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May v. Advanced Coast First Aid, 2015 BCPC 113 (CanLII)

Date:
2015-04-28
File number:
C72735
Citation:
May v. Advanced Coast First Aid, 2015 BCPC 113 (CanLII), <https://canlii.ca/t/ghjwg>, retrieved on 2024-03-29

Citation:      May v. Advanced Coast First Aid                           Date:           20150428

2015 BCPC 0113                                                                          File No:                  C72735

                                                                                                        Registry:                 Nanaimo

 

 

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BETWEEN:

LINDA MAY and GERRY MAY

CLAIMANTS

 

 

AND:

ADVANCED COAST FIRST AID SERVICES INC

DEFENDANT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OF THE

HONOURABLE JUDGE GOUGE

 

 

 

 

Appearing in person:                                                                                             Mr. & Ms. May

Appearing for the Defendant:                                                                              Mr. Widdifield

Place of Hearing:                                                                                                   Nanaimo, B.C.

Date of Hearing:                                                                                                      April 20, 2015

Date of Judgment:                                                                                                  April 28, 2015


[1]           On April 7, 2014, Corey May enrolled in an industrial first aid course offered by the Defendant.  His parents, Linda and Gerry May, paid his tuition, in the amount of $704.  On April 17, 2014, Mr. Corey May was expelled from the course.  Mr. & Ms. May sue to recover the tuition which they paid. To avoid confusion, I will refer to Linda & Gerry May as “the Claimants”, and Corey May as “Mr. May”.

[2]           The Claimants complain that the Defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations for Mr. May’s disability, resulting in Mr. May’s failure to complete the course and the waste of the tuition paid by the Claimants.  The Defendant replies that Mr. May omitted to inform the Defendant of his disability, rendering it, as a practical matter, impossible for the Defendant to make suitable accommodations for him.  The Defendant says that, if Mr. May had done so, the Defendant could and would have made accommodations to assist Mr. May to successfully complete the course.

[3]           It is important to note that the Claimants’ complaint may properly be described as one of “adverse effects discrimination”. That is, the Claimants say that:

a.            by failing to make reasonable accommodations for Mr. May, the Defendant discriminated against him in a manner forbidden by section 8 of the Human Rights Code RSBC 1996, c 210; and

b.            the effect of such discrimination was to make it impossible, or materially more difficult, for Mr. May to successfully complete the Defendant’s course.

The governing principles were stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore vs British Columbia 2012 SCC 61 (CanLII), [2012] 3 SCR 360.

[4]           Although no medical evidence was tendered at trial, Mr. May says, and I accept, that he suffers from a psychological condition which incorporates Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and working memory deficiencies.  I also observed during his evidence that he is exceptionally diffident and shy, attributes which appear to be associated with his psychological condition.  Those aspects of his mental condition affect his ability to learn, and may explain why he failed to complete post-secondary courses in engineering and nursing before he enrolled in the Defendant’s course.

[5]           Mr. May completed and signed two forms during the enrolment process for the Defendant’s course.  The Defendant complains that he made no reference to his learning disability in either form.

[6]           One of the enrolment forms contained the following paragraph (underlining added):

I have told the instructor of any physical limitations or phobias I have ie: neck, back or knee problems, claustrophobia, etc. that could hinder my ability to participate in some of the classroom activities ie: having a hard collar put on, being strapped to the spine board etc. The following is a list of the problems I have:

(Please print)

_____________________________________

In the space provided, Mr. May printed the words “Corey May has no concerns”. 

[7]           The second enrolment form was a questionnaire. One of the questions was (underlining added):

Have you experienced any psychological or emotional episodes which could preclude you from performing the duties of an occupational first aid attendant?

Mr. May answered “no” to that question.

[8]           Surprisingly, neither enrolment form asked for any information about learning disabilities or special needs in an educational context.

[9]           The Defendant asserts that the two enrolment forms placed on Mr. May the obligation to disclose his learning challenges, and that his omission to do so released the Defendant from the obligation to make reasonable accommodations for his disability. I reject that assertion for two reasons:

a.            the enrolment forms did not seek information about learning disabilities; 

b.            the law imposes an obligation on educational institutions to actively seek such information - the onus is on the educator, not the student.

[10]        The first enrolment form twice uses the letters “ie”. Although the customary periods have been omitted after each letter, the draughtsman can only have intended the common abbreviation “i.e.”, which is short for “id est”, a Latin phrase which means “that is”. Unlike “e.g.”, “i.e.” has a restrictive meaning. It means “the following items and no others”. So, construed according to ordinary English usage, the first of the two forms asked only about the specific matters following each of the two “ie’s”. None of them are in a way related to a learning disability.   

[11]        The second enrolment form asked about psychological conditions which might “preclude” the student from performing first aid duties. There is no evidence from which I could infer that Mr. May’s condition is so serious that it might preclude him from doing so. 

[12]        I conclude that the Defendant’s complaint about Mr. May’s omission to disclose his disability in the Defendant’s enrolment forms is unfounded.

[13]        Mr. May says that he attempted to discuss his disability with the Defendant’s instructor, Mr. Widdifield, on the second and third days of the course, but that Mr. Widdifield refused to listen to him. Mr. Widdifield denies that the exchange took place. Mr. Widdifield asserts that Mr. May never raised the subject with him, and that the two men never discussed it. I need not decide which version of events is true, because a person who complains of “adverse effects discrimination” is not obliged to prove that the person alleged to have discriminated knew of the other’s disability.

[14]        Mr. May’s evidence is sufficient to establish that he suffers from a medical condition which adversely affected his ability to participate in and successfully complete the course.

[15]        The applicable legal principles were recently stated by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Telecommunications Workers Union vs Telus Communications Inc [2014] AJ No. 4672014 ABCA 154; [2014] 6 WWR 217 @ paragraphs 28 – 29:

One type of discrimination is adverse-effect discrimination. For that type, the three-part test for demonstrating a prima facie case is articulated in Moore v Ministry of Health ….

1. The claimant has a characteristic that is protected from discrimination under the Code;

2. The claimant has experienced an adverse impact; and

3. The claimant must show that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact.

                                                               *   *   *

Demonstrating an employer's knowledge of an employee's disability is unnecessary, in a case alleging adverse-effect discrimination. By definition, adverse-effect discrimination is the uniform application of a seemingly neutral employment policy to all employees, regardless of whether some employees have protected characteristics. The impugned policy applies to a disabled employee whether or not the employer knows about the disability. The basic three-part test is sufficient to accommodate cases where an employer's knowledge is relevant to a prima facie case, and thus "knowledge" should not be added as a fourth element of the prima facie case test.

[16]        The Defendant’s submission that Mr. May carried the onus of disclosing his disability is irreconcilable with the passage quoted from TWU vs Telus, and I reject it for that reason. As a matter of law, the onus lay on the Defendant to make appropriate enquiries. Mr. Widdifield concedes that he made none.

[17]        I hasten to point out that the onus imposed by law on educators, to make enquiries about learning disabilities, is not very difficult to discharge. It would have been very simple for the Defendant to have included in one of its enrolment forms the question:

Do you suffer from any learning disability, or any other condition, which requires special attention during your instructional program?

If so, please provide details in the space below.

 

[18]        It follows that the Defendant had a legal duty to make reasonable accommodations for Mr. May and failed to do so.

[19]        In most cases, the appropriate forum for a claim of adverse effects discrimination is the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, which has jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought by the Claimants in this action. Complaints of this kind are better adjudicated by the Tribunal for two reasons:

a.            the Tribunal has particular expertise in the investigation and adjudication of human rights complaints;

b.            the Tribunal has a broader and more flexible array of remedies available to it than does this court.

With that acknowledged, it is appropriate to consider whether this court has jurisdiction over the claim in this case.

[20]        Each of the parties expressed to me some concern over the time and expense associated with these proceedings, and urged me to conduct the case as expeditiously as possible. If there is a way to decide the issues without subjecting the parties to another hearing before another tribunal, it would be desirable to do so.

[21]        I observe that the Human Rights Code contains no exclusive jurisdiction clause. There is nothing in the Human Rights Code analogous to section 137 of the Labour Relations Code RSBC 1996, c 244. For that reason, I conclude that, if this court would otherwise have jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute and to award the remedy sought, the power of the Human Rights Tribunal to do the same things does not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of this court.

[22]        This court has jurisdiction to decide claims for damages for breach of contract, provided that the amount awarded must not exceed $25,000.

[23]        The contract in this case contained no express term requiring the Defendant to comply with the Human Rights Code. The question is whether such a term may be implied. The legal principle to be applied in answering that question was articulated in Reigate vs Union Manufacturing Co [1918] 1 KB 592, and was recently quoted with approval by Chief Justice Bauman in Boxer Capital Corp vs JEL Investments Ltd [2015] BCJ No. 75; 2015 BCCA 24; 379 DLR (4th) 712 @ paragraph 36. It is:

… an implied term is not to be added because the Court thinks it would have been reasonable to have inserted it in the contract. A term can only be implied if it is necessary in the business sense to give efficacy to the contract; that is, if it is such a term that it can confidently be said that if at the time the contract was being negotiated someone had said to the parties, "What will happen in such a case," they would both have replied, "Of course, so and so will happen; we did not trouble to say that; it is too clear." Unless the Court comes to some such conclusion as that, it ought not to imply a term which the parties themselves have not expressed.

In this case, I am in no doubt that, if the parties had been asked at the time of enrolment whether the Claimants would be entitled to expect and require the Defendant to carry out its obligations to Mr. May under the Human Rights Code, both parties would have replied “of course”. For that reason, there was an implied term of the contract that the Defendant would do so, and this court has jurisdiction, both to determine whether the Defendant performed that obligation and to award a remedy if it did not.

[24]        The Defendant had a contractual obligation to make reasonable accommodations for Mr. May. Mr. Widdifield acknowledged that he made none, because he was not aware of Mr. May’s disability. On the authority of TWU vs Telus, that is not a sufficient excuse. It follows that the Defendant breached its contract.

[25]        The normal measure of damages for a breach of contract is a sum of money sufficient to put the claimant in the financial position she would have occupied if the contract had been performed according to its terms. However, where it is difficult or impossible to prove the facts relevant to the normal measure of damages, the innocent party may advance an alternative claim for wasted expenditures. To expand briefly, it would be difficult or impossible for the Claimants to prove that, if reasonable accommodations had been made, Mr. May would have completed the course successfully and thereby enhanced his income-earning capacity. He had previously failed to complete other vocational courses, and it is apparent that he suffers from significant educational challenges. The most that can be said is that he might or might not have been successful. The reason that we cannot know is that the Defendant, in breach of its contract, failed to make the accommodations which might have allowed him to succeed. In that circumstance, the law allows the innocent party to claim expenses thrown away (in this case, Mr. May’s tuition) in lieu of damages. A defendant can successfully resist such a claim by showing that, even if the contract had been performed according to its terms, the claimant would not have received a financial benefit. However, the defendant carries the onus on that issue: Sunshine Vacation Villas Ltd. vs Governor & Company of Gentlemen Adventurers Trading Into Hudson’s Bay [1984] BCJ No. 1794; 1984 CanLII 336 (BC CA), 58 BCLR 33; 13 DLR (4th) 93. That is thought to be fair because it is the defendant’s breach of contract which gives rise to the difficulty of proof.

[26]        In this case, there is no evidence on which I could conclude that reasonable accommodations would have been futile. For that reason, the Defendant’s onus is undischarged, and the Claimants are entitled to succeed.

[27]        The Claimants are entitled to judgment for $704, plus court order interest at the Registrar’s rate from April 30, 2014 to the date of this judgment. Rule 20 of the Small Claims Rules provides that the successful party is entitled to: (i) filing fees; (ii) reasonable fees for effecting service of documents; and (iii) “any other reasonable charges or expenses that the judge … considers directly related to the conduct of the proceeding”. If the Claimants seek recovery of any such expenses, and the parties are unable to agree, the Claimants may schedule a further hearing before me.

April 28, 2015

 

 

                                                                                    _______________________________

                                                                                    T. Gouge, PCJ