This website uses cookies to various ends, as detailed in our Privacy Policy. You may accept all these cookies or choose only those categories of cookies that are acceptable to you.

Loading paragraph markers

S.E. v. D.C., 2015 BCPC 268 (CanLII)

Date:
2015-09-28
File number:
15843
Citation:
S.E. v. D.C., 2015 BCPC 268 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/glf19>, retrieved on 2024-03-29

Citation:      S.E. v. D.C.                                                                  Date:           20150928

2015 BCPC 0268                                                                          File No:                     15843

                                                                                                        Registry:              Abbotsford

 

 

 

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

     

 

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF

THE FAMILY LAW ACT, S.B.C. 2011 c. 25

 

 

 

 

BETWEEN:

S. E.

APPLICANT

 

AND:

D. C.

RESPONDENT

 

 

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OF THE

HONOURABLE JUDGE K. D. SKILNICK

 

 

 

 

Counsel for the Applicant:                                                                                         D. Klassen

Appearing in person:                                                                                                            D. C.

Place of Hearing:                                                                                                Abbotsford, B.C.

Dates of Hearing:                                                                                   September 21-22, 2015

Date of Judgment:                                                                                       September 28, 2015


Background

 

[1]           The Applicant S. E. and the Respondent D. C. are the biological parents of a son named M.L.C. who was born (d.o.b.) 2006. The Applicant has an older son from a previous relationship named E.S.E-L. who was born (d.o.b.), 1999. The parties lived together in a common law relationship from June 10, 2004 until their separation on November 3, 2013. They lived together in a home in Mission, B.C. that they jointly owned. Since their separation, the Applicant has been living in the home with the children.

[2]           The Applicant suffers from physical disability and is fairly described by her physician as a “complex patient” with multiple medical issues. These have affected her mobility and have left her with residual back problems. She has also been diagnosed with cerebral aneurisms and she has also had multiple surgeries to her left knee, which her doctor describes as “relatively unstable.” Understandably, this has severely limited her options for finding gainful employment, in spite of her education. She has a Bachelor of Arts degree with a double major in history and geography. Many of her options for employment either require field work or prolonged office work, both of which are quite difficult because of her medical conditions.

[3]           In spite of her physical challenges, the Applicant does a remarkable job of parenting her two children, especially when one considers the health challenges faced by the children themselves. The Applicant’s older son E.S.E-L. has an enlarged aorta, dilated carotid arteries, a number of food and environmental allergies, and some difficulty with speech.

[4]           The parties’ son M.L.C., who is the subject of this application, also has a number of food and environmental allergies which require a severely restricted diet. The complexity of the diet adds to the expense in the home. M.L.C. requires multiple medications and he maintains quick access to epinephrine in an epipen in the event that eating the wrong type of food causes a seizure. He also has problems with his joints and with his energy levels. His doctors believe that he may have a condition known as Vascular Ehler’s Danions Syndrome and Mast Cell Disorder. This is a very serious condition and some persons who have this diagnosis are at risk for arterial or organ rupture, which can be fatal. According to a report from the child’s paediatrician, M.L.C. may require specialized assessment and diagnosis of a type that is not available in Canada. This has been a problem because M.L.C. does not have a passport and up to now the Respondent has been unwilling to sign the necessary consent required for his son to get a passport. The Respondent says that he is now willing to do so, provided that certain other conditions satisfactory to him are met.

[5]           The Applicant alleges that the Respondent did not take M.L.C.’s dietary restrictions seriously enough and also alleges that he experimented with the child’s diet, which resulted in at least one major negative reaction for the child. The Respondent disputes this and says that while he may have been skeptical about the state of the child’s allergies in the past, he is now on board with the child’s specialized meal plan. He testified “I accept his medical condition. I don’t understand it, but I know he’s in jeopardy.” The Respondent has made the necessary accommodations within his home to follow M.L.C.’s diet. The Respondent’s oldest son (from a previous relationship) lives in the Respondent’s home during part of the week, and he also testified that he and his father are diligent about making sure that M.L.C.’s diet is followed. In her evidence, the Applicant conceded that the Respondent has gotten better in this regard, though she is still not confident that he will continue to be careful if the current precautions are removed. (An earlier court order directed that the Applicant was to send the child’s food with him and the Respondent was to reimburse the Applicant for the cost of food that the child eats while at his home.)

[6]           When the parties separated, the Applicant and the children remained in the home that the parties jointly owned. The Applicant last worked in 2009. Because of her medical condition, she receives a disability pension which was for the sum of $9,746 in 2014, and which will likely be close to the same amount this year. When the parties separated in November of 2013, the Respondent began paying the Applicant $200 per month, which was intended as child support. He also paid a portion of the mortgage on the jointly owned home as well as part of the insurance payments.

[7]           The children are home-schooled by the Applicant and the Respondent is satisfied that this is appropriate and he is complimentary about the job that the Applicant does. The older son splits his education between home-schooling and a long distance education program at a local high school, while the youngest son is fully home-schooled. Despite the children’s health issues, the Applicant is diligent about finding extra-curricular activities for the children as she is best able given her limited budget. These activities include swimming and a modified karate program.

[8]           M.L.C.’s medical condition makes for a lot of appointments with doctors, counsellors and other medical professionals. The Applicant is not opposed to M.L.C. spending more time with the Respondent, but she is concerned that an overly generous parenting time schedule will interfere with medical appointments as well as her ability to schedule them. She believes that the Respondent will not always be reasonable in accommodating these appointments. As an example, she cites an incident which occurred when she took M.L.C. to a specialist in Alberta. Her sister lives there and she wanted to use the trip as an opportunity for M.L.C. to spend time with his extended family. The Respondent was against this and tried to have police force the child’s return for his scheduled visit. When he found that the police would not assist him without a court order, he relented, but now uses this example as justification for the need for a police enforcement clause.

[9]           The Respondent has a health plan at his employment and he has extended his coverage on the plan to include M.L.C. He was unsure what additional cost this was for him, but was unconcerned about this and remains willing to keep M.L.C. on the plan. This is a huge benefit for the family because the plan covers a large portion of the child’s prescription and other medical and dental costs, though it does not completely cover these. The Applicant estimates that she spends over $200 per month regularly for medical costs.

[10]        The Respondent was very candid in acknowledging that in the past he had difficulty with his temper, but to his credit he attended counselling to address the problem, and he presented as very respectful and reasonable. However there are still some remaining areas of contention between the parties. The Respondent believes that the Applicant should co-operate in selling the jointly-owned home and divide their communal assets. He is concerned that while she delays in this, the condition of the house is deteriorating and its value is dropping. He also believes that the Applicant behaves too authoritarian in administering her responsibilities for the children and that she is unwilling to discuss and collaborate with him on issues pertaining to the children’s health.

[11]        From the Applicant’s perspective, she sees the Respondent as being difficult to discuss things with and is concerned that if she was forced to negotiate with him on any medical issues, this might cause delays that could jeopardize M.L.C.’s health. She cites, as examples of the Respondent’s unreasonableness, his refusal to sign the consent for M.L.C.’s passport and his calling the police when M.L.C. was with her in Alberta. She does not want him in the home because she fears that he will become argumentative and pushy in the presence of the children. The Respondent says that this wouldn’t happen, but that he is willing to respect the Applicant’s wishes about going to the home, even though he would like to attend there to perform some maintenance.

[12]        The Respondent is employed as a warehouseman. According to his notice of assessment, he earned $36,706 from that employment in 2014 and is trying to obtain a better paying position within the company. He has a child from an earlier relationship, an adult son who resides at his home for part of the week.

[13]        Everyone agrees that M.L.C. is a very intelligent, curious and inquisitive child with a keen analytical mind, but with limitations on his energy level. The child benefits from an extended family on both sides, and it appears that both sides of the family are aware of the child’s physical limitation and dietary needs and are careful in this regard. The only concern about extended family appears to the Respondent’s mother, who still harbours resentment towards the Applicant. In her testimony, she described the Applicant as a “freeloader” and as someone who was prone to “b.s.” She acknowledged confronting the Applicant at an earlier court appearance and telling her “The freeloading is over. You should start packing your bags.” When one considers the incredible responsibility that the Applicant carries in caring for two children with very serious medical problems, while coping with her own medical problems and living on a very limited income, this kind of disparagement is not only disrespectful, but highly offensive. It is also not in M.L.C.’s best interest for him to have either parent denigrated in this fashion.

[14]        Little has been mentioned about the Applicant’s older child E.S.E-L. thus far. He will soon turn 16 years of age. The Respondent is of the view that E.S.E-L. does not wish to have a relationship with him and therefore he is of a like mind. The Respondent believes that E.S.E-L.’s affections for him have been alienated by the Applicant, while she states that it is E.S.E-L. who does not wish to see the Respondent. The parties are not seeking any orders with respect to E.S.E-L. and therefor nothing is served by further exploring this question.

Previous Court Orders

[15]        On April 1, 2014, the parties appeared before the Honourable Judge Brown at a hearing for an interim order. Judge Brown ordered that the Respondent was to have supervised parenting time with M.L.C. once per week (part of Sunday one week, and part of Wednesday the following week). The order for supervised parenting time was made “on a without prejudice basis”, meaning that subsequent judges dealing with this matter should not draw any negative or adverse inference against the Respondent from the fact that supervised parenting time was once in place. Nothing in the evidence that I have heard suggests any need for supervision and I note that this requirement was removed the following month. Judge Brown also ordered that the Respondent was not to use any physical discipline towards the child and that he was to take every precaution regarding M.L.C.’s food allergies.

[16]        On May 30, 2014 another hearing was held before Judge Brown. At that time Judge Brown found that both parents were M.L.C.’s guardians (as that term is defined in the Family Law Act). He removed the requirement for supervised parenting time and increased the Respondent’s parenting time to every second weekend from Saturday at noon until Sunday at noon and each Wednesday from 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. The Respondent was ordered to continue to take precautions regarding M.L.C.’s food allergies and it was also ordered that the Applicant would purchase the child’s food for any parenting time with the Respondent and for him to reimburse her the cost of such food, unless the Applicant agreed that this wasn’t necessary. It was also ordered that the parties were to communicate by email, and that the Respondent would not use physical discipline on the child. The order also required the Respondent to pay the following sums to the Applicant “on an interim basis”:

a) half of the bi-weekly mortgage payment ($257)

b) half of the house insurance payment ($57.50)

c) half of the mortgage insurance premium ($16)

d) half of the life insurance premium to a maximum of $40 per month and

d) child support of $200 per month.

 

[17]        On December 8, 2014, the parties agreed to a consent order made as part of a Family Case Conference held before the Honourable Judge Point. This order varied Judge Brown’s order and directed the Respondent to pay the Applicant $300 per month for the support of both E.S.E-L. and M.L.C.. It also spoke to some disclosure requirements for this hearing that both of the parties have met.

Analysis

1. Parenting Issues

[18]        The Family Law Act directs that in making orders concerning a child, the only consideration for the court is the best interests of that child. Section 37 of that Act lists the factors to be taken into consideration as follows:

(a) the child's health and emotional well-being;

(b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them;

(c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life;

(d) the history of the child's care;

(e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development;

(f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities;

(g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward the child or another family member;

(h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to care for the child and meet the child's needs;

(i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members;

(j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being.

 

[19]        In the case of M.L.C., the most glaring concern is his health. Everyone wants him to grow up safe, healthy and happy. Everyone should be willing to set aside their own wants and desires in favour of his needs, and in their hearts, I believe that everyone is willing to do so. Both of the parties are good people who care for their child and while there is residual tension between them resulting from their separation (whose fires are stoked by family in some cases), I believe that the parties place their child’s well-being ahead of their own comfort and have made sacrifices for the child. Any order which is made should err on side of keeping M.L.C. safe.

[20]        The evidence presented leads me to the conclusion that there needs to be one parent to make timely decisions about M.L.C.’s health. These decisions shouldn’t be a matter of debate, and if, for example, the child needs to travel to the United States for medical reasons, there should be no negotiation or bargaining as a prerequisite to granting his passport. If all past hurts were forgotten, perhaps decision-making could be shared, but as long as there are unresolved property issues, then feelings, fears and family can impede rational, dispassionate decision making. This isn’t a good thing for M.L.C.

[21]        The Applicant is the parent who is best suited to make decisions about M.L.C.’s health and welfare. Practically everyone including the Respondent agrees that she has been diligent and conscientious about her son’s health and education. She has been the one who has taken the child to his medical appointments, in part because her living situation affords her the most flexibility, but also because she is a very good parent. The Respondent is also capable of filling this role, but under the circumstances, the Applicant is the best option for the “decider” role. The Respondent should be entitled to receipt of medical information and to have his point of view heard. But when the time comes to make a decision, those decisions must be made in a timely fashion, unimpeded by any sort of horse trading. These sorts of decisions are not meant to please or accommodate either of the parties; they are to be made solely in the child’s best interests. They must be made on that consideration alone, and not as part of any discussions about “if you give me this, then I’ll agree with you.”

[22]        Another issue of contention here is parenting time. The Respondent would like to spend more time with M.L.C. and the Applicant does not oppose this. The Respondent is at work from Monday to Friday, and weekends are his best opportunity for quality time with the child. The Applicant would also like some weekend time. Her position is somewhat unique however because M.L.C. is home-schooled, so that she is with the child every day through the week. As both his parent and his educator, she enjoys the flexibility to convert a weekday to a holiday. However she would still like to have entire weekends with the child, in part so that she can take the child to visit family and others who are unavailable during the week. Some sort of compromise is in order here and the order which will be made in this action will seek to find some middle ground.

[23]        Previous court orders have sought to be somewhat micromanaging in nature. Likely this was required at the time, when resentments were fresh and concerns about M.L.C.’s health caused orders that erred strongly on the side of caution. Other terms in previous orders were essentially court orders demanding that the parties act like decent human beings to one another and to their child. While I don’t fault the makers of the previous orders, I think that the time has now come to lighten up with these sorts of moralizing conditions. The parties are mature enough to know that, for example, when they disparage one another in front of M.L.C., or allow their extended family members to do so, they are not scoring points over the other parent, they are hurting M.L.C.. He deserves the freedom to love both of his parents without being made to feel as if loving one parent is somehow being disloyal to the other. I believe both parents are aware of this. They either love their child enough to refrain from hurting him in this manner or they don’t. Words to this effect in a court order don’t change that, and probably only serve to escalate tensions and promote feelings of mistrust and of being mistrusted.

[24]        The Respondent would like a “police enforcement” term in the order that is being made here. Making such an order would be a mistake in this case. Firstly, the Family Law Act, in section 231, requires that before making such an order I must be satisfied that “no other order under this Act will be sufficient to secure the person's compliance”. I am not satisfied that this is so. The only time that the Respondent was denied parenting time was when the child was in another province seeing a medical specialist, and the Applicant offered to make up the lost time. Under those circumstances, reasonable persons would see that as an understandable compromise and one in the child’s best interest. I also fail to see how it could be in M.L.C.’s best interest to have him snatched from one parent by a police officer if similar circumstances arose. The Respondent’s reluctance towards reasonable compromise last time raises concerns about how he might exercise such discretion if given. I also do not see this as a wise use of police resources in the community.

[25]        However I do agree with the Respondent that the restrictions placed upon him in previous court orders regarding his management of his son’s diet are no longer called for. The evidence is consistent that the Respondent has been diligent about following his son’s diet. He has been careful to set aside a separate cupboard for M.L.C.’s food, and keeps detailed records of what ingredients are and aren’t acceptable for his son’s diet. Connor Chenery testified about the strict procedures followed in the home to avoid food contamination in the kitchen at the Respondent’s home. Nothing in the evidence suggests that the Respondent is the kind of person who would purposely or recklessly make his son ill just to get back at the Applicant. The previous orders have achieved their purpose of making the Respondent understand and appreciate the importance of following his son’s diet, but continuing these provisions now only serves to fuel feelings of mistrust, control and animosity. It is time for these training wheels to come off.

[26]        There are certain things that the parties will be expected to do from here on in, but it is not necessary for these to be included in a court order. For example, the parties have been ordered to communicate in writing and this is a wise course of action. It maintains a record of who said what and what precisely was said. It is very helpful in the event the parties return to court at some point in future (something I am hoping to avoid). It will also encourage respectful communication because the parties know that if they are rude, unreasonable or petty, it may come back to haunt them in the event of any future court proceedings. The Applicant has agreed to continue to communicate with the Respondent about the child’s diet, about his whereabouts when he is out of the country and about his medical appointments. The Respondent has agreed to respect the Applicant’s wishes by not entering her home when he is picking up or returning the child. The parties will be taken at their word on this. I hope they will make the most of this opportunity to show their sincerity, maturity and reasonableness.

2. Support

[27]        In making orders for child and spousal support order I intend to treat this child and these parties no differently than any others in Canada. The Federal Child Support Guidelines and family law generally places responsibility on parents who have brought a child into the world to care for that child. In the Respondent’s case, because the Applicant is the parent who cares for the child the vast majority of the time, he is expected to pay the Applicant child support in accordance with the Guidelines. This is a level of support that M.L.C. is entitled to, and however difficult it may be, the Respondent is expected to contribute this level of support for the child and to arrange his personal circumstances to meet this responsibility. The Respondent states that he understands this and agrees to do so. Based on the best evidence of his income (his 2014 Notice of Assessment), he earns an annual income of $36.706 and this attracts a monthly child support payment of $334.

[28]        M.L.C.’s health needs place additional financial burden on these parents. This burden should be shared. The child’s prescriptions are usually not fully covered by health plans and his special dietary needs add to the grocery costs of his household. The parties have reached agreement about how best to address this. They have agreed that the Respondent will pay the Applicant an additional sum of $200 per month for expenses under section 7 of the Guidelines.

[29]        There are two remaining unresolved financial issues before me concerning these parties. Firstly, the order of Judge Brown dated May 30, 2014, required the Respondent to pay one half of the mortgage, house insurance and mortgage insurance, as well as half of the life insurance premium. The Respondent stopped making these payments as of January 1, 2015, notwithstanding the court order requiring him to do so. The Applicant wants this order to continue and wants the arrears fixed. The Respondent wants this at an end.

[30]        I note that Judge Brown did not make any order for spousal support. I have listened to a recording of Judge Brown’s reasons for decision, in which he stated that he was making his order as an interim order and that he was making the order “because the [Applicant] is experiencing some financial stress”. Judge Brown added that he was unsure whether an order for spousal support was feasible, given the level of the Respondent’s income. Although he did not expressly state so, I suspect that he was exercising his jurisdiction under section 226 of the Family Law Act which permits him to make such an order concerning the mortgage and related payments. (The order concerning life insurance was made under section 170 of the Family Law Act).

[31]        The second unresolved issue is whether there should be any order for spousal support. Counsel for the Applicant has submitted Divorce Mate calculations of the range of child support payable, factoring in the parties’ income and assuming that the Respondent will pay $334 per month for child support and an additional $200 for special expenses. Under such circumstances, the range of monthly spousal support recommended under the guidelines ranges anywhere from $0 in the low and mid-range, to $101 at the high range.

[32]        I do not propose to erase Judge Brown’s order regarding payment of expenses. Firstly, I cannot sit on appeal of that order, and secondly, I don’t wish to reward the Respondent for his failure to follow a court order. Counsel for the Applicant asks that the arrears be fixed and that the Respondent be ordered to pay them, adding that they may ultimately be satisfied when the house is sold. This is a reasonable resolution of this issue. I do not have sufficient evidence to calculate the amount of those arrears (because some of the payments are expressed as bi-weekly while others are simply to be paid “when due”). Counsel for the Applicant may file an affidavit calculating the amount of arrears and if satisfactory, that amount can be included in the final order that is taken out.

[33]        Whether or not to continue the order is a difficult question. On the one hand it is obviously advantageous for M.L.C. to continue to live in the home he is familiar with. On the other hand, continuing the order places a tremendous financial burden on the parties’ modest means. It is a disincentive to getting the Applicant to consent to sell the home and divide the parties’ major communal asset. In my view the fairest way to resolve this issue is to continue the obligation for a reasonable period of time, with a fixed end date. This will address both concerns. So long as this remains an obligation on the part of the Respondent, no spousal support will be payable by him.

[34]        Counsel for the Applicant has requested that I made an order dispensing with the need for the Respondent’s signature approving the form of the order in this matter. I am of the view that under Rule 18(4) of the Provincial Court (Family) Rules, this is no longer required, and the rule only requires that lawyers sign off on the form of orders. In this Registry (and likely in most if not all others), Registry staff review the formal orders to ensure that they match what the judge has ordered.

Order

[35]        For the foregoing reasons the following order is now made:

UPON THE COURT being advised that the name and birth date of the Child who is the subject of this order is M.L.C. born (d.o.b.) 2006;

AND UPON being satisfied that the guardians of the Child are S.E. (the Applicant) and D. C. (the Respondent) pursuant to section 39 of the Family Law Act;

1. The Applicant shall have the following parental responsibilities for the Child as set out under section 41 of the Family Law Act, namely:

a) Making day-to-day decisions affecting the child and having day-to-day care, control and supervision of the child as provided in subsection (a);

b) Making decisions respecting where the child will reside as provided in subsection (b);

c) Making decisions respecting the child's education and participation in extracurricular activities, including the nature, extent and location, as provided in subsection (d);

d) Giving, refusing or withdrawing consent to medical, dental and other health-related treatments for the child as provided in subsection (f);

e) Applying for a passport, licence, permit, benefit, privilege or other thing for the child as provided in subsection (g)

 

2. The parties shall share all remaining parental responsibilities under section 41 of the Family Law Act. Both of the parties may request and receive from third parties any health, education or other information concerning the child.

3. The Respondent shall have parenting time with the Child as follows:

a) Every second weekend (commencing on the weekend of October 9, 2015) from Friday at 7:00 p.m. until the following Sunday at 4:00 p.m., or the following Monday at 4:00 p.m. if that Monday is a Statutory Holiday other than Christmas or Boxing Day;

b) One other Sunday each month, selected by the Applicant, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.;

c) One other evening on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday selected by the Respondent from 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.;

d) Such other times that the parties agree to and confirm by email in advance.

 

4. The Respondent shall have additional parenting time with the Child at the following times, provided that when these times fall, the weekend access set out in paragraph 3(a) of this order shall be suspended or adjusted accordingly:

a) In odd numbered years from 10:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. on December 24 (with the Child being in the Applicant’s care from December 24 at 8:00 p.m. until at least all of December 26th);

b) In even numbered years from 10:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. on December 25 (with the Child being in the Applicant’s care from December 25 at 8:00 p.m. until at least all of December 26th);

c) On Easter Sunday in odd numbered years (from Good Friday at 10:00 a.m. if Easter Sunday falls on a weekend during which the Respondent would normally have the care of the child, and from 10:00 a.m. on Easter Sunday otherwise) until 8:00 p.m. (In even-numbered years, the Child shall be in the Applicant’s care for all of Easter Sunday, and if it falls on a weekend which would otherwise be part of the Respondent’s parenting time, that parenting time shall end on the previous Saturday at 8:00 p.m.)

d) During the months of July and August, the Child shall be in the Respondent’s care for three non-consecutive weeks (with at least one week in between each of these weeks) commending and ending on a Friday at 7:00 p.m. The Respondent shall select and inform the Applicant by email of which weeks he will exercise this parenting time no later than the previous May 1st. If he fails to do so, the Applicant may select these weeks. The parenting time schedule set out in paragraph 3 (a) (b) and (c) of this order shall be suspended for July and for August until the end of the final of the aforesaid three weeks, and the alternating weekend parenting time set out in paragraph 3(a) shall resume on the next weekend following the weekend that the Child is returned to the Applicant.

e) The Child shall be in the Respondent’s care on the Respondent’s birthday from at least noon to 6:00 p.m. if on a weekend, and from 6:00 p.m. to 8:30 in on a weeknight.

f) If Father’s day falls on a day when the Respondent would not otherwise have parenting time with the Child, he shall have additional parenting time from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. on that day. If Mother’s Day falls on a day when the Respondent would otherwise have parenting time with the Child, he shall return the Child to the Applicant at 10:00 a.m. on that Sunday.

g) The parties may adjust any of these times by prior agreement, confirmed by email.

 

5. Notwithstanding anything in this order, if the Child has a medical appointment that falls during the Respondent’s parenting time, the Applicant may take the Child to such appointment.

6. Each of the parties may be present at any of the Child’s extracurricular activities whether or not such activity falls during that party’s allotted parenting time.

7. The Respondent having been found to have an annual income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, he is ordered to pay to the Applicant, for the support of the Child, the sum of $334 per month payable on the 1st day of each and every month commencing on October 1, 2105 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter until further order of this court. In addition, the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant the further sum of $200 for special or extraordinary expenses under section 7 of the Guidelines, payable on the 1st day of each and every month commencing on October 1, 2105 and continuing on the 1st day of each month thereafter until further order of this court.

8. This order replaces and suspends the terms of all previous court orders made in this matter, provided that any arrears of child maintenance, or any arrears of any other amounts ordered to be paid by the Respondent which are unpaid remain outstanding and nothing in this order shall operate as a cancellation of any arrears. Upon the filing of a satisfactory affidavit setting out the arrears owing by the Respondent under the Order of this Court made on May 30, 2014, those arrears shall be fixed and set out in the entered copy of this order.

9. Pursuant to section 226 of the Family Law Act, the Respondent shall continue to pay to the Applicant those amounts set out in the Order of this Court made on May 30, 2014 for:

a) half of the bi-weekly mortgage payment ($257)

b) half of the house insurance payment ($57.50)

c) half of the mortgage insurance premium ($16)

and pursuant to section 170 of the Family Law Act

d) half of the life insurance premium to a maximum of $40 per month

 

until the parties’ jointly-owned home in Mission, B.C. has been sold, or until June 30, 2016, whichever first occurs.

10. The Respondent shall continue to keep the Child as a beneficiary under his employment health benefits plan.

11. The application for spousal support is dismissed, provided that the Applicant may reapply when the parties’ jointly-owned home in Mission, B.C. has been sold. The application for a police enforcement clause under section 231 of the Family Law Act is dismissed.

 

Dated at the City of Abbotsford, in the Province of British Columbia this 28th day of September, 2015.

 

__________________________________________

(The Honourable Judge K. D. Skilnick)