                                                                                            B. S.

Appearing on their own behalf:                                                                                          B. R.l

Place of Hearing:                                                                                         Prince George, B.C.

Date of Hearing:                                                                                          September 15, 2016

Date of Judgment:                                                                                       September 23, 2016


INTRODUCTION

 

[1]           Pursuant to an Order of Judge D. O’Byrne made July 21, 2008 (the “July 21, 2008 Order”), B. L. R. was found to be a B.C. residence with an annual income of $54,204.80 for the purposes of determining the amount of child support payable to B. R. S. (“Ms. S.”) for the support of their two children, T. C. R. (“T.”), born [omitted], and S. A. R. (“S.”), born [omitted].  Mr. R. was ordered to pay Ms. S. $812 per month commencing August 1, 2008 and continuing so long as the child is a child as defined in the Family Relations Act.

[2]           On February 26, 2016, Mr. R. applied to have the July 21, 2008 Order terminated.  In the alternative, Mr. R. asked:

a.         The July 21, 2008 Order be suspended pending an application for production of documents from S. A. R., B. R. S., and the UFV.

b.         The July 21, 2008 Order be changed to recalculate the applicable child support, pursuant to . . . the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

 

[3]           Mr. R. also seeks reimbursement for overpayment of child support for the period in which the court finds S. was no longer a child.  Mr. R. says at the earliest, S. became ineligible for child support when he turned 19 on [omitted] and, at the latest, on June 1, 2015, after the Federal Maintenance Enforcement Program (“FMEP”) suspended any further enforcement action.

[4]           Mr. R. argues that S. is not a child as defined by the Family Law Act and has not been a child since he turned 19.

[5]           Ms. S. does not agree Mr. R.’s support obligations for S. should be terminated.  She does agree, however, Mr. R.’s child support payments can be suspended while S. is not in school.

[6]           Ms. S. counterclaims for ongoing child support.  She also seeks an order that Mr. R. provide:

a.         2008 - 2015 Notice of Assessments as required under the July 21, 2008 Order;

b.         extraordinary expenses for S. R.’s tuition, registration fees, book fees and transportation; and

c.         retroactive child support to January 1, 2009, because Mr. R. failed to provide her with copies of his Notice of Assessment as required in the July 21, 2008 Order.

 

[7]           The matter came before me for a hearing on September 15, 2016.

[8]           Ms. S. said S. was not in attendance at Court because he could not get time off work.  Nevertheless, she did not want to adjourn the hearing because of the distance she has to travel to attend Court.  She preferred to have this “done right now.”

ISSUES

 

[9]           The issues raised in the pleadings were as follows:

a.         Is S. a child pursuant to the Family Law Act?

b.         If S. is not a child pursuant to the Family Law Act, when did he cease being a child?

c.         Is Mr. R. entitled to any reimbursement of child support paid to Ms. S. for S.?

d.         Is Ms. S. entitled to retroactive child support to January 1, 2009?

e.         Is Mr. R. responsible for paying S.’s extraordinary expenses for tuition, registration fees, book fees and transportation, prospectively and retrospectively?

[10]        Given the lack of court time, I restricted my determination of the threshold issues of whether S. was a child, and if not, when he cease being a child.  The remaining issues relating to retroactive child support will have to be adjudicated at a later date.  I have, however, set out some of the legal principles applicable to the outstanding issues.

EVIDENCE AT HEARING

 

[11]        I received the following evidence at the hearing:

a,         The affidavit of Mr. R. sworn February 26, 2016, marked as Exhibit 1;

b.         The affidavit of Mr. R. sworn May 18, 2016, marked as Exhibit 2;

c.         A letter from the FMEP marked Exhibit 3;

d.         A photocopy of a cheque dated June 21, 2016, from FMEP payable to Mr. R. in the amount of $507 reimbursing him for an overpayment in child support, marked as Exhibit 4;

e.         The affidavit of Ms. S. affirmed on June 13, 2016, marked as Exhibit 5;

f.         The affidavit of Ms. S. affirmed on June 13, 2016, and marked as Exhibit 6;

g.         A letter from S. R. dated September 13, 2016 and marked as Exhibit 7;

h.         The oral evidence of Mr. R.; and

i.         The oral evidence of Ms. S.

 

[12]        In reaching my decision I have considered all the oral and written materials before the Court.

BACKGROUND FACTS

 

[13]        Mr. R. and Ms. S. are the biological parents of T., now 24 years old and S., now 22.

[14]        Mr. R. and Ms. S. cohabitated from approximately 1992 to 1995.  They never married.  After they separated, T. and S.’s primary residence was with Ms. S. and Mr. R. had access to the children as set out in the various Court Orders.

[15]        Both Mr. R. and Ms. S. have remarried since their separation.  Mr. R. is now married to K. R., his wife of 17 years.  They have a 16 year old daughter.  Ms. S. is married to D. S.  Mr. R. and his wife reside in Prince George.  Ms. S. resides with her husband and S. in Mission, B.C.

[16]        Over the years, Mr. R. and Ms. S. entered into a series of Consent Orders with respect to custody, access, and child support of T. and S.  These Orders are attached as Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit.

[17]        T. graduated from high school in June 2011.  He began working full-time shortly after he graduated and did not pursue any post-secondary education.  Mr. R. stopped paying child support for T. after November 5, 2011, when T. turned 19.  (See: Exhibit “E” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).  I understand T. continues to reside with Mr. and Ms. S., however, he pays for room and board.  Mr. R. says he has a close relationship with T.  Child support for T. is not at issue in these proceedings.

[18]        S. is now 22 years old.  He graduated from high school in June 2012 when he was 18.  He turned 19 on [omitted].

[19]        Since graduating from high school, S. has had a number of jobs.  Nevertheless, he has always resided with Ms. S.

[20]        Mr. R. does not have a close relationship with S. and they have not spoken in three months.  Mr. R. says the only contact he has with S. is that which he initiates.

[21]        S. wants to be a police officer.  In pursuit of this career goal, S. enrolled part-time in a Criminal Studies Program at UFV in Abbotsford, B.C. in the fall of 2013.  S. has struggled academically both before and after attending UFV.  (See: Exhibits “F”, “I”, “J” and “K” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

[22]        S. has no medical condition or disability which would encumber his ability to work or pursue post-secondary education.  In fact, an entrance requirement to UFV’s Criminal Justice Program is a letter from a physician as evidence of good health, if required.  (See: Exhibits “L” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

[23]        The Criminology/Criminal Justice section of UFV’s winter/summer academic calendar indicates the two year Criminal Justice Studies Program requires 64 credits for completion.  A full-time student would take 5 three-credit courses per semester in the first three semesters.  The fourth semester requires a full-time student to take three three-credit courses and one six credit practicum.  (See: Exhibit “L” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).  The academic year commences in September and ends in April.

[24]        Students must maintain a cumulative grade point average in order to continue unrestricted in the program.  Students with less than a 2.0 grade point average may be placed on academic warning or academic probation.  Students on academic probation are restricted to registering in 10 credits per semester.  At some point, if a student’s cumulative and semester grade point average remains below 2.0, UFV will require the student to withdraw from the program.  (See: Exhibits “L”, M” and “N” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[25]        Ms. S. was enrolled with FMEP which monitored and enforced Mr. R.’s child support payments.  Over the years, FMEP collected monthly child support payments from Mr. R. and paid them to Ms. S.

[26]        Since S. turned 19, Ms. S. has repeatedly asked FMEP to monitor and collect Mr. R.’s child support payments for S.  (See: Exhibits “P”, “Q”, “R”, and “S” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[27]        FMEP’s policy with respect to enforcing child support orders for a child 19 years or older is set out on in FMEP’s February 22, 2016 correspondence to Mr. R.  FMEP Enforcement officer, Judy Mason states:

Our policy is to check on the Recipient’s position for ongoing child support and to collect information about the child/children 1 month before they turn 19. Forms sent out to the Recipients have a deadline for return, and if not returned, we stop monitoring. If the forms are returned, then a copy is provided to the Payor with our cover letter letting him/her know that the Receiver’s position is that maintenance should still be scheduled. After age 19, we are to check with the Respondent throughout the school year to ensure that nothing has changed. It is my personal style to bf my files for December (just before the January school semester) and August (just before the September school semester) to collect ongoing information from Recipients.

 

            (See: Exhibits “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

 

[28]        On June 27, 2013, Ms. S. completed and signed FMEP’s “Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances” with respect to ongoing child support for S.  In that document Ms. S. represented to FMEP:

a.         She wanted FMEP to continuing enforcing maintenance for S.;

b.         S. was not married;

c.         S. was attending school;

d.         S.’s anticipated graduation was “N/A”;

e.         S. is currently attending “UFV”;

f.         S. is living with her;

g.         S. is working part-time;

h.         S. does not have a medical condition or disability that prevents him from working.

            (See: Exhibit “P” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

           

[29]        On August 26, 2013, Ms. S. has represented to FMEP:

a.         She wanted FMEP to continuing enforcing maintenance for S.;

b.         S. was not married;

c.         S. was attending school;

d.         S.’s anticipated graduation was 2016(?);

e.         S. was returning to school on Sept. 4, 2013;

f.         S. is living with her;

g.         S. is working part-time;

h.         S. does not have a medical condition or disability that prevents him from working;

i.         “S. attends UFV full time and is currently in criminology. He has plans in staying in this course until he is able to apply with the RCMP.  In addition, S. also studies psychology.”

 

            (See: Exhibit “Q” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

 

[30]        In his letter of September 6, 2013, Alan Wiseman, Registrar of UFV, states that S. was enrolled as a part-time student.  Also, the only record of S.’s studying psychology is Exhibit “K” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit showing S. enrolled in Criminology 105 “Psychological Explanations of Criminal and Deviant Behaviour”, a required course for the Criminal Justice Diploma Program at UFV.  (See: Exhibits “H”, “K” and “L” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[31]        On June 4, 2014, FMEP Enforcement Officer Judy Mason sent a “Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances” form to Ms. S.  (See: Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[32]        On June 18, 2014, Ms. S. completed and signed FMEP’s “Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances” with respect to ongoing child support for S., in which she represented to FMEP:

a.         She wanted FMEP to continuing enforcing maintenance for S.;

b.         S. was not married;

c.         S. was attending school;

d.         S.’s anticipated graduation was “N/A as S. is in a 4+ program with added classes”;

e.         S. was off for the summer and planning on returning to UFV beginning September 2014;

f.         S. is living with her;

g.         S. is working part-time;

h.         S. does not have a medical condition or disability that prevents him from working;

i.         “S. is now on summer break and returns to University the first week of September, 2014, in which he will continue to study criminology.”

 

            (See: Exhibit “R” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

 

[33]        On June 19, 2014, FMEP Enforcement Officer Judy Mason sent Mr. R. a copy of Ms. S.’s completed Request for Information.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[34]        On August 21, 2014, Ms. Mason sent out to Ms. S. another Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances form for completion.  (See Exhibits “S” and “V” Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[35]        On September 2, 2014, Ms. S. completed and signed FMEP’s “Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances” with respect to ongoing child support for S., in which Ms. S. represented to FMEP:

a.         She wanted FMEP to continuing enforcing maintenance for S.;

b.         S. was not married;

c.         S. was attending school;

d.         S.’s anticipated graduation was 2017;

e.         S. was returning to school on Sept. 2, 2014;

f.         S. is living with her;

g.         S. is working part-time;

h.         S. does not have a medical condition or disability that prevents him from working;

i.         “S. is in school full time, completing his criminology degree and working part time.  He lives at home with me.  Nothing has changed since last updated.”

            (See Exhibit “S” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit)

 

[36]        On September 8, 2014, FMEP Enforcement Officer Judy Mason sent letters to Ms. S. and Mr. R. confirming Ms. S.’s position and FMEP’s intention to continue to schedule child maintenance.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[37]        In October 2014, Mr. R.’s legal counsel sent a letter to Ms. S. seeking information with respect to S.’s employment, education, income and expenses.  On October 3, 2014, Ms. S. said that she would provide S.’s 2013 Tax Return and his 2014 pay stubs from his employment at M. and W. for 2013 and 2014. She adds:

If your client wants to vary the court order, then he can expect my own claim for variation based upon increased income since 2008, and a claim for contribution towards s. 7 expenses.

So at this time, I request that your client provide me with his 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, tax returns . . . within three weeks of this letter.

 

            (See Exhibit “B” to Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit)

 

[38]        On November 9, 2014, Ms. S.’s husband, D. S. and S. entered into a five-year TD Auto Finance Conditional Sales Contract for the purchased of a 2013 Dodge Dart.  The principal amount financed was $22,561.40 with interest accrued at 6.24%.  (See Exhibit “F” to Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit).  Ms. S. says that Mr. S. and S. co-own the vehicle, but it is S. who makes the car payments.  S. also pays for the car insurance, fuel, parking, etc.

[39]        On December 9, 2014, FMEP again sent Ms. S. a Request for Information. Again, Ms. S. confirmed she wanted child support to continue.  On December 17, 2014, Ms. Mason sent to Ms. S. and Mr. R. a letter confirming that FMEP would continue to enforce Mr. R.’s child support obligations for S.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[40]        In her June 13, 2016 affidavit, Ms. S. says that she provided Mr. R.’s lawyer with copies of S.’s pay stubs and Income Tax Returns as well as confirmation of the courses in which S. was currently enrolled.

[41]        Ms. S. says that in a letter dated February 23, 2015, she reiterated her request to Mr. R.’s counsel that he provide her with his Income Tax Returns from 2009 to 2014.  Mr. R. refused to do so until Ms. S. provided proof of S.’s enrolment in UFV.  Ms. S. said “it was at this time my son approached me telling me that he was going to be dropping out of school for a few months [due] to his inability to focus on class with all the financial burdens he had on his shoulders.”  (See Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit, p. 5).  Mr. R. says S. told him he was forced to withdraw from UFV for six months because of his poor grade point average.  (See Mr. R.’s May 18, 2016 affidavit).

[42]        On June 5, 2015, Ms. S. responded to FMEP’s request for information of S.’s circumstances.  She said she wanted FMEP to stop enforcing child support for S. as of July 1, 2015, “however would still like the arrears owing.”  (See Exhibit “T” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[43]        On June 17, 2015, FMEP Enforcement Officer Judy Mason sent Mr. R. a letter advising him as of June 30, 2015, Ms. S. no longer wished FMEP to monitor and enforce ongoing child support for S.  She did indicate, however, that FMEP would monitor and enforce payment of arrears in the amount of $505.63.  Ms. Mason advised Mr. R. that Ms. S. may ask FMEP to monitor and enforce child support again if S.’s circumstances change.  Ms. Mason adds “If this happens, we will contact you and let you know of the child’s new circumstances and advise you whether you need to again send us payments for the child.”  (See Exhibit T” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[44]        On January 7, 2016, Ms. S. wrote to FMEP advising that S. had returned to school and she wanted Mr. R.’s monthly child support payments reactivated.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[45]        On January 11, 2016, Ms. S. completed and returned FMEP’s “Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances” form with respect to S., in which she represented:

a.         She wants FMEP to continuing enforcing maintenance for S.;

b.         S. is not married;

c.         S. was attending school;

d.         S.’s graduation is “N/A (ongoing)”;

e.         S. is living with her;

g.         S. is working part-time;

h.         “I have attached copy of S.’s university registration and enrollment schedule. He has asked that I ask for support to resume.

 

[46]        Mr. R. attached a copy of Ms. S.’s January 11, 2016 response to FMEP “Request for Information of Child’s Circumstances” as Exhibit “U” to his February 26, 2016 affidavit.  There is no attachment.  There is marked on the first page “Send your university registration.”

[47]      When a recipient advises FMEP she wants child support to continue, FMEP generally continues to monitor and collect child support with notice to the payor.  When a recipient seeks to have dormant child support payments reactivated for a child over the age of 19, FMEP gives the payor 30 days’ notice.  In the instant case, Ms. Mason scheduled reactivation of Mr. R.’s child support payments for S. in March 2016, in order to give Mr. R. proper notice.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[48]        If the payor does not agree with the recipient that child support payments ought to be continued or reinstated, then FMEP refers the payor to court.  Mr. R. notified FMEP of his intention to apply to the courts to review and change his child support obligations for S.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[49]        Ms. Mason explained to Mr. R. that FMEP has no authority to require Ms. S. to provide proof that S. was in school or question if he was attending part-time or fulltime or even passing.  All FMEP can do is advise him of Ms. S.’s request that child support payments continue and Mr. R. could decide whether he will make those payments or seek a court order to terminate the maintenance.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[50]        From January 1, 2014 to February 22, 2016, Mr. R. paid $9,105.50 to Ms. S. in child support for S.  During this entire period, S. was 19 years or older.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

 

            Mr. R.’s Position

 

[51]        Mr. R. believes that since he was 19, S. has been employed full-time or close to full-time.  Mr. R. does not believe S. has never attended UFV full-time.  He says S. told him on January 22, 2016, that he had just started second year courses.  Mr. R. says that Ms. S.’s representations to FMEP and this Court that S. attends UFV full-time are untrue.

[52]        Mr. R. was prepared to assist him financially if S. achieved satisfactory grades.  He believes that S. is smart, but his efforts in UFV are lacking and he needs to be more accountable and responsible.  (See Mr. R.’s May 18, 2016 affidavit).

[53]        The only corroborating information Mr. R. has of S.’s attendance and performance at UFV is that which he obtained surreptitiously by accessing S.’s student account at UFV.  S. gave Mr. R. his student account information in September 2013 so Mr. R. could transfer Registered Education Savings Plan funds to UFV for S.’s benefit.  Exhibit “D” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit shows either Mr. R. or his wife transferred $565.36 and $433.53 to UFV for S.’s benefit on September 12, 2013, and 20, 2013 respectively.

[54]        Mr. R. says he has no direct knowledge of S.’s employment history or his 2014, 2015, or anticipated 2016 income, nor does he have knowledge of S.’s condition, means, needs and other circumstances.  He has no knowledge of S.’s expenses relating to his attendance at UFV.  (See Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit, paragraphs 25 to 28, 50).

            S.’s Position

 

[55]        S. did not testify at the hearing nor did he provide an affidavit.  The three letters he wrote to the Court did not disclose any concrete information as to his current, past, or anticipated employment income or attach corroborative documentation.  S. provided no documentation from UFV verifying his attendance or academic performance.  In fact, S. was upset that Mr. R. went into his personal account with UFV and retrieved his school records for use in these proceedings.  S. said he gave Mr. R. his personal UFV information in 2013 so he could deposit money for his course, but not for any other purpose.  (See Exhibit “J” to Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit).

[56]        In a letter dated April 15, 2016, S. states:

I am writing this letter to the judge to show what my monthly payments are every month. I don’t want to do this and I feel it is unnecessary and a waste of the court[‘s] time because my dad should just want to help instead of making my mom go through this all the time.  If I could have asked for the support to come to me in my name, I would have, but because this is a pre-existing order, I can’t so my mom has asked for it to be reinstated.

 

[57]        In this April 15, 2016 letter, S. says his monthly expenses are as follows: (a) approximately $711 to $761 for car related expenses; (b) $70 for his phone; and (c) $12.95 for banking fees.  With respect to his education expenses, S. says every four months he pays approximately $1,204 - $1,304 for registration fees, tuition fees and books.  He writes that he can now only afford to go to two classes per semester because he cannot afford anything more.  He does not mention when he took more than two classes per semester.  He goes on to say:

Any incidentals, hobbies, date night (I do have a life and girlfriend) I can’t do anymore because I have no spare money to have any type of life outside school and work.  I understand that I am considered an adult, but I am 100% reliant on my mom and step dad for everything and I need my dad to please help too.  It’s not fair that my mom is putting her life on hold helping me and she never complains, but my dad freaks out over helping me and doesn’t want too.

 

[58]        S. wrote another letter dated May 31, 2016, which is attached as Exhibit “J” to Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit. He says:

At no time did I ever say in my letter to the court that I was isolated at home without the ability to spend anything at anytime, or do anything but sit in my room alone.  Most of the time, that’s what we do though.

            . . .

I’m sometimes able to have a good month depending on my work schedule and course load . . . that all depends on the time of the year. During summer break, I’m not attending classes and working full-time, therefore able to have a little extra spending money for myself.  Not much, but some.  Certainly not enough to attend a full-time criminology degree program and University as I would like too, in addition to all my other responsibilities.

. . .

I am 100% reliant on the help of my parents at this point in my life, what I’m referring to is the bigger expenses such as rent, utilities, food education, books, transportation. I’m not meaning for small things such as a movie night or pizza and hot chocolate while watching late night TV.

 

[59]        S. says he lives in his mother’s home for free and that “she does not ask for a penny from me, she feeds me and has helped me financially many times for my university courses and car payments.”

[60]        S. also wrote a letter to the Court dated September 13, 2016, which was entered as Exhibit 7 in these proceedings.  He explained that he was unable to attend Court on September 15, 2016, because his employer refused to give him the days off. His employer said “Due to me being a new employee, I would need to give much more notice than 2 months for any time off, regardless of my reasons.”  I understand from his September13, 2016 letter that S. is now employed, possibly full-time and no longer enrolled in UFV.  He writes:

. . . I have bills to pay and responsibilities in order to get to work that pays my bills. . . Although I worked as many hours as allowed, I was still unable to earn enough during the summer to pay for tuition, books, in addition to car payment, insurance, fuel, etc. . . . I am having a difficult time juggling all of these things financially. . . If I don’t have a vehicle, I can’t get to work to earn a living, or university which is in another town then we live. So for now I need to work to pay my bills.

 

[61]        In his September 13, 2016 letter, S. does not disclose his income, hours of work, or nature of his employment.  He provides no evidence as to his progress in completing his program at UFV except to suggest he is going to try and get back into class in January 2017.  So, notwithstanding, S. works either full or part-time, and has only taken two courses per semester, if that, he relies on his parents to pay all his living expenses.  The only expenses S. admits to paying are those set out in his April 15, 2016 letter.  From my calculation S.’s monthly expenses vary from $845 to $1,170 per month depending on whether or not he is attending UFV.  The majority of S.’s expenses are car-related.

            Ms. S.’s Position

 

[62]        Ms. S. says that when S. is attending UFV Mr. R. should pay child support and/or S.’s tuition, books registration and school fees.  When he is not in school, then S.’s child support payments can be suspended provided they are reinstated when he returns.  (Reply, p. 5).

[63]        In her Reply filed April 15, 2016, Ms. S. writes:

Everything in the applicant “B. L. R.’s affidavit is irrelevant such as our son S.’s prior grades, prior GPA scores. There were a large number of personal reasons why S. had some hard semesters, one was stress of not being able to pay tuition, or pay his bills, or family members being sick.  What is relevant, is that S. has been, and continues to reside at home with me, while attending criminology studies at the UFV.

            . . .

S. cannot move out and live on his own, although he would love this more than anything, as he does not make the money to do so, therefore; he has no choice but to live at home and be supported in order to continue with school.

 

[64]        In her Reply, Ms. S. says that “S. does not attend university full-time anymore sadly, because of the costs involved with tuition/extras and monthly responsibilities.  Ms. S. does not provide any corroborating documentation to show when or if S. attended UFV full-time.

[65]        Notwithstanding Mr. Wiseman’s September 6, 2013 letter stating S. was in enrolled as a part-time student in UFV for the 2013 fall semester, Ms. S. continued to assert S. was attending UFV full-time.  (See Exhibit “Q” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit and Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit, page 6).

[66]        Ms. S. attributes S.’s decision to attend UFV part-time to Mr. R.’s inadequate financial support.  She says S.’s expenses include his “tuition, books, insurance, car payments, fuel, etc.”  She also acknowledges S. regards his car as a priority expense.  She says the 2013 Dodge Dart referred to in Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit was “purchased by his step father as the primary borrower and S. was a co-borrower for insurance/driving privileges.”

[67]        In her June 13, 2016 affidavit, Ms. S. states that until August 2014, S. worked part-time at M. and W. where he earned minimum wage.  In August 2014, S. began working at GVF, where he earned $16 per hour.  This job ended in early January 2015.

[68]        In her June 13, 2016 affidavit, Ms. S. says Mr. R.’s lawyer demanded “copies of S.’s Income Tax Returns, copies of pay stubs, confirmation of courses, and copies of transcripts for high school and post-secondary education, and grades by mail.”  She says that she did provide Mr. R.’s counsel with S.’s pay stubs, Income Tax Returns and confirmation of courses in which S. was currently enrolled.  She did not provide Mr. R.’s counsel with S.’s transcripts or grades.

[69]        Ms. S. said that S. tried to get back into UFV this semester, which I understand to be the fall of 2016, but unfortunately he had bills to pay and unable to juggle his bills, car payment and tuition.  Ms. S. says it costs S. $900 to $1,000 every semester to attend school.  She only learned three or four days before the hearing date that S. was not returning to UFV or that he was unable to attend at the hearing in person to testify.

[70]        Ms. S. says the program which S. attends at UFV is a four year program and S. is just going into second year.  If S. were to attend full-time, then she expects he would complete the program in two years.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Changing, suspending or terminating orders respecting child support

152 (1) On application, a court may change, suspend or terminate an order respecting child support, and may do so prospectively or retroactively.

            (2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the court must be satisfied that at least one of the following exists, and take it into consideration: 

                        (a) a change in circumstances, as provided for in the child support guidelines, has occurred since the order respecting child support was made;

                        (b) evidence of a substantial nature that was not available during the previous hearing has become available;

                        (c) evidence of a lack of financial disclosure by a party was discovered after the last order was made.

 

[71]        The change of circumstances which Mr. R. asserts is S. maturing into an able-bodied adult working outside the home and attending a post-secondary institution.

[72]        The threshold issue in these proceedings is whether S. is a child for the purposes of the Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 (“FLA”) 

[73]        Pursuant to s. 147 of the FLA each parent of a child has a duty to support the child.  Section 146 of the FLA, states a “child” includes a person who is 19 years of age or older and unable, because of illness, disability or another reason, to obtain the necessaries of life or withdraw from the charge of his or her parent or guardians.  This definition of a child in FLA is almost identical to the predecessor legislation, s. 87 of the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 (now repealed), which defined a child to include “a person who is 19 years of age or older and, in relation to the parents of the person, is unable, because of illness, disability or other cause, to withdraw from their charge or to obtain the necessaries of life.”  In DMP v. GEA, 2013 BCPC 117, Judge Skilnick held the FLA does not change the law on whether adult children remain “children” for support purposes of receiving child support.

Child support when children of the marriage are the age of majority or over the age of majority

[74]        The onus is on the party seeking child support to prove an adult child is unable to withdraw from parental support or provide the necessaries of life from his or herself: Sijercic v. Kazic, 2016 BCSC 186 (CanLII), at para. 28; Darlington v. Darlington, 1997 CanLII 3893 (BC CA), C.L.C. v. B.T.C., 2012 BCSC 736 (CanLII) at para. 27; D.S. v. W.D.G., 2016 BCSC 1345 (CanLII), at para. 40.

[75]        The courts accept that pursuing a post-secondary education necessary to equip a child with a career qualifies as “other cause” for a child’s continuing dependence on his parents.  Mere attendance at an educational institution is not sufficient.  A court must consider the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a child is able to withdraw from his parent’s charge: V.S. v. D.M.S., 2016 BCSC 1346 (CanLII) at para, citing W.P.N. v. B.J.N., 2005 BCCA 7 (CanLII).

[76]        The oft-cited authority on whether an adult student is legally entitled to receive child support is Farden v. Farden, 1993 CanLII 2570 (BC SC).  In Farden, Master Joyce, as he then was, identified a list of factors to guide the court’s determination as to whether an adult child attending a post-secondary institution is entitled to receive child support.  Farden was recently considered by Madam Justice Young in D.S. v. W.D.G., 2016 BCSC 1345 (CanLII) and by Mr. Justice Schultes in N.M. v. G.M., 2015 BCSC 1732 (CanLII).  In D.S., as in Farden and this case, the payor parent was distressed at the pace at which the child was pursuing his studies.  Madam Justice Young states:

[43]      In Farden, Master Joyce said (at p. 64):

Whether or not attendance in a post-secondary institution will be sufficient cause for a finding that the child is still a "child of the marriage" requires examination of all of the circumstances. It is not a conclusion which follows automatically from proof of attendance at the institution [McNulty v. McNulty (1976), 1976 CanLII 1935 (BC SC), 25 R.F.L. 29 (B.C.S.C.)].

[44]      The other factors that the court may wish to consider are now referred to as the Farden factors because of the frequency of reference to them. Those factors are:

(1) whether the child is in fact enrolled in a course of studies and whether it is a full-time or part-time course of studies;

 (2) whether or not the child has applied for or is eligible for student loans or other financial assistance;

(3)  the career plans of the child, i.e. whether the child has some reasonable and appropriate plan or is simply going to college because there is nothing better to do;

(4) the ability of the child to contribute to his own support through part-time employment;

(5) the age of the child;

(6) the child's past academic performance, whether the child is demonstrating success in the chosen course of studies;

(7) what plans the parents made for the education of their children, particularly where those plans were made during cohabitation;

(8) at least in the case of a mature child who has reached the age of majority, whether or not the child has unilaterally terminated a relationship from the parent from whom support is sought.

[77]        A recipient parent does not have to lead evidence on each of the Farden factors to discharge his or her burden of proof: N.M. v. G.M., 2015 BCSC 1732 (CanLII), at para. 41, citing: Darlington v. Darlington, 1997 CanLII 3893 (BC CA).

Factor #1: Whether the child is in fact enrolled in a course of studies and whether it is a full-time or part-time course of studies

 

[78]        I find that S. was enrolled off and on in a part-time Criminal Justice Studies Program at UFV from September 2013 to April 2016.  There is documentary evidence indicating that in the 2013/2014 academic year S. enrolled in 2 three-credit courses per semester and earned 12 course credits.  By comparison, a full-time student would earn between 15 and 18 credits in each of the fall and winter semesters.  (See Exhibit “L”, to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).

[79]        Because of the dearth of documentation, I am unable to determine how many courses S. completed following the 2013/2014 academic year.  There is hearsay evidence indicating S. has now completed his first year of the Criminal Justice Studies Program in UFV.  If this is accurate, then S. completed approximately 10 three-credit courses over a three year period.  There is also evidence he withdrew from UFV early in 2015.  Ms. S. says S. returned to UFV in the 2016 winter semester but has again withdrawn for the 2016 fall semester.  S. says he wants to re-enroll in UFV in January 2017.

Factor #2: Whether or not the child has applied for or is eligible for student loans or other financial assistance

 

[80]        There is no evidence S. has applied for student loans or other financial assistance.  Mr. R. says S. told him on January 22, 2016, he has never applied for any financial assistance or student loans and does not want to.  (See Mr. R.’s May 18, 2016 affidavit).  Neither Ms. S. nor S. have said that this was inaccurate or provided documentary evidence to the contrary.  Neither have they provided an explanation as to why S. has not sought any financial assistance beyond asking his parent to support him.  Nevertheless, S. is not required to exhaust all other sources of financial assistance before being found unable to withdraw from his parent’s charge: De Beck v. De Beck, 2012 BCCA 465 (CanLII) (at para. 41).

Factor # 3: The career plans of the child, i.e. whether the child has some reasonable and appropriate plan or is simply going to college because there is nothing better to do

 

[81]        S. enrolled in the Criminal Justice Studies Program with the goal of becoming a police officer.  There is nothing before me to suggest this was an unreasonable or inappropriate career plan.

Factor #4: The ability of the child to contribute to his own support through part-time employment

 

[82]        S. has been working since he graduated from high school in June 2012.  Like many persons entering the workforce upon completing high school, S.’s first jobs paid minimum age.  At some point S.’s hourly rate increased.  The Court has no source documents to assess, quantify or verify S.’s earnings over the past four years.

[83]        By way of his letter dated September 13, 2016, and marked Exhibit 7, S. says his work prevented him from attending at Court to testify at the hearing of this matter.  He does not say where he works, how often he works, or what he earns.

[84]        S. had been supported by Mr. R. and Ms. S. until June 2015, after which Mr. R. stopped making child support payments at Ms. S.’s request.  Since then, S. has been 100% reliant on Mr. and Ms. S., even though he has been attending UFV only part-time and intermittently.  Other than his car expenses, S. has not provided any documentation to particularize or corroborate his expenses.  Still, I accept that since January 1, 2014, S. would have paid UFV some money for tuition, registration fees and books.  I have no doubt he pays for a cell phone and incurs banking fees.  However, without knowing S.’s income, I cannot say what he is able to contribute towards his living or educational expenses.  It does appear to me that S. has placed possessing and operating a car ahead of his educational and career goals.

            Factor #5: Age of the child

 

[85]        S. did not start his post-secondary education until he was 19, although he had completed high school a year earlier.  He is now 22 years old and has stopped attending UFV for the second time since he started the Criminal Justice Studies Program in September 2013.

[86]        Ms. S. says that with Mr. R.’s support, S. could attend UFV full- time and complete a four year degree in criminology within the next two years.  She thought S. would need support in the amount of $450 to $500 per month.  In his letter of May 31, 2016, S. says that if his father continued to pay support or even paid his tuition, he would be able to attend full-time studies on a regular basis.  My concern is that up until July 2015, Mr. R. was paying child support for S. in the amount of $504.97 per month.  He also paid S.’s tuition for the 2013 fall semester.  S. has never attended UFV full-time, even when Mr. R. was paying child support.

Factor #6: The child's past academic performance, whether the child is demonstrating success in the chosen course of studies

[87]        Mr. R. says he was willing to assist provided S. demonstrated a reasonable effort pursuing his studies.  S. has admitted to his father that at various times he has been under academic warning or academic probation and compelled to withdraw from UFV because of his poor grades.

[88]        S. attributes his slow progress in UFV’s Criminal Justice Studies Program to financial hardship.  Although this may be a factor in S.’s low grade point average, it is not determinative.  I accept that not all persons are academically gifted and those who struggle in school are still entitled to pursue a career which requires some post-secondary education or training.  Still, I find S.’s underachievement troubling given he has been supported by his parents since graduating high school.

[89]        As S. says in his May 31, 2016 letter, he is 100% reliant on his parents for “rent, utilities, food, education, books, transportation.”  His mother also helps him from time to time with his car payments and school fees.  Until June 2015, Mr. R. contributed to S.’s living expenses through his monthly child support payments of $504.97 per month.  S. has provided no satisfactory explanation why he cannot succeed with even a part-time program when his parents have and continue to provide his necessaries of life.

[90]        Ms. S. and S. have had ample opportunity to provide documentation if S.’s attendance and performance at UFV was more than marginal.  Ms. S. acknowledges Mr. R., through his counsel, repeatedly requested this information.  Ms. S. refused to provide it because she thought it irrelevant.  I infer from this lack of disclosure that Mr. R. is correct.  S. is not now, nor has he ever, attended UFV on a full-time basis and was forced to withdraw because of his poor academic performance.  I find that S. has not demonstrated success in his studies at UFV.

Factor #7: what plans the parents made for the education of their children, particularly where those plans were made during cohabitation;

 

[91]        Mr. R. and Ms. S. were never married.  They cohabitated briefly when T. and S. were very young.  They each married other partners.  Their affidavits indicate they do not communicate well.  Mr. R. says at paragraph 66 of his February 26, 2016 affidavit that Ms. S. will not discuss child support matters with him.  She has told him not to include her in discussions with S. regarding school and support and to deal with S. directly.

[92]        Mr. R. and Ms. S. obviously hold contrary views about supporting S. through his post-secondary education.  Mr. R. believes S. ought to work reasonably diligently and maintain a satisfactory grade point average.  Ms. S. believes S.’s academic performance is irrelevant.  She is willing to support S. notwithstanding his inadequate attendance and performance at UFV and believes Mr. R. ought to do the same.  I find that Mr. R. and Ms. S. made no express or implied educational plans for S.

Factor #8: At least in the case of a mature child who has reached the age of majority, whether or not the child has unilaterally terminated a relationship from the parent from whom support is sought

 

[93]        Mr. R. says that he and S. are not close and he has to initiate contact with his son if there is to be contact.  Mr. R. attributes the distance between them, in part, to these proceedings.  Still, the evidence does not suggest their relationship has deteriorated to the point it can be said that S. has “unilaterally terminated a relationship from him.”

[94]        Recently, in Shaw v. Arndt, 2016 BCCA 78 (CanLII), the B.C. Court of Appeal discounted the quality of the parent-child relationship as a relevant factor in assessing whether an adult child is entitled to financial assistance from his parents.  Madam Justice Newbury held that if a child’s conduct is relevant “it should only be in truly egregious cases of misconduct by a child against a parent”.  This was the case in R.M.W. v. C.A.W., 2016 BCSC 1688 (CanLII) where the son made a conscious unilateral decision to terminate his relationship with his mother and aligned himself with his father.  The evidence of alienation in this case is weak.  Although Mr. R. and S. are distant, they are not estranged.

[95]        Applying the Farden factors to the case at bar, I find that S. is not a child for the purposes of the FLA and that he ceased being a child when he withdrew from UFV sometime in early 2015.  S. has not provided any records to show when or why that occurred.  I assume that if there is documentation to show some meritorious reason for S. leaving UFV in 2015, he or Ms. S. would have brought them to the Court’s attention.  Accordingly, I find S. was no longer entitled to child support as of January 1, 2015.

[96]        In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into consideration the evidence before me, both oral and written.  I recognize it can take a young man time to make his way in the world and become established in the work force.  For this reason, I do not accept Mr. R.’s argument his obligations to pay child support should end with S.’s 19th birthday.  It seems, however, by November 19, 2014, S. was earning sufficient money he could take on the expense of a relatively new vehicle.  In concluding that S. is not entitled to child support from and after January 1, 2015, I have taken into consideration the paucity of documentary evidence as to his income, expenses, and UFV records.  Ms. S. has demonstrated that she understands the need to provide corroborating documentation, both in her response to Mr. R.’s affidavits and to her counterclaim for child support.  For example, she has attached to her affidavit S.’s receipts for jewellery he purchased for his girlfriend and the TD Auto Finance Conditional Sales Contract.  She has demanded Mr. R. produce his Notice of Assessments for every year since and including 2009.  I find Ms. S.’s failure to provide this Court documentation corroborating S.’s earnings and expenses deliberate.  I am not persuaded S. is unable to withdraw from his parents’ charge.  As Mr. Justice Grauer stated in Hansen v. Hansen, 2016 BCSC 1596 (at para. 4), “the section requires that the child be “unable” to withdraw, the reason must be more than a lifestyle choice: Kohan v Kohan, 2016 ABCA 125 (CanLII).”

[97]        I recognize that Ms. S. sincerely believes S. is struggling financially and unable to contribute to his own support.  I have no doubt she is a loving and devoted mother who indulges her adult son because she does not want to see him flounder.  However, Mr. R. is not a lesser parent because he believes that as an adult, S. should financially contribute to his own post-secondary education and make a reasonable amount of effort to succeed in his studies.  

OUTSTANDING ISSUES

 

            Reciprocating Retroactive Child Support Orders

 

[98]        Both Mr. R. and Ms. S. have requested a retroactive adjustment to Mr. R.’s child support obligations for S.  As he is not in arrears, Mr. R. seeks reimbursement from Ms. S. of child support payments made after S. was no longer a child.  Ms. S. seeks a retroactive increase in Mr. R.’s child support obligations for S. extending back to 2009.  She also seeks extraordinary expenses for S.’s tuition, registration fees, book fees and transportation, past and present.  These are issues which remain outstanding in these proceedings.  To some extent they are interrelated and need to be considered concurrently.  To assist the parties in addressing these issues, I have set out below some of the legal principles in play.

            Principles governing retroactive child support orders

 

[99]        Both Mr. R.’s and Ms. S.’s Applications require consideration of the law governing retroactive child support orders.

[100]     Section 170(b) of the FLA provides that support can be ordered retroactively with respect to any period before the application for the order is made.

[101]     Pursuant to Section 150(1) of the Family Law Act, a court is required to make an order for child support order in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (the “Guidelines”).  The Guidelines state:

Presumptive rule

 (1) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, the amount of a child support order for children under the age of majority is

(a) the amount set out in the applicable table, according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the spouse against whom the order is sought; and

(b) the amount, if any, determined under section 7.

Child the age of majority or over

(2) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, where a child to whom a child support order relates is the age of majority or over, the amount of the child support order is

(a) the amount determined by applying these Guidelines as if the child were under the age of majority; or

(b) if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child.

 

[102]     Section 7 of the Guidelines sets out the type of expenses that a court may order in addition to the table amounts of child support provided in the Guidelines.  “Special or extraordinary" expenses may be included in a child support order depending on the necessity of the expense, the best interests of the child, the means of the child, the means of the spouses, and the family's prior spending pattern.  Expenses for post-education are often accepted as an extraordinary expense.

[103]     Section 3(2) of the Guidelines governs the determination of support for a child who has reached the age of majority, but is still dependent.  The court must decide whether an amount determined by applying the Guidelines as though the child was under the age of majority would be inappropriate and, if so, determine what amount would be appropriate in view of the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child.

[104]     In Schreiber v. Schreiber, 2009 BCSC 366 (CanLII), Mr. Justice Smith reviewed the fundamental analysis required under s. 3(2):

[13] However, the analysis under s. 3(2) focuses not on the amount set out in the Guidelines, but on whether the Guidelines approach is inappropriate. That is because the basic assumptions on which the table amounts are based may not apply to the living situation and needs of an older child. In [Wesemann v. Wesemann 1999 CanLII 5873 (BC SC), [1999] B.C.J. No. 1387 (S.C.)], Martinson J. said:

16. The usual Guidelines approach is based on certain factors that normally apply to a child under the age of majority. That is, the child resides with one or both parents. The child is generally not earning an income and is dependent on his or her parents.

17. The usual Guidelines approach is, in most cases, based on the understanding that, though only the income of the person paying is used to calculate the amount payable, the other parent makes a significant contribution to the costs of that child's care because the child is residing with him or her.

18. The closer the circumstances of the child are to those upon which the usual Guidelines approach is based, the less likely it is that the Children over the age of majority may reside away from home and/or earn a significant income. If a child is not residing at home, the nature of the contribution towards the child's expenses may be quite different;

[105]     The governing authority on retroactive child support obligations is the Supreme Court of Canada decision of D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; L.J.W. v. T.A.R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, 2006 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 23. D.B.S., dealt with an application by the recipient parent for a retroactive increase in child support.  Mr. Justice Bastarache makes it clear in D.S.B. (at para. 60) that “[n]o child support analysis should ever lose sight of the fact that support is the right of the child.”

[106]     In D.B.S., Bastarache J. sets out the justification for retroactive child support orders:

[68]      The concern associated with retroactivity is that, from the perspective of the person on whom a retroactive obligation is imposed, the order is arbitrary and unfair . . . Yet a retroactive child support order, as considered in the present appeals, does not involve imposing an obligation on a payor parent that did not exist at the time for which support is being claimed. . . As I concluded above, a payor parent always has the obligation to pay — and the dependent child always has the right to receive — child support in an amount that is commensurate to his/her income. This obligation is independent of any court order that may have been previously awarded. Accordingly, even where the payor parent has made payments consistent with an existing court order, (s)he would not have been fulfilling his/her obligation to his/her children if those payments did not increase when they should have, according to the applicable law at the time. Thus, the support obligation of a payor parent, while presumed to be the amount ordered by a court, will not necessarily be frozen to the amount ordered by a court. It is the responsibility of both parents to ensure that the payor parent fulfills his/her actual obligation, tailored to the circumstances at the relevant time. Where they fail in this obligation, a court may order an award that recognizes and corrects this failure. Such an award is in no way arbitrary for the payor parent. To the contrary, it serves to enforce an obligation that should have been fulfilled already. [Citations omitted]

 

[107]     Bastarache J. set out four factors to be considered by the court in assessing whether a retroactive order is appropriate:

a)         whether there is a reasonable excuse for why support was not sought earlier;

b)         the conduct of the payor parent;

c)         the circumstances of the child or recipient spouse; and

d)         any hardship occasioned by a retroactive award on the payor spouse.

Cited by Madam Justice Kirkpatrick in McKenzie v. Perestrelo, 2014 BCCA 161 (CanLII) at para. 106:

 

[108]     In D.B.S., the Supreme Court held that as a general rule, absent misconduct, a retroactive change to a child support will commence the date of effective notice, but no more than three years in the past.  “Effective notice” is “not restricted to the date upon which an application to the court or formal notice is given, but generally when the topic is broached.  The reason for this rule is that persons must have some certainty in their financial affairs.

[109]     In this case, the evidence before me indicates the topic was broached in October 2014, when Mr. R.’s lawyer wrote to Ms. S. seeking evidence of S.’s earnings.  In the spirit of the best defence is an offence, Ms. S. demanded Mr. R.’s 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 Income Tax Returns.  (See Exhibit “B” to Ms. S.’s June 13, 2016 affidavit).  By this date Mr. R. and Ms. S. had notice the other sought renegotiation of S.’s child support.  

[110]     Ms. S. says a retroactive review of Mr. R.’s child support payments for S. is justified because Mr. R. failed to disclose his annual Notice of Assessments as required under the July 21, 2008 Order.  If a court were to review Mr. R.’s child support payments for S. retroactive to 2009, the applicable analytical framework would change after S. turned 19.

[111]     Mr. R. has paid child support from and after January 1, 2015, in the amount of $504.97 per month.  From January 1, 2014 to February 22, 2016, Mr. R. paid $9,105.50 in child support.  (See Exhibit “V” to Mr. R.’s February 26, 2016 affidavit).  I understand FMEP gave Ms. S. two support payments Mr. R. made in trust pending a determination of this matter.  Mr. R. seeks an order that Ms. S. reimburse him for payments made after S. was no longer a child under the FLA.  

[112]     The issue of an application for a retroactive decrease was considered in G.M.W. v. D.P.W., 2014 BCCA 282 (CanLII).  In G.M.W., the recipient mother obtained a court order in 2007 based on the payor father’s imputed income.  Eventually the father provided Income Tax Returns and Notices of Assessment showing he had income which was materially lower than that imputed by the courts.  He applied to retroactively vary the child support payments for a three year period based on his actual income for that period.  The court granted the application with the result that the mother had to reimburse the father $31,700.  In allowing the appeal, the B.C. Court of Appeal held that before the court makes a retroactive order, whether to increase or decrease child support, it must engage the analytic framework for a retroactive award as established in D.B.S.

[113]     There is distinction between a retroactive increase and a retroactive decrease in child support payments.  It is one thing to order payment of monies with respect to a past obligation that only recently matured and another to order child support be recalculated and reduced.

DISPOSITION

[114]     S. R. is not a child for the purposes of the Family Law Act.

[115]     S. R. has not been a child for the purposes of the Family Law Act from and including January 1, 2015.

[116]     Mr. R.’s obligations to pay child support for S. R. ended on December 31, 2014.

[117]     The parties will contact the Judicial Case Manager and schedule a date to continue the hearing for their retroactive review and payment or repayment of S.’s child support.

[118]     Within 60 days of the continuation date, each party must disclose to the other all relevant documents not previously disclosed.  This includes all of Mr. R.’s Notices of Assessment from 2009 to and including 2014.  It also includes S.’s income, expenses, and education for any period in issue.

[119]     Mr. R., Ms. S., S. R. must appear in person at the continuation of the hearing.

[120]     The Judicial Case Manager will schedule a Pre-Trial Conference.

[121]     If the parties do not wish to proceed with any of the outstanding matters, they are to advise the Judicial Case Manager.

[122]     I will remain seized of this matter to its conclusion.

 

 

_______________________

J. T. Doulis

Provincial Court Judge

Province of British Columbia